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Current writing on “evidence tampering”—inclusive of the 
destruction, fabrication, and suppression of evidence—creates the 
impression that our system of litigation is in a state of fundamental 
disrepair. This Article suggests that this perception may merely reflect 
defects in the conventional view of trial’s purpose. The conventional 
view sees trial as a stand-alone device for uncovering microhistorical 
truths about what has already come to pass. In contrast, this Article 
advocates viewing trial as but one component of the overall 
mechanism by which the legal system influences everyday behavior. 
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When trial is viewed less in terms of discerning past events, and more 
in terms of shaping future events, several apparently troublesome 
aspects of the existing system’s treatment of evidence tampering gain 
substantial justification, and the way is paved for a more fruitful 
evaluation of current doctrine. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ..........................................................................................1217 
I. The Law’s Neronian Attitude: Data ..........................................1229 
A. Is Legal Process Burning?...................................................1230 
1. Impressionistic Evidence...........................................1230 
2. Systematic Empirical Analysis..................................1231 
3. Summary......................................................................1239 
B. Is the Law Fiddling? ............................................................1239 
C. Forced Assessment ..............................................................1246 
II.  The Law’s Myopic Focus: Doctrine .............................................1247 
A. Criminal Statutes..................................................................1248 
1. Obstruction of Justice ................................................1249 
2. Contempt.....................................................................1258 
3. Perjury .........................................................................1259 
B. Procedural and Evidentiary Sanctions ..............................1261 
1. Sanctions under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.....................................................................1262 
2. The Court’s Inherent Powers....................................1269 
3. New Trial and “Fraud upon the Court” ..................1279 
C. Independent Civil Actions: The Gentle Arc of the 
Spoliation Tort..............................................................................1280 
D. Professional Responsibility.................................................1283 
E. Summary ...............................................................................1285 
III.  Is the Law Too Lax?.....................................................................1286 
A. The Purpose of Policing Evidence Tampering .................1289 
1. Thought Experiment..................................................1289 
2. A Taxonomy of Potential Evidence Tamperers .....1289 
3. Truth-Finding Benefits of Anti-Tampering 
Enforcement .........................................................................1291 
4. Primary Activity Benefits of Anti-Tampering 
Enforcement .........................................................................1291 
5. Summary......................................................................1294 
B. The Optimal Enforcement Level .......................................1295 
1. Self-Dampening Primary Activity Benefits.............1295 
080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC 9/17/2004  2:04 PM 
2004] EVIDENCE TAMPERING 1217 
2. Self-Enhancing Truth Benefits .................................1296 
3. The Optimal Level of Anti-Tampering 
Enforcement .........................................................................1298 
C. The Optimal Method of Enforcement...............................1299 
1. Truth-Finding..............................................................1299 
2. The Primary Activity Incentives Approach ............1300 
3. Existing Law and Practice .........................................1301 
D. Summary ...............................................................................1303 
IV.  Is the Law Myopic? ......................................................................1303 
A. The Ex Ante Inscrutability of Fact-Finding......................1305 
1. Thought Experiment: Broadening the Range of 
Potentially Unfavorable Evidence .....................................1306 
2. Effect on Primary Activity Incentives......................1307 
3. Effect on Truth-Finding.............................................1309 
B. The Questionable Private-Costs Reason to Push the 
Tamperer Upstream.....................................................................1311 
C. The Private Benefits Reason to Focus Direct 
Regulation Downstream .............................................................1314 
Conclusion.............................................................................................1315 
Appendix...............................................................................................1318 
A. Supplemental Discussion ....................................................1318 
1. The Trajectory of Social Costs..................................1318 
2. The Role of Inframarginal NonTamperers .............1321 
3. Self-Dampening Primary Activity Benefits and 
the Possibility that “Good” Primary Activity 
Actors will be Inframarginal Tamperers. ..........................1322 
4. Focus on Marginal Changes ......................................1323 
5. Tamperer’s Opponent’s Primary Activity 
Incentives ..............................................................................1323 
6. Alternatively Manipulating the Stakes Attached 
to Evidence Production.......................................................1323 
B. Mathematical Analysis ........................................................1324 
1. Basic Model.................................................................1325 
2. The Truth-Seeking Approach...................................1326 
3. The Primary Activity Approach...............................1334 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Headlines periodically remind us that the production of evidence 
is a game whose rules can be broken. In the 1980s, Oliver North 
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destroyed key documents during the Justice Department’s Iran-
Contra investigation.1 In the 1990s, President Clinton lied under oath 
about his involvement with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.2 
In the early 2000s, Arthur Andersen shredded trunkloads of audit-
related documents during an SEC inquiry into Enron’s special 
purpose entities.3 
In fact, according to many judges and practitioners, evidence 
tampering4 is hardly confined to blockbuster events.5 Documents that 
should be produced in response to a discovery request are regularly 
shredded, altered, or suppressed. Witnesses frequently lie to 
investigators, deposers, and courts. Fact finders are routinely misled 
by the fabrication or destruction of evidence. 
Academic analysis of evidentiary foul play, however, is far from 
common. On the evidence scholar’s bookshelf, a few lonely volumes 
 
 1. See Quotations of the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, at A2 (“‘When the time came for 
Oliver North to tell the truth, he lied. When the time came for Oliver North to come clean he 
shredded, he erased, he altered. When the time came for Oliver North to let the light shine in, 
he covered up.’—John W. Keker, prosecutor.”). 
 2. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121–1125 (E.D. Ark. 1999); RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 
55-1, at 772–73 n.4 (2002). 
 3. Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Misread Depths of the Government’s Anger, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2002, at A1; see also Indictment at 5–8, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. 
CRH-02-121 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 7, 2002). 
Since this Article was written, domestic icon Martha Stewart and her broker, Peter Bacanovic, 
were convicted of obstruction of justice, perjury, and related offenses in connection with 
Stewart’s fortuitous sale of Imclone stock. Constance Hays & Leslie Eaton, Stewart Found 
Guilty of Lying in Sale of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A1; see also Superseding 
Indictment, United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717 (MGC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2004). 
 4. This Article uses the term “evidence tampering” to refer to the full range of activities 
by which parties alter the natural evidentiary “emissions” of the transactions and occurrences 
that may give rise to suit. Some of these activities add to the set of natural emissions. These 
include fabricating documents or things, or lying to investigators, deposers, or the court. Other 
activities reduce the set of natural emissions. These include destroying or preventing the 
creation of documents and things, or bribing witnesses not to testify. As discussed in detail in 
Part II, not all of these activities are subject to sanction under current law. Indeed, there is a fine 
line—if any line at all, in principle—between some of these activities and the legitimate 
“production” evidence. See, e.g., Chris W. Sanchirico, Relying on the Information of Interested—
—and Potentially Dishonest——Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 320, 320–41 (2001) 
(emphasizing the importance of the probabilistic dependence of evidence presentation costs—
and by extension, evidence destruction costs—to regulating out-of-court behavior). 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Article, I take as given that there is much to be said about 
the regulation of evidence tampering without first resolving this definitional boundary problem. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
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on perjury, obstruction, and spoliation6 hide among numerous tomes 
on hearsay, character, privilege, experts, and the like. An 
uncharitable assessment might characterize the field as more 
concerned with whether the declarant herself testifies than with 
whether what she says is truthful. To be sure, rules prohibiting 
hearsay are often said to be designed in part to prevent foul play.7 But 
notwithstanding sideways glances of this sort, evidence tampering has 
been something of a Medusa in evidence scholarship. Though 
recognizing its presence, the field has largely been reluctant to stare 
directly at the problem. 
Among the few scholars who have investigated the web of rules 
that police evidence tampering, the most common reaction might be 
characterized as dismay. Some distillation reveals that this response is 
largely inspired by two perceptions regarding the current system. 
First, commentators perceive a dissonance between the apparent 
epidemic of evidence tampering, on the one hand, and the leniency of 
the rules prohibiting such behavior on the other.8 Second, 
commentators view the practical prohibitions that do exist as myopic, 
given the almost exclusive focus of these prohibitions on tampering 
directly connected to specific ongoing or imminent litigation. Such 
rules, it is argued, merely encourage parties to shift their manipulative 
behavior “upstream” toward the underlying transaction or occurrence 
and away from specific litigation, with little or no impact on the 
problem.9 
This Article allies itself with the small existing literature on 
evidence tampering in viewing the topic as worthy of far more 
attention than it receives. It parts company with that literature, 
however, in proposing that the dismay expressed in previous 
scholarship may well be misplaced. It contends that such dismay is 
more the result of a conceptual imbalance regarding the object of 
evidentiary process than an indication that the current system is in a 
state of fundamental disrepair. 
 
 6. The term “spoliation” most commonly refers to the destruction or alteration of 
documents, though its meaning may also encompass a broader range of activities. See Jay E. 
Rivlin, Note, Recognizing an Independent Tort Action Will Spoil a Spoliator’s Splendor, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1004 n.2 (1998). 
 7. See, e.g., GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 180–81 
(1996) (listing exposing deception as a purpose of cross-examination and a basis for the hearsay 
rule). 
 8. See infra notes 52–96 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 119, 360, and accompanying text. 
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The imbalance concerns the ex ante versus ex post purposes of 
law. Regarding law’s ex ante function, one need not look far for 
explanation or justification. When it comes to analyses of the 
“substantive law,” the idea that legal rules set incentives for everyday 
behavior—incentives to perform as contracted, to disclose accurate 
financial information, to take reasonable precaution, to adopt a safe 
product design, to eschew physical violence—occupies a central 
position.10 In recent decades, the importance of this ex ante approach 
has only increased, as law and economics has become ever more 
assimilated into legal scholarship.11 In the modern teaching of torts, 
contracts, or criminal law, explicit reference to how such legal rules 
influence behavior is de rigueur. 
At the same time, the study of the essential informational link 
between the substantive law and the day-to-day behavior that it 
supposedly regulates—namely, evidentiary process—retains a 
predominantly ex post perspective. Most analyses of evidence law 
take litigation’s prime object to be the discovery of truth about past 
events.12 The role that evidence law plays alongside the substantive 
law in shaping truths that have yet to materialize receives scant 
 
 10. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort 
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 378–79, 422–23 (1994) (citing deterrence as the 
primary rationale for tort law among mainstream legal scholars). 
 11. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 1–3 (3d ed. 2000) 
(providing evidence of the influence of economics on legal scholarship). 
 12. See, e.g., William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 MOD. L. REV. 261, 272 
(1984) (stating that according to the “dominant underlying theory of evidence . . . the primary 
end of adjudication is rectitude of decision”). With specific relation to evidence tampering, see 
JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 1.11, at 14 (1989) (“The most 
obvious and perhaps the strongest justification for restricting the destruction of evidence is that 
destruction reduces the likelihood that the judicial process will reach accurate results.”); John 
H. Beckstrom, Destruction of Documents with Federal Antitrust Significance, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 
687, 689 (1966) (discussing the truth-finding benefits of a statute requiring businesses subject to 
federal antitrust laws to retain certain documents for a period of time to help prevent document 
destruction); Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 832, 881–82 (1991) 
(arguing that law’s response to the “missing evidence” problem evinces its primary concern with 
trial accuracy); Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need 
for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1991) (“[Spoliation] is a form of 
cheating which blatantly compromises the idea of the trial as a search for the truth.”); Dale A. 
Oesterle, A Private Litigant’s Remedies for an Opponent’s Inappropriate Destruction of Relevant 
Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1187–88 (1983) (analyzing document destruction in light of 
increased truth-finding and litigation costs); Lisa C. Harris, Note, Perjury Defeats Justice, 42 
WAYNE L. REV. 1755, 1755 (1996) (“[T]he crime of perjury is the antithesis of truth that is the 
ultimate objective of the judicial system.”). 
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attention.13 Oddly, this is largely true even among the few economics-
oriented scholars who study evidence.14 
 
 13. To be sure, the fact that the ex post perspective predominates the study of process does 
not mean that it reigns in isolation. Nearly all proceduralists are willing to admit a place for 
“deterrence” in the pantheon of social policy objectives by which they take the measure of 
doctrine. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.11, at 15 (“[D]estruction of evidence 
strikes indirectly at . . . utilitarian goals served by [substantive law].”). But whereas the social 
objective of truth-finding has finely chiseled features following generations of careful attention, 
“deterrence” remains more or less a block of stone. 
 Several authors have challenged the dominance of ex post truth-seeking by advocating 
for alternatives other than primary activity incentive setting. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN 
GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 59–60, 67–73 
(1996) (arguing that aspects of evidence law difficult to reconcile with the consequentialist goal 
of accurate trial outcomes are well explained by recourse to deontological concerns regarding 
the path taken to reach such outcomes); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A 
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 3 (1984) (emphasizing the importance of dispute resolution rather 
than truth-seeking in the adversary system); Mirjan Damaska, Truth in Adjudication, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 289, 303–04 (1998) (discussing how a focus on lawmaking in legal proceedings 
reduces the importance of fact-finding accuracy); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to 
Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1986–87) (pointing to trial’s role in producing social and individual “catharsis,” achieved 
through visceral satisfaction with legal process); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On 
Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358, 1359, 1373, 1378 
(1985) (arguing that the purpose of judicial process is to induce individuals to internalize the 
instruction of the law and, to this end, to produce “acceptable verdicts,” which are not 
necessarily “probable verdicts”). 
 14. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested 
Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 30 (1986) (analyzing the incentive to omit evidence and positing 
truth revelation as the policy objective); see also Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Naive, 
Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?, 12 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 257, 257 (1996) (arguing that the legal system is likely to generate unbiased estimates of 
liability and damages despite the jury’s naiveté and initial bias); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David 
E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings, 18 RAND J. 
ECON. 308, 309 (1987) (analyzing standards of proof and positing as the social objective the 
minimization of the sum of loss-weighted false convictions, loss-weighted false acquittals, and 
the litigation effort of defendants); Joel Sobel, Disclosure of Evidence and Resolution of 
Disputes: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proof, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF 
BARGAINING 341, 351–59 (Alvin Roth ed., 1985) (analyzing a model in which maximizing social 
welfare is equivalent to minimization of loss-weighted trial error plus evidence costs). 
In the law review literature, see, for example, Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard 
Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice 
and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313, 381 (1991): 
Under a theory of adjudication that emphasizes deterrence, [an] unskewed increase in 
favorable and unfavorable information presented ought to improve the tribunal’s 
ability to distinguish desirable from undesirable conduct. This in turn increases 
expected sanctions for those who act undesirably at the same time that it decreases 
sanctions for those who act desirably. 
and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 
1480–84 (1999), which posits trial error minimization as the goal of evidence law. 
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This Article suggests that the sizable gap between how the 
system actually regulates evidentiary foul play and how 
commentators believe it should is largely the result of the fact that the 
literature’s treatment of litigation’s ex ante purpose is 
disproportionately cursory compared to the prominence of this 
purpose in actual system design. In particular, the Article shows that 
both sources of scholarly consternation regarding evidence 
tampering—the law’s apparently Neronian attitude toward evidence 
tampering, as well as the supposedly myopic approach of the steps it 
does take—are more easily reconciled with an approach to evidence 
 
There are exceptions. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, 
Litigating and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99, 99–100 (1989) (examining 
the relationship between deterrence and truth-finding); see also Louis Kaplow, The Value of 
Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 312–14 (arguing that 
when there is perfect information about whether an accident has occurred, there is no incentive 
difference between charging the injurer with the harm that she expected to cause or the harm 
that she actually did cause, even though the later assessment of damages is in a sense more 
accurate); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & 
ECON. 191, 192, 194, 201–02 (1996) (claiming that “accuracy in assessment of harm cannot 
influence the behavior of injurers . . . to the degree that they lack knowledge of the harm they 
might cause when deciding on their precautions”); Chris W. Sanchirico, Character Evidence and 
the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1259–63 (contrasting “trace evidence” and 
“predictive evidence” and arguing, in the context of character evidence, that the use of 
“predictive evidence” at trial, though helpful for truth-finding, may be harmful for primary 
activity incentive setting); Chris W. Sanchirico, Games, Information and Evidence Production: 
With Application to English Legal History, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 342, 342–43 (2000) 
(extending the model in Sanchirico, supra note 4, to examine the trade-off between the “fixed” 
and “variable” evidentiary costs of litigation); Sanchirico, supra note 4, at 320 (modeling “the 
role of evidence production in the regulation of private behavior via judicial and administrative 
process”); Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character 
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 319, 319–24 (1994) (finding that the optimal 
threshold quantum of evidence for guilt is systematically lower when the object is taken to be 
error minimization, rather than maximal deterrence); Chris W. Sanchirico, Enforcement by 
Hearing: How the Civil Law Sets Incentives (Columbia Economics Dep’t, Discussion Paper No. 
95-9603, 1995) (first circulated version of model in Sanchirico, supra note 4); Chris W. 
Sanchirico & George Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the 
Verifiability of Contractual Performance 2–4 (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (questioning the emphasis on “verifiability” in contract scholarship), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/99030901.pdf?abstractid=10033. 
Note that a sizable portion of the economic analysis of procedure does ground itself in the 
goal of setting incentives for everyday behavior. However, this literature is not concerned with 
the issue of how claims are proven; most models simply posit exogenous probabilities for 
possible trial outcomes. Rather, the focus of this research program is on other aspects of 
litigation, such as filing and settlement behavior. See generally ROBERT BONE, BONE’S CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003) (surveying major advances in the 
economics of civil procedure). 
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law that emphasizes setting “primary activity”15 incentives rather than 
discerning past primary activity behavior. 
Consider first the law’s purportedly lackadaisical attitude toward 
tampering. Determining whether the law devotes an appropriate 
amount of energy to the problem of evidence tampering requires 
understanding the social costs and benefits of enforcing evidence-
tampering law. 
The social costs of anti-tampering enforcement, which are well 
understood by scholars in this area,16 are roughly the same whether 
one takes the purpose of process to be truth-finding or primary 
activity incentive setting. Accordingly, such costs do not play a 
leading role in distinguishing these two approaches. Nor, therefore, 
do they play a leading role in this Article. Nonetheless, it is important 
to bring these costs to the fore upfront, to take off the table the 
notion that more enforcement is always better under any approach. 
Such social costs consist essentially of the costs of running a 
second layer of legal process to adjudicate behavior, not in the 
primary activity, but in the primary layer of legal process.17 
Prosecuting a litigant for obstructing18 her primary prosecution for 
narcotics trafficking, for instance, requires diverting prosecutorial 
resources away from other offenses, including narcotics crimes. The 
obstruction defendant, in addition, will divert private resources away 
from potentially productive activity toward her second-layer defense. 
And society must then pause to entertain arguments and evidence on 
each of the several elements of the obstruction crime. Likewise, 
imposing sanctions for the destruction of evidence under either 
specific procedural rules19 or the court’s “inherent power”20 requires 
holding secondary hearings to determine whether evidence was in 
fact destroyed, and if so, its likely content, the destroyer’s state of 
 
 15. Following common usage, I use the term “primary activity” to refer to the underlying 
transaction or occurrence that may give rise to litigation. 
 16. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1187 (analyzing the effect of evidence destruction 
on litigation costs); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.11, at 96 (describing the costs of 
hearings on evidence tampering). 
 17. Indeed, the costs of policing tampering accrue in a theoretically infinite regress, as was 
hinted at when the government recently indicted a witness for perjuring himself in Martha 
Stewart’s trial for perjury, obstruction, and related offenses. Jonathan D. Glater, Stewart Stock 
Case is Jolted by Charge That an Agent Lied, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A1. 
 18. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 19. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 20. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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mind, and the extent to which the destruction prejudiced the other 
side.21 
Unlike the social costs of policing and punishing evidence 
tampering, the social benefits of these activities differ markedly 
depending on whether one takes a truth-finding or primary activity 
approach. These different benefits are the subject of Part III. As 
explained therein, truth-finding benefits come primarily from two 
sources: the deterrence of tampering and the ability to rectify trial 
outcomes when those tamperers who are not deterred are caught in 
the act.22 In contrast, and somewhat counterintuitively, the main 
primary activity benefit of increasing anti-tampering enforcement 
derives from the fact that such enforcement worsens the prospect of 
ending up as a litigant who still finds the tampering worthwhile.23 
These different sources of social benefit lead to different views of 
the appropriate intensity of anti-tampering enforcement.24 The truth-
finding benefits of increasing anti-tampering enforcement turn out to 
have a self-enhancing quality: the greater the current level of 
enforcement, the greater the incremental benefits of additional 
enforcement.25 This quality is largely inconsistent with a middling 
level of enforcement effort. Were the truth benefits of increasing anti-
tampering enforcement up to a middling level worth the social cost, 
so too would be increasing enforcement from a middling level to a 
high level.26 In contrast, the primary activity benefits of anti-
tampering enforcement are self-dampening: the more we increase 
anti-tampering enforcement, the less reason there is to continue to 
increase it.27 It follows that from a primary activity perspective, the 
law’s seemingly halfhearted approach may well be appropriate.28 
The Article’s discussion of general enforcement effort centers on 
this distinction between self-enhancing truth benefits and self-
dampening primary activity benefits. But, in fact, expressions of 
 
 21. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.11, at 96 (recounting a case where the 
hearing to determine whether the spoliator knew that the destroyed documents were relevant 
“lasted 23 days and generated 3,000 pages of transcript, approximately 2,000 pages of 
depositions introduced into evidence, and thousands of pages of documentary exhibits”). 
 22. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 23. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 24. See infra Part III.B. 
 25. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 26. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 27. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 28. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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dismay regarding the law’s laissez-faire attitude toward evidence 
tampering implicate not just the general intensity of enforcement, but 
also the methods of enforcement employed. Here too, as explained in 
Part III, the implications of the primary activity approach are both 
distinct from those of the truth-finding approach and better aligned 
with current law.29 
First, in creating a given level of legal risk for the potential 
tamperer, the primary activity approach provides less of a reason than 
the truth-finding approach to emphasize the frequency with which 
tampering is detected, as opposed to the size of the sanction 
imposed.30 And indeed, though it may be that only a small proportion 
of tamperers are caught under the current regime—as is often 
claimed31—when they are caught, punishments can be severe.32 
Second, in the event that tampering is uncovered, there is less 
reason under the primary activity approach than under the truth-
finding approach to correct litigation outcomes that have already 
been skewed as a result of the tampering.33 This may help explain the 
law’s otherwise dismaying reluctance to make such ex post 
corrections under current law.34 
The second source of scholarly dismay with evidence tampering 
law is commonly characterized not as a problem of lax enforcement, 
but as a problem of focus—myopia, to be specific. As noted, the law 
tends to penalize evidence tampering only when it occurs far 
downstream in the flow from primary activity through filing, 
discovery, and trial.35 After challenging conventional explanations for 
this enforcement regularity, Part IV of this Article puts forward an 
alternative explanation founded on how the private benefits of 
evidence tampering change along the course of litigation. 
The point of departure in Part IV is the suggestion that our 
system of fact-finding is remarkably inscrutable when viewed from an 
upstream perspective. A manufacturer of dangerous products, for 
example, may have little sense ex ante of precisely which evidentiary 
emissions will end up as damaging evidence in future lawsuits. 
 
 29. See infra Part III.C. 
 30. See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
 31. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
 34. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 35. See infra Part II. 
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Exacerbating this uncertainty is the fact the plaintiff is in large 
measure free to meet her burden of persuasion however she prefers—
using whatever combination of evidentiary offerings she chooses. 
Whatever its drawbacks along other dimensions, the ex ante 
inscrutability of fact-finding lowers the private benefits of evidence 
tampering. When one is less able to predict whether a given piece of 
evidence will be decisive in future litigation, the benefits of tampering 
with it are reduced.36 
Clearly, however, the evidentiary lay of the land comes into 
sharper focus for the parties as they head toward trial. By the time 
they pass through process’s lower reaches, therefore, tampering is no 
longer as effectively discouraged by the system’s erstwhile 
inscrutability. Consequently, other more direct devices—like 
spoliation inferences, discovery sanctions, or the threat of obstruction 
charges—become necessary to fill the growing regulatory void.37 
These are the main substantive points of the Article. But before 
turning to their detailed exposition, some clarifying remarks on scope 
and methodology are in order. 
After scarcity, the second most notable feature of scholarship on 
evidence tampering is fragmentation.38 In general, the few scholars 
who have written in the area write on either perjury,39 or evidence 
destruction,40 or missing witnesses,41 or some other isolated genre of 
manipulation. Very few treat the problem of evidence manipulation 
generically.42 
But despite the inevitable sacrifice of detail and the necessity of 
spanning several fields of legal scholarship, there is arguably much to 
 
 36. See infra Part IV.A. 
 37. See infra Part IV.C. 
 38. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of 
the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1191–92 (1987) (criticizing “doctrinal 
isolationism” even within the specific rules governing evidence destruction). 
 39. See, e.g., Rebecca Kislak & John J. Donoghue, Perjury, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 957 
(1999). 
 40. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12; MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., 
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN 
CIVIL LITIGATION (2000). 
 41. See, e.g., Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference—Quieting the 
Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 MD. L. REV. 137 (1985). 
 42. Exceptions include Joseph M. Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 27 (1984), 
who considers simultaneously missing witness instructions, use of weaker evidence when 
stronger evidence is available, and the failure to create or preserve evidence, and Nance, supra 
note 12, who deals with “missing evidence” generically. 
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be gained from an integrated treatment, if only because the potential 
evidence manipulator is likely also to take a holistic approach, 
viewing fabrication, destruction, suppression, coercion, bribery, and 
the like as potential substitutes and complements. This Article 
specifically attempts to parallel the manipulator’s integrated 
approach. 
Accordingly, the Article is forced to make the requisite sacrifices 
to doctrinal detail, both generally throughout, and also specifically, by 
focusing on the regulation of evidence tampering as it affects civil 
litigation in federal district court between private parties. This focus 
certainly does not insulate the project from administrative or criminal 
law, since these may be implicated by private suit behavior. But it 
does, nonetheless, bound the topic. Not considered herein, for 
example, are the special constitutional issues surrounding the 
destruction of evidence by police and prosecutors.43 
Second, a remark on method. Following Professor Nesson, who 
in turn takes his lead from Justice Holmes,44 this Article measures 
anti-tampering law by its effect on the behavior of the “bad person”: 
the person who makes a coolly “rational” assessment of whether 
shredding, fibbing, or forging furthers her selfish interests, with no 
serious consideration of the ethical implications of her behavior. 
Nesson justifies designing doctrine according to its effect on the 
“bad” based on the risk that market evolutionary forces will 
otherwise drive out the “good.”45 The choice of a similar approach in 
this Article derives in part from Nesson’s concern, but also from an 
additional consideration that goes more to incidence than evolution. 
Even if it were determined, contrary to Nesson’s hypothesis, that an 
 
 43. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, §§ 6.1–6.25, at 205–48 (discussing the 
problems that arise when evidence is destroyed by prosecutors or police in criminal 
proceedings). 
 44. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 795: 
Holmes tells us to consider the law from the vantage of a “bad man” who cares only 
for the material consequences of his actions . . . . Unlike good men and women who 
are influenced by conscience, the bad man is unmoved by soft considerations of ethics 
and morality except as they translate, through the actions of others, into bottom line 
effects. 
(citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)). 
 45. See id. at 805: 
I do not believe that lawyers are stereotypically Holmesian bad men, or that the law 
should assume that they are. But neither are they saints. Many lawyers will consider 
these incentives and succumb to the powerful temptation to spoliate. And once some 
lawyers begin to serve their clientele through spoliation, the marketplace will force 
others to follow suit. 
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evolutionarily stable majority of litigants behave legally and 
ethically,46 a system not specifically designed to guard against the 
minority who manipulate it would be a system that essentially taxes 
the ethical to subsidize the unethical. 
A final point on methodology. Although this Article is concerned 
with explaining existing law, the object here is not to provide just-so 
stories for existing doctrine. In the first place, the justifications for 
existing law that are provided apply only to the broadest contours of 
the law in this area. A large set of interesting (though arguably 
secondary) issues are left aside. Secondly, as the reader will see, the 
analysis herein is less a justification than a suggestion to revise the 
justifying criteria—by shifting the focus from truth-finding to primary 
activity incentive setting. 
That said, the Article does argue for this revision of justifying 
criteria specifically by making the case that the implications of the 
primary activity approach fit better with existing doctrine. This 
reflects the methodological conviction that it is in some cases 
legitimate to discipline legal analysis by treating as a “rebuttable 
presumption” the proposition that the basic outline of existing law 
makes sense. 
Anchoring the analysis in existing law may be especially justified 
when it comes to evidence tampering, where the gap between what 
the law is and what most scholars believe it should be has been so 
persistent over time. Modern treatments of evidence tampering may 
well entice the reader with the claim that the problems of spoliation 
and perjury have become much more serious in recent years. But, in 
fact, researchers in this area have been making similar claims of 
urgency for at least the last five decades. In what remains one of the 
most thoughtful (and undervalued) treatments of document 
destruction, Professor Beckstrom, writing in 1966, warns of the 
growing prevalence of document “retention” policies (twice as many 
at U.S. corporations in 1961 as in 1957),47 discusses the existence of 
firms specializing in the “storage” of business documents,48 considers 
 
 46. Behavioral law and economics offers compelling evidence that some portion of the 
population is indeed “fair-minded.” See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 
Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 209 (1995); Ernst Fehr & Simon 
Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 
(2000) (documenting that “many people deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a 
reciprocal manner”). 
 47. Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 688–89. 
 48. Id. at 714. 
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the impact of data processing and computer science,49 and attests to 
the growing prevalence of document destruction in antitrust settings.50 
Things have certainly changed since 1966. But the gap between 
scholarship and practice is apparently not one of them. 
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Parts I and II 
critically assess the two above-mentioned sources of scholarly dismay 
on their own terms. In particular, Part I examines the dual empirical 
proposition that the law is lackadaisical in policing evidence 
tampering and that such tampering is commonplace in actual process. 
Part II assesses the claim that what practical prohibitions exist are too 
exclusively focused on activities directly connected in time and effect 
to specific ongoing or imminent litigation. Because of the nature of 
these respective claims, Part I concerns mainly data, Part II mainly 
doctrine. Taken together the two parts also serve as a general review 
of evidence tampering in law and practice, an exercise justified, 
perhaps necessitated, by the dearth of attention devoted to evidence 
tampering in scholarship to date.51 
Parts III and IV contrast the primary activity and truth-finding 
approaches to the two sources of scholarly unease. Part III concerns 
the law’s purportedly lackadaisical attitude. Part IV addresses the 
law’s apparently myopic approach. Concluding remarks and a 
technical appendix complete the Article. 
I.  THE LAW’S NERONIAN ATTITUDE: DATA 
Commentators who approach evidence tampering from a truth-
finding perspective find the legal regime lackadaisical and myopic. 
This Part of the Article investigates the empirical basis for the first of 
these concerns, breaking it down into two separate claims: that 
evidentiary foul play is rampant and that the law has been looking the 
other way. 
The findings on both claims are mixed. On the one hand, both 
enjoy surprising unanimity among experts in the field. On the other 
hand, however well grounded in personal experience, both are 
unsupported by systematic empirical investigation. Data is often 
cited, to be sure. But a peek behind the numbers reveals their lack of 
reliability and relevance. 
 
 49. Id. at 714–15. 
 50. Id. at 768–69. 
 51. Readers who wish to move quickly to the Article’s main points, however, can focus on 
the summaries in Sections I.C. and II.E. 
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The Part ends with a consciously forced assessment of the 
empirical landscape and a resolution to move forward provisionally, 
accepting for the purpose of argument that the legal regime 
regulating evidence tampering is running far short of full tilt. 
A. Is Legal Process Burning? 
1. Impressionistic Evidence. Impressionistic evidence that 
tampering is unexceptional is easy to come by. On the topic of 
fabrication, Federal District Judge Marvin H. Shoob remarks that 
“people would be shocked if it were truly known how many witnesses 
lied under oath in a court of law every day.”52 Milwaukee prosecutor 
E. Michael McCann, former chair of the ABA Section of Criminal 
Justice, provides the vivid metaphor that “if perjury were water, the 
people in civil court would be drowning.”53 Chief Judge Richard A. 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit notes that “[i]t is not unusual for one 
judge to say to another that he or she has just presided at a trial at 
which several of the witnesses were obviously lying.”54 
Regarding evidence destruction, the leading treatise on the topic 
similarly notes: 
During the course of our work, many litigators privately confided to 
us that, at some point in their careers, they suspected or were 
confronted with the fact that documents were deliberately destroyed 
by their clients or their opponents. Public confirmation of these 
suspicions was not hard to find.55 
In sum, the assertion that evidence tampering is a common 
occurrence is at least itself a common pronouncement.56 
 
 52. Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, 81 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (1995). 
 53. Id. at 70. 
 54. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, 
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 147 (1999); see also Richard H. Uviller, Credence, 
Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 813 
(1993) (“All guilty defendants who choose to testify will lie on the stand about anything that 
might improve their chances and about which they imagine they can be persuasive.”). 
 55. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, at ix. 
 56. See, e.g., KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at xi (“Spoliation of evidence is an unfortunate 
reality of modern-day civil litigation.”); Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 715 (“[W]illful document 
destruction in antitrust settings has been revealed in a number of cases, and from this fact alone 
it is reasonable to speculate that, as with an iceberg, this is only a sample of what is below the 
surface.”); Steven M. Cohen, What Is True? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 817, 817–18 (2002) (arguing as a former Assistant U.S. Attorney that witness 
cooperators often lie to police); Curriden, supra note 52, at 70 (quoting a prominent trial judge 
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2. Systematic Empirical Analysis. But for a phenomenon that 
everyone seems to think happens all the time, tampering remains 
surprisingly elusive in systematic empirical analysis.57 The few 
empirical findings mentioned in the literature are often carelessly 
employed and, on closer inspection, ultimately inconclusive.58 
Consider, first, the two most frequently cited studies. 
a. Looking for Mr. Pepke. In support of the claim that 
spoliation is a pervasive problem, several recent law review articles 
cite to a survey conducted, apparently circa 1991, by “Harvard Law 
Professor Charles R. Nesson.”59 Nesson’s survey, these articles 
 
as saying that perjury “is so widespread and pervasive that it has become a major concern 
among trial judges”); id. (quoting a state trial judge as saying: “I think there is an element out 
there beginning to realize that you can walk into court, take the oath, lie up a storm, and not 
have to worry about being punished for it, even if you are caught.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A 
New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial 
as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 
794 (1993) (“The general consensus is that misconduct is widespread during discovery.”); 
Nesson, supra note 12, at 793 (“It is impossible to know precisely how common spoliation is 
today. Interviews and surveys of litigators suggest a prevalent practice.”); Steffen Nolte, The 
Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 351, 353 (1995) 
(“Destruction or spoliation of evidence in civil litigation has undermined the integrity of the 
adversary system.”); Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1186 (“The naked truth is that many 
corporations purposefully operate programs to destroy evidence.”); Harris, supra note 12, at 
1777 (“[P]erjury in the courtrooms continues to skyrocket seemingly out of control.”); Laura 
Mansnerus, Lying Rampant in Civil Suits, but Prison for Lying Is Rare, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
1998, at A22 (“[L]egal experts agree that in ordinary civil suits, lying is rampant . . . .”). 
Even sources that explicitly advise against tampering also implicitly indicate that it is a 
frequent occurrence. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 18.1, at 381 (advising against 
evidence destruction while also stating that “[p]ersons under investigation for tax violations 
often . . . panic and take steps to ‘fix’ the case against them by [evidence tampering]” (emphasis 
added)); Laurie Kindel & Kai Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millennium See a 
Further Expansion of Sanctions for the Improper Destruction of Evidence?, 27 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 687, 710–11 (2000) (repeatedly warning about the sanctions for evidence destruction 
and also providing advice on how to prevent seemingly inevitable tampering by the other side). 
 57. See Curriden, supra note 52, at 69 (“Perjury is an evasive issue that has been subject to 
little, if any, formal research. Nor are there adequate statistics on perjury prosecutions and 
convictions.”); Nesson, supra note 12, at 793 (“It is impossible to know precisely how common 
spoliation is today.”). 
 58. Cf. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 55–72 (1989) 
(contrasting casual empirical claims about the impact and operation of Rule 11 to actual data 
for the Third Circuit); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of 
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
1393, 1396 (1994) (questioning empirical evidence on “alleged massive discovery abuse in the 
federal courts”). 
 59. Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold, Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards Recognition of 
Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 (1993) (“One survey completed by 
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explain, established that “50% of all litigators found spoliation to be 
either a frequent or regular problem.”60 
In fact, Nesson conducted no such survey, let alone in the early 
1990s, as the opening lines of his cited article reveal. Although 
Nesson does cite a similar statistic,61 his supporting footnote refers the 
reader to a 1985 article by Professor Rhode.62 What is more, the 
statistic that Nesson recites concerns not “spoliation,” but “unfair and 
inadequate disclosure of material information prior to trial.”63 
A perusal of the Rhode article confirms that Rhode conducted 
no such survey either, let alone circa 1985. Instead, Rhode cites to an 
unpublished manuscript by “S. Pepke” cautiously entitled “Interim 
Report and Preliminary Findings,” laying out the results—which one 
must conclude are “preliminary”—of a study conducted circa 1983.64 
Rhode, like Nesson, reports that the survey question concerned 
“unfair and inadequate disclosure” rather than “spoliation.”65 
 
Harvard Law Professor Charles R. Nesson, concluded that 50% of all litigators found spoliation 
to be either a frequent or regular problem.” (citing Nesson’s 1991 article, Nesson, supra note 12, 
at 793)); Rivlin, supra note 6, at 1001 n.4 (“See Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or 
Mutilate . . . (commenting on a survey completed by Harvard Law Professor Charles R. 
Nesson)”; Kindel & Richter, supra note 56, at 706 (stating that “one survey has found that fifty 
percent of all litigators now consider spoliation to be either a frequent or regular occurrence,” 
and citing, without signal, solely to Nesson’s 1991 article); KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at xiv 
(supporting the same statistic with only a “see” citation to Nesson’s 1991 article, Nesson, supra 
note 12). 
 60. Spencer, supra note 59, at 39. 
 61. Nesson, supra note 12, at 793. 
 62. Id. at 793 n.1 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 589, 598–99 (1985)). 
 63. Id. at 793 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 589, 598–99 (1985)). The linguistic distinction between “spoliation” and “unfair and 
inadequate disclosure prior to trial” is potentially significant. Although the term “spoliation” is 
in some usages broadly defined, neither Rivlin nor Spencer employ a particularly broad 
definition. See Rivlin, supra note 6, at 1004 (defining spoliation as “the failure to preserve 
property for another’s use as evidence in pending or future litigation”); Spencer, supra note 59, 
at 38 n.4 (adopting a prior author’s definition of “spoliation” as when a person “destroys, 
mutilates, or alters evidence, and thereby interferes”) (quoting Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, 
Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, Interfering With Prospective Civil Action, as Actionable, 70 
A.L.R. 4th 984, 986 (1989)). Even so, potential differences remain between even the broadest 
meaning of “spoliation,” on the one hand, and “unfair and inadequate disclosure,” on the other. 
Plumbing the depths of these linguistic distinctions at this point would, nonetheless, be 
premature—for there were several more switches in this game of telephone. 
 64. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 599 
n.30 (1985) (citing “S. Pepke, Standards of Legal Negotiations, Interim Report and Preliminary 
Findings (1983) (unpublished manuscript)”). 
 65. Id. at 598. 
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As it turns out, there is no “S. Pepke” in the legal literature. 
Further investigation reveals, however, that there is an S. Pepe66 who 
did indeed conduct a survey of litigators, and among the 
“preliminary” findings listed in his “interim report” was something 
resembling the 50 percent figure that is so frequently cited.67 Pepe’s 
results were never published in final form,68 and his “interim report” 
leaves unanswered several important questions about how the survey 
was conducted.69 
Nonetheless, the “interim report” does make clear that Pepe’s 
often cited finding was neither about spoliation, as asserted by recent 
articles, nor about “unfair and inadequate” disclosure, as asserted by 
both Rhode and Nesson. Rather, the phenomenon that 50 percent of 
 
 66. Typographical errors of this sort, though regrettable, are inevitable and 
understandable. Whether those who continue to cite this statistic are conducting a reasonable 
inquiry under the circumstances is open to question. 
 67. STEVEN D. PEPE, STANDARDS OF LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS: INTERIM REPORT AND 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 3 (1983) [hereinafter PEPE, REPORT] (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal); Steven D. Pepe, Summary of Selected Findings of the Study on the Standards of Legal 
Negotiations 16 (date unknown) [hereinafter Pepe, Summary] (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). The study was conducted “[i]n conjunction with the American Bar 
Foundation and the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.” PEPE, 
REPORT, supra, at cover page. The interim report describes itself this way: 
The following is a summary of preliminary findings of the Study on the Standards of 
Legal Negotiations. These preliminary findings were drawn from responses by 1034 
litigation attorneys from the State of Michigan and 1513 from large law firm litigators 
throughout the country as well as 256 state judges, 75 federal judges, and 128 
law professors . . . .  
Id. at 1. (emphases added). 
The focus of the survey was attorney behavior during pretrial negotiation, but several 
questions dealt specifically with discovery itself. The survey consisted of two parts. First, the 
respondents were asked questions about a hypothetical fact pattern and the ensuing settlement 
negotiation scenario. Steven Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations, Appendix to PEPE, 
REPORT, supra (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (questionnaire 
relating to PEPE, REPORT, supra). Second, the respondents were asked general questions about 
their own experiences regarding, inter alia, pretrial disclosure. Id. According to the report, the 
average respondent was a 37-year-old attorney who had spent seven years doing a substantial 
amount of litigation. PEPE, REPORT, supra, at 2. 
 68. Cf. Steven D. Pepe, Professional Responsibility in Pretrial Discovery—A Tale of Two 
Cities, MICH. B.J., Mar. 1985, at 298, 300 (mentioning the findings only in passing); Steven D. 
Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations: Interim Report for ABA Commission on Evaluation of 
Professional Standards and ABA House of Delegates, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 206–08 (3d ed. 1985) (excerpting Pepe’s interim report and 
preliminary findings, but not including the result cited by Rhode, supra note 64, at 598–99, 599 
n.30). 
 69. For example, there is little information in the interim report on sampling methods and 
response rates. 
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Pepe’s litigators regarded as a regular or frequent problem was 
“unfair or inadequate disclosure.”70 
The distinction between “and” and “or” is as important as the 
distinction between “Pepe” and “Pepke.” Had half the respondents 
stated that they found pretrial disclosure regularly or frequently to be 
both “unfair and inadequate,” one could conclude that half found 
disclosure regularly or frequently to be, inter alia, “unfair.” If “foul” is 
the opposite of “fair,” then perhaps “unfairness” represents the kind 
of evidentiary foul play whose prevalence those who cite the statistic 
mean to establish. But because Pepe’s survey respondents were 
talking about “unfair or inadequate,” one cannot rule out the 
possibility that some, or even all of the 50 percent thought that only 
“inadequacy,” and not “unfairness,” was a regular or frequent 
problem. 
The difficulty with this, in turn, is that “inadequate” is not a self-
defining term. “Inadequate for what?” is the begged question. From 
what can be gleaned from Pepe’s “interim report,” each respondent 
was free to provide her own tacit answer.71 Some respondents may 
well have interpreted “inadequate” to mean “inadequate for my 
opponent to meet the requirements of law” or “inadequate for her to 
meet her ethical obligations.” But some or all respondents might just 
have meant “inadequate for my side to win the case” or even 
“inadequate for my side to win without having had to try so hard.” 
In the end, therefore, perhaps all that can be concluded from this 
elusive twenty-year-old study—this detached root of the most 
commonly cited empirical finding on evidence tampering—is that the 
average attorney circa 1980 would have liked to have known more 
about her opponent’s case. 
 
 70. See PEPE, REPORT, supra note 67, at Appendix (containing a copy of the survey 
questionnaire, which poses the question at issue in the second part); id. (describing the two parts 
of the survey, entitled “Discovery Problems & Negotiations,” phrasing the question thus: “In 
your practice do you experience the problem of unfair or inadequate disclosures of material 
information during pretrial stages of litigation? Seldom if ever, Occasionally, Regularly, 
Frequently, Not applicable or do not know” [emphasis added]); see also Pepe, Summary, supra 
note 67, at 3 (noting that a majority of litigators in both samples experience unfair or inadequate 
disclosure of information as a regular and commonplace problem). 
Note, however, that in the summary discussion in PEPE, REPORT, supra note 67, Pepe 
uses “and” rather than “or” in relation to this question (though, arguably, this choice is not 
incorrect in the specific context in which it appears). Id. at 3 (“When asked about problems of 
unfair and inadequate disclosure of material information pretrial . . . 51% of the [n]ational 
respondents felt that this was a regular or frequent problem.” [emphasis added]). This may help 
to explain later confusion regarding the actual wording of the questionnaire. 
 71. See PEPE, REPORT, supra note 67; Pepe, Summary, supra note 67. 
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b. Brazil Survey. Another frequently cited72 statistic derives 
from Professor Brazil’s questionnaire-guided interviews of 180 
Chicago area litigators in 1979.73 Based on responses to “open-end 
questions, plus complaints attorneys volunteered at other times 
during the interviews,”74 Brazil reports that 61 percent of his sample 
“mentioned” the problem of “evasive responses, withholding 
information, or noncompliance”75 in connection with discovery. 
Brazil’s survey was a pioneering effort. Yet, as empirical support 
for the prevalence of evidence tampering—one of the survey’s 
frequent employments—it has several drawbacks. First, Brazil’s 
aggregate statistics, the only statistics that are cited in the evidence 
tampering literature, are of questionable value given Brazil’s 
sampling technique. As Brazil explains, 
[a]lthough the method used to select the attorneys to be interviewed 
would not produce a statistically representative sample of Chicago 
litigators, it was designed to . . . permit comparison of the attitudes, 
perception and experiences of differently situated litigators.76 
Brazil’s study is perhaps best viewed as a series of parallel surveys, 
one for each cohort of similarly situated litigators. Even if each cohort 
taken individually was properly sampled, it would be a mistake to 
assume that the simple concatenation of these parallel surveys 
produces a proper sample of the full population. By way of analogy 
one might properly survey one hundred randomly chosen individuals 
from each state in order to compare attitudes across states. But 
simply aggregating these individuals into a sample of five thousand 
would provide an inaccurate sense of national attitudes. Rhode 
Island, for example, would be oversampled relative to California. 
Second, Brazil’s study, like Pepe’s, raises serious definitional 
issues. The phenomenon whose prevalence is surveyed appears to be 
too broadly and ambiguously defined to distinguish it from the 
general pursuit of self-interest in pre-trial process. What range of 
activities is covered by the disjunction, “evasive responses, 
withholding information, or noncompliance”? What portion of the 61 
 
 72. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments; Nesson, 
supra note 12, at 793 n. 2; Rivlin, supra note 6, at 1004 n.5. 
 73. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal 
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 790 (1980). 
 74. Id. at 824. 
 75. Id. at 825 fig.14. 
 76. Id. at 791 (emphases added). 
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percent is attributable to each? Does “withholding information” 
include failing to volunteer damaging information to the other side? 
Does an “evasive response” include answering the question precisely 
as asked, rather than giving the opponent-questioner the benefit of 
the doubt? Brazil’s own discussion of the definition of “evasion” 
confirms the breadth of meaning connected to even this single 
element of his trio.77 
Brazil’s 61 percent finding regarding “evasive responses, 
withholding information, or noncompliance” inspires what has 
become one of the most frequently quoted passages of his article: 
[A]mong the lawyering practices targeted for blame, none 
commanded more negative attention than the redoubtable art of 
evasion . . . . [I]t would be difficult to exaggerate the pervasiveness 
of evasive practices or their adverse impact on the efficiency and 
effectiveness (for information distribution) of civil discovery. 
Evasion infects every kind of litigation and frustrates lawyers in 
every kind of practice.78 
Given that this statement apparently applies not to evasion per se but 
to “evasive responses, withholding information, or noncompliance,” 
and given the definitional problems with the term “evasion” alone, 
this is a potentially misleading summary of Brazil’s results. 
Reattached to the actual survey results that inspired it, this often-
quoted excerpt may signify only that litigating parties act strategically 
within the confines of the rules governing discovery.79 
 
 77. See id. at 829: 
The term “evasion” as used here is incapable of precise definition but embraces 
several kinds of reportedly widespread practices. The most obvious is the habit of 
manipulating the definitions of opponents’ words, interpreting their interrogatories, 
document demands, or deposition questions as narrowly, broadly, or selectively as 
possible for the purpose of serving a client’s adversarial interests . . . . The term 
“evasion” also refers to more direct forms of resistance to disclosure, for example, 
refusing to respond in any way to discovery probes or intentionally withholding some 
evidence that is clearly sought and discoverable . . . . 
In fact, “several attorneys made it clear that evasion, at least in the form of seeking out and 
taking advantage of ambiguities, oversights, or other errors in the way opponents phrased 
discovery probes was, so far from being unethical, a clear duty of the responsible advocate.” Id. 
at 838. 
 78. Id. at 828–29 (referring to the 61 percent statistic in his figure 14, id. at 825 fig.14). 
 79. Note also that this finding regarding evasion mostly concerns interrogatories. See id. at 
829–30. (“Lawyers commonly associated the problem of evasion with interrogatories, the only 
one of the rule-created instruments of discovery that a sizable number of attorneys (50 of 177; 
28 percent) identified by name as a principal source of difficulty.”). 
Another finding concerning “evasion” appears elsewhere in the study. Brazil asked 
lawyers to compare the existing system to a “frictionless system of sharing information in which 
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When Brazil does ask directly about “lack of candor or bad faith 
by the opposing party or attorney,”80 the results are less dramatic. 
Respondents reported on average that such practices impeded 
discovery in 14 percent of their cases.81 
Yet, at the same time, Brazil does provide impressionistic 
evidence that foul play is far more prevalent than this. He reports, for 
instance, one litigator’s view that “’manufacturing evidence for 
parties is so common it would shock the average person.’”82 And so, in 
the end, Brazil’s study, though it fails to provide systematic evidence 
of tampering, does in effect provide evidence of the juxtaposition 
between the paucity of firm evidence and the prevalence of firmly 
held impressions. 
c. Other Studies. Other empirical research in this area is also 
problematic. One can still find mention of a study by Arther and Reid 
in which almost 90 percent of parties in a large sample of paternity 
suits admitted after trial that they lied under oath when subsequently 
confronted with a lie detector test.83 But this study was conducted in 
1954. And the very fact that it is still wheeled out to certify the 
prevalence of perjury in modern process may itself be some indication 
of the scarcity of contemporary empirical support. Moreover, as is too 
rarely noted, the study appears to have been sponsored in some 
 
responding parties made good faith efforts to understand and satisfy the requests of 
propounding parties.” Id. at 834. Brazil finds that every lawyer in his sample stated that “evasive 
and incomplete” answers had impeded discovery at least once. Id. at 835. Arguably, however, 
this unanimous response is merely the result of his having posed a “frictionless system” as the 
benchmark. 
 80. Id. at 838. There were also definitional difficulties with “lack of candor.” Brazil reports 
that the attorney/respondents were not sure whether lack of candor meant “dishonesty” or 
“evasiveness.” Id. In “later interviews” (Brazil does not say what portion) the attorneys were 
instructed to include just unethical behavior. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 838 n.80; see also id. at 855 n.105: 
A few attorneys even admitted having [lied]. One said, e.g., that he and a client 
simply decided not to acknowledge the existence of clearly discoverable information 
because to do so would have been disastrous for the client’s case . . . . Another 
attorney intimated that it was not beyond the pale “even [to] lie about temporarily 
losing a document.” 
 83. Richard O. Arther & John E. Reid, Utilizing Lie Detector Techniques to Determine the 
Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 213, 215 (1954); 
see Franklin E. Zimring, Commentary, What Is the Aim of Criminal Law? Is it Selective 
Prosecution to Deter Wrongdoing or an Inflexible Moralist Standard?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, 
at B9 (citing Arther & Reid, supra); Robert Cooter & Winand Emmons, Truth-Bonding and 
Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 2 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (same). 
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capacity by a company that stood to profit from the general use of lie 
detector tests.84 
Beckstein and Gabel’s 1980 survey of the ABA’s Antitrust Law 
Section85 is occasionally cited to support the proposition that evidence 
destruction is widespread.86 Respondents were asked to indicate “the 
frequency with which you encounter [various] compliance practices 
among corporations.”87 Two of these practices are of interest here. 
First, respondents were asked about “policies that reduce 
historical records.”88 Roughly half said that they had often or always 
encountered such practices. More than three quarters said they had 
encountered such practices at least sometimes.89 As with survey 
questions posed by Pepe and Brazil, this question seems too broadly 
worded to support the conclusion that evidence tampering is 
prevalent. The category “policies that reduce historical records” 
presumably includes not only last-minute shredding, but also truly 
routine document management. 
Consistent with the possibility that such policies need not qualify 
as tampering are participants’ answers to a second question 
concerning converse practices. The survey asks about the prevalence 
of “policies to preserve information on intent, sources of competitive 
information, etc.”90 Here, roughly 30 percent said that they often or 
always encounter such practices among corporations, while almost 70 
percent said that they at least sometimes encounter such practices.91 
 
 84. Arther & Reid, supra note 83, at 213 (opening with a two-paragraph editor’s note 
detailing the management positions of both authors at John E. Reid and Associates, “an 
organization specializing in lie detection”); id. at 214–15 (indicating that results come from “a 
six-year study of the 312 disputed paternity cases handled at the Chicago laboratory of John E. 
Reid and Associates”); see also www.reid.com (last visited February 26, 2004) (website for John 
E. Reid and Associates, “established 1947,” offering polygraphs services). 
 85. Alan R. Beckenstein & H. Landis Gabel, Antitrust Compliance: Results of a Survey of 
Legal Opinion, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 459 (1982). 
 86. See, e.g., Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1183 & n.418 (citing the Beckenstein & 
Gabel study in support of the proposition that “[t]he routine destruction of documents, often 
accomplished through formal ‘document management’ programs, has become commonplace”). 
 87. Beckenstein & Gabel, supra note 85, at 489. 
 88. Id. at 493. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. To be sure, careful empirical research in the broad area of litigation has flourished 
over the last two decades. Yet, this has benefited the analysis of evidence tampering only 
indirectly. Most of the attention has been focused on proving, disproving, or qualifying the claim 
that the costs of pretrial discovery—incurred legitimately or otherwise—are disproportionate to 
what is at stake in most litigation. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: 
Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 636 
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3. Summary. On the issue of whether legal process is ablaze 
with evidentiary foul play, any attempt at metanalysis is largely 
abortive. Studies by Pepe, Brazil, and others laid aside, no results 
appear to survive preliminary screening, leaving nothing to 
synthesize. At the same time, an informal “survey” of statements in 
the legal literature regarding the prevalence of evidentiary foul play is 
unusually conclusive. It appears to be as difficult to find a 
commentator who thinks evidence tampering is under control as it is 
to find systematic empirical evidence confirming its ubiquity. 
B. Is the Law Fiddling? 
Although commentators are in accord that evidence tampering is 
commonplace92 and that this is a lamentable state of affairs,93 they do 
 
(1998) (finding that the “parade of horribles” that dominates the debate over discovery is 
confined to a minority of cases); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery 
and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 531 
(1998) (“[F]or most cases, discovery costs are modest and perceived by attorneys as 
proportional to parties’ needs and the stakes in the case.”). These researchers did occasionally 
ask about foul play, but not in a way that confirms or dismisses anecdotal evidence on the topic. 
For example, in studying the efficacy of mandatory disclosure under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26, one study found that “lawyers report that when disclosure is done on a 
mandatory basis, it is full disclosure for 50% of the cases and pro forma disclosure for the 
remaining half of the cases.” Kakalik et al., supra, at 679. With regard to requests for the 
production of documents and things under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, another study 
found that: 
[D]ocument production . . . . is the activity for which the highest percentage of 
attorneys reported problems in their case (44%). The most frequently reported 
problems with document production were failure to respond adequately (28% of 
those who engaged in document production) and failure to respond in a timely 
fashion (24%). 
Willging et al., supra, at 540. 
 92. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 93. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 793 (“Spoliation is an effective, and, I believe, a growing 
litigation practice which threatens to undermine the integrity of civil trial process. It is a form of 
cheating which blatantly compromises the ideal of the trial as a search for truth.”); Nolte, supra 
note 56, at 353 (“Destruction or spoliation of evidence in civil litigation has undermined the 
integrity of the adversary system, thus raising serious public policy concerns.”); Oesterle, supra 
note 12, at 1188 (“[E]xisting laws on the consequences of document destruction are too lenient. 
The standards defining illegal destruction are too permissive, and the penalties attaching to 
illegal acts are largely toothless.”); Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1086 (“[T]he strict 
controls being developed by many courts are justified. In particular, truth and fairness to 
litigants support restrictions on evidence destruction even though the inefficiency of wide-
ranging document preservation and concern for individual rights and privacy suggest boundaries 
beyond which destruction of evidence should not be controlled.”); Harris, supra note 12, at 
1779–1802 (arguing for the need to revamp the legal system’s approach to perjury, discussing 
the reasons why perjury has been able to “infect the system of justice,” and finding the reason to 
be that its “contagion has gone unchecked”). 
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not always agree on what aspect of the legal system is to blame. Some 
emphasize the leniency of the rules as written—including the relevant 
criminal statutes, procedural rules, evidentiary rules, and codes of 
professional responsibility.94 Others fault the lack of enforcement by 
prosecutors,95 judges,96 and attorney disciplinary boards.97 Ultimately, 
 
 94. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1188 (arguing that “existing laws on the consequences of 
document destruction are too lenient”). But see Nesson, supra note 12, at 806 (“I do not believe 
that the remedy to the problem is to strengthen and clarify the rules. Existing rules are more 
than adequate . . . . From reading the rules of discovery, one would think that spoliation is a 
question the law has taken very seriously.”). 
 95. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 5.1, at 170 (“[C]riminal convictions have been 
obtained only for destruction of evidence pertinent to criminal proceedings, not civil actions, 
and then only for selective rather than routine destruction.”); KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 
69 (noting that limited prosecutorial resources prevent prosecution of spoliation in private 
lawsuits); Kindel & Richter, supra note 56, at 700 (“[T]he threat of criminal prosecution for 
spoliation of evidence in the civil arena appears to be more theoretical than real . . . . [given] no 
reported criminal convictions [arising from] civil litigation.”); Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1202–
03 (“Either private parties do not complain . . . or federal prosecutors do not prosecute those 
complaints that are reported.”); Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1106 (“The threat of 
criminal prosecution for evidence destruction in civil litigation . . . appears to be more 
theoretical than real. Our research revealed no criminal convictions for destroying evidence in 
civil litigation. Indeed, we have discovered only one reported government investigation of 
document destruction in a private lawsuit.”); Uviller, supra note 54, at 813 n.84: 
Not only are witnesses rarely prosecuted for perjury, but criminal defendants are 
virtually exempt (which they doubtless know). . . . [I]f a defendant is acquitted, only 
the most vindictive prosecutor will take a second shot at proving his lost cause by the 
perjury route. The barrier is not the Double Jeopardy Clause, but rather the prudent 
balance of discretion and valor. 
Kristin Adamski, Comment, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Courtroom: Spoliation 
of Evidence in Illinois, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 346 (1999) (“[T]here are no cases where a 
party was criminally convicted for the spoliation of evidence in civil litigation.”); Harris, supra 
note 12, at 1777 (suggesting that despite “severe regulations . . . few [perjury] offenders . . . are 
ever punished”). But see Richard F. Ziegler & Seth A. Stuhl, Spoliation Issues Arise in Digital 
Era, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 16, 1998, at B9 (“It’s not easy to go to jail because of discovery abuse in 
civil litigation, but it can happen.”). 
 96. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 806–07: 
[I]n practice, judges are extremely reluctant either to expose discovery violations or 
to punish discovery violations once exposed, applying the rules instead in ways that 
minimize or avoid the problem . . . . Whatever the motivation, the resulting judicial 
behavior sends a message to every litigator: the rules against spoliation will not be 
seriously enforced. 
Uviller, supra note 54, at 813 n.84 (“Not only are witnesses rarely prosecuted for perjury, but 
criminal defendants are virtually exempt (which they doubtless know). If convicted, their 
fruitless perjury may induce some judges to add a small increment to their . . . sentence . . . .”). 
But see GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.1, at 66 (citing approximately fifty cases as 
evidence that “discovery sanctions are fast emerging as an effective tool against inappropriate 
destruction of evidence”). 
 97. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1219 (“[V]ery few charges are brought and few 
convictions are obtained against lawyers who counsel or assist clients in the illegal destruction of 
documents.”); Harris, supra note 12, at 1770: 
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however, this too has been a battle of competing impressions. As with 
the question of whether evidence tampering is commonplace, the 
question of what the law does to address the problem has been the 
subject of little systematic empirical analysis. 
This is not to say, of course, that statistics are rarely deployed. 
The public debate surrounding President Clinton’s impeachment is a 
case in point. For a brief time, the lax enforcement of perjury became 
newsworthy.98 The New York Times and other news outlets began 
reporting that in 1997 only about ninety of the nearly fifty thousand 
filed felony cases—roughly .2 percent—were on charges of perjury.99 
But then the news pendulum swung the other way, and the 
possibility that these claims were exaggerated became the story.100 The 
 
In spite of the frequency with which lawyers are admittedly involved in perjury, 
formal complaints against attorneys for perjury or suborning perjury filed by state 
attorney disciplinary boards represent only a fraction of the annual charges filed 
against attorneys. For example, in Michigan, from the years 1982 through 1994, of 
approximately 2,700 formal complaints filed by the grievance administrator against 
attorneys, only seven involved attorney perjury or suborning of perjury. 
(footnotes omitted). 
This regularity may not apply to sitting lawyer/presidents acting as private litigants. In 
addition to facing sanctions under the discovery rules, President Clinton was suspended from 
the Arkansas Bar for five years and was fined $25,000. See ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 55-1, at 
772–73 (stating that, under some circumstances, “a lawyer may be disciplined for wrongful 
conduct even though she was not acting in her capacity as a lawyer while she was engaging in 
the wrong”). 
 98. See Dennis Cauchon, Perjury Charges Rarely Brought in Civil Cases, USA TODAY, Jan. 
29, 1998, at 5A (“Kenneth Starr can indict former White House intern Monica Lewinsky for 
perjury if there is evidence that she lied in a civil case. But, in practice, such prosecutions are so 
rare that bringing charges would raise questions of whether Lewinsky had been unfairly singled 
out for prosecution.”); id. (“(Perjury) charges are brought very, very, very infrequently in these 
types of cases.” (quoting Ronald Woods, a defense attorney and former U.S. attorney in 
Houston)); Mansnerus, supra note 56. (“[L]egal experts agree that in ordinary civil suits, lying is 
rampant and prosecution for lying is rare. There have been at most a few dozen published court 
decisions over the last decade that concern perjury and civil cases, though the total number of 
prosecutions could be considerably higher.”). 
 99. See Cauchon, supra note 98 (“In 1996, only 86 of the 42,436 criminal defendants 
convicted in federal court were found guilty of perjury, encouraging perjury or bribing a witness, 
according to U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics.”); William Glaberson, Testing of a 
President: Legal Issues; In Truth, Even Those Little Lies Are Prosecuted Once in a While, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1998, at A1. (“One statistic on perjury prosecutions has been widely circulated 
since the President’s supporters began arguing that perjury was little more than a technicality 
seized upon by his enemies: Of 49,655 cases filed by Federal prosecutors last year, only 87 were 
for perjury.”). For the most recent federal statistics on perjury, contempt, and obstruction, see 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 2000 (2002). 
 100. Compare Ruth Marcus, Paying the Price for Civil Perjury: Prosecution May Be 
Unusual, but It Can Mean Prison, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1998, at A4 (challenging “any of the 
pundits on the air to find . . . a case of civil perjury that has been pursued criminally at the 
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New York Times itself reported that, however rare perjury 
prosecutions might be in federal court, they were markedly less rare 
in state court.101 The Times supported this claim with the statistic that 
in California in 1997, there had been 4,318 “perjury prosecutions” out 
of 326,768 “felony prosecutions” (or about 1.3 percent, six times the 
.2 percent in the federal criminal system).102 This California statistic 
was then picked up by the House’s Impeachment Trial Manager, 
Representative Stephen E. Buyer (R-Ind.), who presented it with 
great aplomb in advancing the House’s case against the President 
before the Senate.103 
One can confirm that around 4,318 arrests in 1997 in California 
were coded as “perjury,”104 and that this was out of a total of 326,768 
felony arrests for the state.105 And thus perjury arrests would appear 
to be more common in California than in the federal system. What 
was not reported, however, is that the percentage of these cases that 
led to conviction in California is notably lower—lower than in the 
 
federal level in the last 100 years” (quoting William H. Ginsburg, NBC’s “Today”)), with id. 
(taking up Ginsburg’s challenge and noting that “[a] cursory computer search of federal court 
records turned up more than twenty-five cases of federal prosecutions for perjury in civil 
cases—and that does not include prosecutions that went forward but did not result in a written 
opinion by the court”). 
 101. See Glaberson, supra note 99 (looking at perjury prosecutions in both the federal and 
state systems). 
 102. Id. The New York Times also reported 395 New York state “perjury cases” but did not 
provide statistics on the total number of felony prosecutions in that state. Id. Data from no 
other state was reported. 
 103. See 145 CONG. REC. S281, SS284 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep. Buyer, 
House Manager) (“In State jurisdictions all across the country, they take [perjury] very 
seriously. I have chosen one State, the State of California, which brought 4,318 perjury 
prosecutions in 1997.”). No other state data is cited. The source of the statistic does not appear 
in the record. 
 104. In 1997 there were 4,313 arrests for which a violation under CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 
(West 2003) (“Perjury defined”) was the major offense and in which a final disposition was 
reported and processed in that year. E-mail from anonymous individual at the Criminal Justice 
Statistics Center, California Department of Justice, to Chris W. Sanchirico, Professor of Law, 
Business, and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School (Oct. 
10, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (basing its statistics on numbers extracted from 
the Offender-Based Transaction Statistics system for the year 1997). See infra note 108 and 
accompanying text for the discussion of data limitations. 
 105. E-mail from anonymous individual at the Criminal Justice Statistics Center, California 
Department of Justice, to Chris W. Sanchirico, Professor of Law, Business, and Public Policy, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School (Oct. 9, 2002) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (“The Adult Felony Arrest Disposition file shows a total count of 326,768 
dispositions in 1997. This matches the number stated in [Glaberston’s] article, however, it is not 
the number of ‘felony prosecutions.’ We are not able to provide a count on the number of felony 
prosecutions.” (emphasis added)). 
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federal system, and lower in comparison to other adult felonies in 
California. Of the roughly 4,318 perjury arrests in California in 1997, 
less than 500 (12 percent) resulted in conviction.106 In comparison, of 
all 326,768 California adult felony arrests, 221,808 (67 percent) led to 
conviction.107 Consequently, though it may be true that the proportion 
of perjury arrests in California (1.3 percent) is six times larger than in 
the federal system, the percentage of all perjury convictions is about 
the same across the two systems (.2 percent). 
Yet the more important and general point is that the precise 
meaning of these kinds of arrest, prosecution, and conviction 
numbers is far from clear. In the first place, such statistics typically 
show only the number of defendants for whom perjury (and/or 
obstruction) was the “most serious offense” charged, prosecuted, or 
proven, a coding convention with uncertain but potentially significant 
effects on the reported frequency of perjury charges and 
convictions.108 Consider, for example, that this coding rule forms part 
of the explanation for California’s relatively large number of perjury 
arrests as well as its relatively small percentage of perjury convictions. 
Most of the 4,000 or so perjury arrests in California in 1997 derived 
from a single county’s idiosyncratic practice of adding perjury charges 
to welfare fraud charges.109 Perjury charges carry the longer sentence 
and so these welfare cases were coded as perjury in the “charges” 
database. Typically, prosecutors in this county would then drop the 
perjury charges and conviction would follow only on welfare fraud.110 
 
 106. See E-mail from anonymous individual, supra note 104. These numbers concern CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 118 (“Perjury defined”), and data limitations apply. See infra note 108 and 
accompanying text. 
 107. Table 6: Final Law Enforcement, Prosecution and Court Dispositions of Adult Felony 
Arrests by Type of Disposition Statewide, CJSC Statistical Tables Site, at http://justice.hdcdojnet. 
state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof00/00/6.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 108. This is true of both the federal numbers and the California numbers. See BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 99, at 107–08 (“Where more than one offense is charged or 
adjudicated, the most serious offense . . . is used to classify offenses.”); DIV. OF CAL. JUSTICE 
INFO. SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 168 (2001), 
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/publications/candd/cd01/appn.pdf (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (“If a person is arrested for multiple offenses, OBTS selects only the most serious 
offense . . . .”). 
Another related problem with the California numbers specifically is that they count 
“perjury” only and not also “obstruction of justice.” 
 109. Telephone Interview with anonymous individual at the Criminal Justice Statistics 
Center, California Department of Justice (Nov. 22, 2002). 
 110. Id. 
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The second general problem with these statistics is that they 
provide no information on whether the coded offense arose in a civil 
trial among private parties, a civil trial in which the government was a 
party, or a criminal trial. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are 
large differences across these three types of cases: although 
prosecutors themselves may pile on or follow up with a perjury 
indictment in a case in which they were already involved,111 they will 
rarely respond to complaints from private parties.112 If so, averaging 
over these various settings serves to exaggerate the threat of perjury 
and obstruction charges in private party litigation. 
Thirdly, the comparison of process crimes with primary activity 
crimes is fraught with difficulty. Crimes like perjury and obstruction 
arise from the operation of a system meant chiefly to adjudicate 
primary activity behavior. Perhaps the relative rarity of perjury and 
obstruction in criminal process merely reflects the fact that the “crime 
opportunities” for this derivative crime are only a fraction of the 
opportunities to commit primary activity crimes and wrongs—a 
fraction roughly equal to the number of primary activity decision 
points that end up generating litigation. If this is the case, perjury and 
obstruction may not be as relatively underenforced as such 
comparisons make them seem. 
Fourthly, even if one could find the right benchmark and 
establish that, relative to that benchmark, the number of perjury 
arrests, prosecutions, and convictions were “low,” it is unclear what 
this would say about enforcement. A small number of arrests, 
prosecutions, and convictions for perjury is consistent with both 
rampant perjury due to lax enforcement and tight enforcement 
leading to very little perjury. Without also knowing how often crimes 
like perjury are committed, knowing how often such crimes are 
 
 111. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1204: 
If a section 1503 [obstruction of justice] offense occurs in the context of a pending 
federal criminal trial, the prosecutor (after going back to the grand jury, of course) 
just adds, in essence, another count to the existing indictment. The fact that the 
prosecution had begun on other charges signals that convicting the defendant is a 
high priority and, perhaps, that the defendant has a history of criminal activity. The 
new section 1503 [obstruction of justice] charge provides another round of 
ammunition for the prosecutor in the plea bargaining process. 
But see Uviller, supra note 54, at 813 n.84 (“[O]nly the most vindictive prosecutor will take a 
second shot at proving his lost cause by the perjury route.”). 
 112. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1188. (“[P]rivate litigants have limited recourse against 
those who engage in unlawful destruction; public prosecutors, however, may initiate or threaten 
a range of prosecutions with criminal and civil penalties.”). 
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punished tells us little about the chance that any given commission 
will be punished. 
Lastly, even if one could reliably determine that the chance of 
arrest, prosecution, or conviction was low, one could not conclude 
from this that the impact of these laws on behavior was insignificant. 
As is well understood, the law’s effect on behavior is not just a factor 
of how frequently transgressions are detected, but also how severely 
they are punished.113 In fact, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
punish perjury and obstruction rather severely—a first time offender 
serves no less than ten months in prison.114 The incremental impact of 
this prison time on the well-being of the average contract or tort 
litigant is likely to be large relative to the stakes of the underlying 
suit, especially considering the potential damage to reputation and 
earning power. According to a Washington Post headline from the 
time of President Clinton’s impeachment, “Prosecuting Civil Perjury 
Is Unusual, but It Can Mean Prison.”115 It is hard to say whether 
reading this would have deterred or encouraged the average civil 
litigant. 
 
 113. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (1931) 
(identifying the trade-off between the probability of the detection and the severity of the 
punishment); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 179–80 (1968) (analyzing the implications of the aforementioned trade-off for 
optimal criminal enforcement). 
 114. As of this writing, the base offense level for obstruction (as for perjury) under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines is still twelve, which roughly means imprisonment from ten to 
sixteen months for a first-time offender and perhaps also fines ranging from $3,000 to $30,000 
(for individual defendants). U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL §§ 2J1.2–.3, 5E1.2 (2001); id. ch. 5 pt. A. 
Several additional points regarding sentencing are in order. First, section 805 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act directs the United States Sentencing Commission to “review and amend, as 
appropriate” the sentencing provisions relating to obstruction of justice. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 § 805, 15 U.S.C.A. § 994 note (West Supp. 2003); see also id. § 1104(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 
994 note (requesting that the Sentencing Commission “ensure that guideline offense levels . . . 
are adequate”). Second, the offense level for conviction of another nonobstruction offense may 
be increased by two if the defendant obstructed the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of 
that offense. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, supra, § 3C1.1. Third, if, based on a single 
knowing, material lie stated under oath in federal district court, a defendant is convicted of both 
perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000) and obstruction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (West Supp. 
2003), these two counts would likely be grouped together resulting in an overall offense level of 
twelve for the single lie. Id. §§ 3D1.1–.2. It is also possible that several lies told to the same court 
in the same case, and to the same end, would also be grouped in this fashion. Id. Fourth, the 
sentencing judge has some authority to deviate from the guidelines. 
 115. Marcus, supra note 100. 
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C. Forced Assessment 
Given the paucity of hard data, the hypotheses that evidence 
tampering is commonplace and that the regulation thereof is lax 
would probably be rejected in any systematic metanalysis116 of existing 
data. But the rejection of a hypothesis in careful empirical work does 
not imply the acceptance of its opposite; the hypothesis that 
tampering is not commonplace and that the law is not lackadaisical 
would probably also be rejected.117 
Suppose, however, that principled agnosticism is not an option. 
Imagine that we find ourselves in a position analogous to that of the 
umpire at home plate—for whom concluding that the runner’s slide 
kicked up too much dust to make the call at a 95 percent confidence 
level, or making a principled plea for “more and better empirical 
work on the play” would be inappropriate responses. 
We might consider the possibility that impressionistic evidence—
though unreliable in general—may be conveying at least some real 
information in this case. Although an isolated anecdote is little more 
than an illustration of what it would be like for a proposition to be 
true, a sizable collection of anecdotes is not so far from a survey. The 
chief similarity is that in both cases many individuals communicate 
their impressions of the world. The chief differences (at least with 
regard to a carefully conducted survey) are three. First, the survey 
produces a more uniform set of responses by asking all subjects the 
same question which all respondents interpret in the same way. 
Second, the survey is more careful about selecting a representative 
sample. Third, because survey questions can be framed in terms of 
personal knowledge, the survey has a somewhat better chance of 
avoiding “herding” behavior, wherein several seemingly independent 
impressions derive in reality from a unitary source. These distinctions 
are likely to make a large difference when one is “averaging” over 
anecdotes that point in many different directions, or when there is 
reason to believe that only those who witness what they regard as 
notable behavior come forward with their impressions. But when, as 
here, the anecdotal evidence is, and has been for some time, relatively 
 
 116. A metanalysis quantitatively combines the results of prior studies meeting express 
criteria. See, e.g., R. Rosenthal & M. R. DiMatteo, Meta-analysis: Recent Developments in 
Quantitative Methods for Literature Reviews, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 59 (2001) (primer on meta-
analysis). 
 117. See generally MORRIS H. DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 437–517 (2d ed. 
1986) (discussing statistical techniques for testing hypotheses). 
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broad-based and remarkably aligned, the impact of these distinctions 
may be somewhat attenuated. 
In reviewing the literature over the last two decades, one is 
struck by the fact that apparently no one—no judge, no plaintiffs’ 
attorney, no defense counsel, no client—is waxing eloquent on the 
sanctity of trial evidence: nobody, apparently, is “drowning” in 
litigant integrity. This regularity would convey less information were 
our attention restricted to the first wave of reporting, when the 
opposite belief that “things are going reasonably well” might not have 
been worth mentioning. But the persistence of this unanimity is 
telling. Despite the fact that it would have been at several points in 
recent history newsworthy, scholarship-worthy, and in the political 
interests of those whose voices generally command attention, the 
optimistic view of evidentiary foul play has never surfaced. 
In the end, then, if we had to make the call—which arguably, we 
do whenever we decline to privilege the status quo—we could 
perhaps feel reasonably secure in concluding that evidence tampering 
is not uncommon and that the law, though it does not ignore the 
activity, does at best a halfhearted job of preventing it. This is the 
provisional position adopted in the remainder of the Article. 
II.  THE LAW’S MYOPIC FOCUS: DOCTRINE 
Scholars may disagree about whether the prevalence of evidence 
tampering is a result of how the law is written or how it is enforced.118 
There is general consensus, however, that the law as written is the 
source of the second potentially troubling aspect of tampering 
regulation considered in this Article—namely, that it is too tightly 
focused on tampering that occurs far downstream along the litigation 
flow.119 
 
 118. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1194–96 (advocating moving back the date on which 
evidence destruction actions can be brought); id. at 1195 (“[L]itigants apparently can destroy 
relevant documents on the eve of the filing of a civil action. Most lawyers appear to use this 
standard as a general rule of thumb when advising clients who are parties to, or are facing, civil 
litigation.”); Philip A. Lionberger, Comment, Interference with Prospective Civil Litigation by 
Spoliation of Evidence: Should Texas Adopt a New Tort?, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 209, 230–31 (1989) 
(“Currently, spoliators may escape criminal or civil sanctions by destroying evidence before the 
institution of legal proceedings.”); Andrea H. Rowse, Comment, Spoliation: Civil Liability for 
Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 193 (1985): 
[U]nder some statutes an individual may escape criminal liability where evidence is 
destroyed before a legal proceeding is instituted, even though the spoliator 
reasonably believed a legal proceeding or investigation was likely to arise. Because of 
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The rules governing evidence tampering span several fields of 
legal scholarship. These rules are notoriously unsettled and their 
application across jurisdictions varies widely—a disequilibrium that 
may reflect infrequent employment.120 The discussion that follows 
considers those laws and rules that apply in civil actions among 
private parties in federal court (although some discussion of agency 
investigations is unavoidable). The focus is on rules that increase the 
legal risk of evidence tampering, as opposed to those that make 
tampering more difficult to effect (e.g., those facilitating 
impeachment of witnesses). Furthermore, the discussion concentrates 
on manifestations of the law’s downstream focus in this area, putting 
aside a host of other interesting issues (many of which are already 
well handled in existing scholarship).121 
The structure of these statutes and rules confirms the impression 
that only downstream evidence tampering is subject to sanction. 
Moreover, even within the limited downstream reaches where these 
rules apply, one detects a sliding scale: the farther downstream the 
activity, the toothier the proscription. 
A. Criminal Statutes 
Statutes criminalizing evidentiary foul play fall into three 
overlapping categories: obstruction of justice, criminal contempt, and 
perjury.122 
 
these statutory loopholes, many lawyers believe they can legally and ethically advise 
their clients to destroy evidence. 
 120. Apparently the Peter Pan of evidentiary procedure, the law in this area has been 
deemed “immature” for almost seventy-five years. See John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. 
Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 230 (1935) 
(“[A]s a whole the published opinions are most unsatisfactory. After reading some scores of 
them, we concluded that any ‘collection of the authorities’ would be an uninformative hodge-
podge.”); Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 690 (writing in 1966: “Unfortunately, there are few 
interpretive cases that are closely enough related to our specific problems to be of much 
assistance. Through this foggy bog the antitrust lawyer must make his way . . . .”); Oesterle, 
supra note 12, at 1231 (writing in 1983: “At present, the standards imposed by courts that have 
gone beyond the language of rule 37 are immature.”); Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A Funny 
Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the 
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statute, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570–71 (1992) (“[T]he mens rea 
requirement has never been clearly articulated.”). 
 121. See generally GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12; Beckstrom, supra note 12; Nesson, 
supra note 12; Oesterle, supra note 12. 
 122. For an analysis of when such “public remedies” might be preferable to procedural and 
evidentiary sanctions or independent tort claims, (discussed infra in Parts II.B and II.C, 
respectively), see Richard D. Friedman, Dealing with Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961, 1980–81 (1997). 
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1. Obstruction of Justice. The twenty statutes in Title 18’s 
Chapter 73123—which reach activities as diverse as destroying, 
altering, and fabricating documentary evidence; lying to juries, 
agencies, and investigators; and violently retaliating against judge, 
jury, or witness—are scattered like leaves over the landscape of 
evidentiary foul play, overlapping here, leaving patches of green 
there.124 In the wake of Enron’s collapse and the conviction of its 
auditor, Arthur Andersen, for obstruction of justice,125 Congress 
tossed a few new leaves onto the turf. Precisely where these landed is 
unclear. Their legislative history is particularly hard to discern, 
shadowed as they were by auditing and securities reforms contained 
in the same Sarbanes-Oxley Act.126 
Arguably, however, Sarbanes-Oxley did little to widen the law’s 
tight focus on downstream tampering.127 The dual object of this 
Section is to support this claim, while also generally elucidating how 
obstruction statutes govern tampering in private suits. 
a. The Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Problem. Much simplified, the score 
of obstruction statutes in Chapter 73 vary in scope along three 
dimensions: (1) the genre of “obstructive” act proscribed; (2) the 
form of “justice” that is obstructed (e.g., judicial proceeding, agency 
investigation, or congressional hearing); and (3) the degree of causal 
and intentional linkage—i.e., the “nexus”—between the 
“obstruction,” on the one hand, and the “justice,” on the other.128 
Before Sarbanes-Oxley, the most criticized aspect of Chapter 73 
was the fact that many obstructive acts were not criminal unless they 
were specifically directed at a pending judicial or agency 
 
 123. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501–1520 (West Supp. 2003). 
 124. See Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 704 (referring to Chapter 73 as a “motley collection” 
of statutes). 
 125. Arthur Andersen, LLP was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000). Luisa Beltran 
et al., Andersen Guilty, CNN Money, at http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/13/news/andersen_verdict 
(June 16, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 126. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)). The relevant titles of this act are 
Title VIII (“Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability”) and Title XI (“Corporate Fraud 
and Accountability”). 
 127. That Congress went so far as to crack open Chapter 73 and yet did little to correct its 
supposedly myopic focus may be instructive, but we will leave that possibility for the analysis in 
Part IV. 
 128. The “nexus” requirement is actually the conjunction of elements that are sometimes 
treated separately. See, e.g., De Marco, supra note 120, at 572 (listing four elements, including 
pendency and specific intent). 
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proceeding.129 More precisely, the provisions of Chapter 73 with an 
adequately broad definition of “obstruction” had an overly strict 
nexus requirement, while those with a relaxed nexus requirement had 
a too narrow definition of “obstruction.” 
Thus, on the one hand, section 1503(a)’s “omnibus 
provision”130—with its broad scope relative to different forms of 
obstructive activity—had (and still has) a strict nexus requirement. 
The Aguilar case, 131 specifically held out as an example of the need for 
reform by the Senate sponsor of the new obstruction provisions, 
illustrates the point.132 Aguilar, a federal district judge, lied to Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigators about his improper 
efforts to influence the outcome of a case being handled by another 
judge in his district. For these lies, he was charged under section 
1503(a)’s omnibus provision with “corruptly endeavoring” to obstruct 
a grand jury investigation.133 At the time that he was questioned by 
the FBI, a grand jury had convened to investigate his influence 
activities, and Aguilar apparently knew of this fact.134 But the FBI 
agents to whom he lied had not been subpoenaed to appear before 
this grand jury and were not “act[ing] as an arm of the grand jury.”135 
The Supreme Court held that there was not a sufficiently significant 
“nexus” between Aguilar’s obstructive act and the kind of justice 
protected by 1503(a)’s omnibus provision: “[U]ttering false 
statements to an investigating agent . . . who might or might not 
 
 129. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995) (finding that the defendant’s false 
statements to the investigating agent were not covered by the statutory language because the 
agent “might or might not” testify before a grand jury); Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1201–02 
(“[S]ection 1503 apparently allows parties to destroy any documents, even those relevant to 
future civil actions, if the destruction occurs before the complaint is filed.” (referring to 18 
U.S.C. § 1503 (2000))). But see Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1111–12 (arguing more on 
the basis of logic than case law that obstructive acts perpetrated prior to a grand jury subpoena 
or civil complaint may be criminal under section 1503). 
See infra notes 162–171 and accompanying text for a discussion of how recent changes to 
Chapter 73 would apply to the facts in Aguilar. 
 130. Section 1503(a)’s omnibus provision applies to “[w]hoever corruptly . . . influences, 
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of 
justice.” § 1503(a). 
 131. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 593. 
 132. See 148 CONG. REC. S1786 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 133. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. 
 134. See id. at 597, 600–01 (noting that when Aguilar asked the FBI agent whether he was a 
target of a grand jury investigation, the agent told him there was a grand jury convening). 
 135. Id. 
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testify before a grand jury is [in]sufficient to make out a violation of 
the [omnibus] provision of § 1503.”136 
On the other hand, several other sections of Chapter 73 requiring 
less of a nexus were seen as too narrow in their definition of 
“obstructive acts.” Chief among these other sections was (former) 
section 1512.137 Unlike section 1503, section 1512 did not (and still 
does not) require that the obstructed form of justice—the “official 
proceeding”138—be “pending or about to be instituted at the time of 
the offense.”139 Yet, although section 1512 applied to “corruptly 
persuading” another to lie, mislead, destroy, or conceal, it did not 
apply to one’s own such acts.140 
b. The Sarbanes-Oxley Solution. Congress’s apparent object in 
passing Sarbanes-Oxley’s obstruction provisions was to combine 
section 1503(a)’s broader definition of obstructive acts with section 
1512’s weaker nexus requirement.141 The House had one idea about 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000) (criminalizing, prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, an array of specific 
forms of obstruction, including killing or threatening witnesses and, by threats or other means, 
inducing another person to destroy evidence). 
 138. The phrase “official proceeding” in section 1512 was and is defined in section 
1515(a)(1) as follows: 
(A) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States, a United States 
magistrate, a bankruptcy judge, a judge of the United States Tax Court, a special trial 
judge of the Tax Court, a judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims, or a 
Federal grand jury; (B) a proceeding before the Congress; (C) a proceeding before a 
Federal Government agency which is authorized by law; or (D) a proceeding . . . 
before any insurance regulatory official or agency . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1) (2000). Thus, in addition to its weaker nexus requirement, section 1512 
also applies to a broader range of “justice” than section 1503(a), a point not emphasized in the 
text. (Note also: not all provisions in section 1512 require that the justice obstructed be an 
“official proceeding,” as defined in section 1515(a)(1)). 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1). Nor did (or does) section 1512 require that the obstructer know 
or intend his acts to be directed specifically to a federal court, grand jury, or investigation. Id. § 
1512(g). 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that 
“neither the bill that passed the House nor the compromise bill that was ultimately enacted 
criminalizes a witness’s violation of his own legal duty”). 
 141. According to Senator Leahy, the sponsor of some of these provisions, the changes to 
Chapter 73 were meant “to clarify and plug holes in the existing criminal laws relating to the 
destruction or fabrication of evidence, including the shredding of financial and audit records” 
because “[c]urrently, those provisions are a patchwork which have been interpreted, often very 
narrowly, by Federal courts.” 148 CONG. REC S1786-6 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). Leahy specifically mentions Aguilar’s nexus requirement and section 1512’s 
inapplicability to one’s own acts. See id. 
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how to do this, the Senate, another.142 Rather than melding the two 
approaches into a coherent whole, the conference report simply 
adopted both approaches,143 thus making Chapter 73’s “medley of 
crimes”144 all the more cacophonous. 
The House’s approach, which has received less attention than the 
Senate’s,145 appears to be more far-reaching along several important 
dimensions146 (although this will ultimately depend upon judicial 
interpretation). The House took the fairly natural step of inserting 
into section 1512 a general proscription on the obstructer’s own 
obstructive acts, new section 1512(c),147 leaving the rest of section 
1512’s structure intact. 
 
 142. The obstruction provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley that originated in the House were finally 
passed as H.R. 5118 on July 16, 2002. H.R. 5118, 107th Cong. (2002). The history leading up to 
passage is somewhat convoluted. The House’s first effort toward enacting what became 
Sarbanes-Oxley was passage of another bill, H.R. 3763 (4/24/02). H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002). 
This was followed in the Senate by passage of S. 2673 (7/15/02), and the two were taken to 
conference. S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002). H.R. 5118 appears to have been the House’s 
“afterthought” in the wake of additional events following passage of H.R. 3763, including the 
revelation in early July that Global Crossing was being investigated for shredding documents 
relevant to its bankruptcy proceedings. See 148 CONG. REC. H5475, (daily ed. July 25, 2002) 
(statement of Rep. Bereuter) (mentioning Global Crossing as a “recent corporate scandal”); 
Dennis K. Berman, U.S. to Investigate Possible Shredding at Global Crossing, WALL ST. J., July 
3, 2002, at B4 (announcing the Global Crossing investigation). H.R. 5118 was then incorporated 
into the conference report on H.R. 3763. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-610 (2002). 
Ironically, the House’s approach in H.R. 5118 was similar to the Senate’s approach, 
ultimately rejected, in the original passage of section 1512 in 1982. S. 2420, 97th Cong. (1982). See 
also Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 382–84 (discussing the legislative history behind section 1512’s 
original passage). 
 143. Compare H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-610 (2002), with H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002), 
and S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 144. United States v. Buckley, 192 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 145. Senator Leahy, who sponsored the Senate approach, received both more press and 
more floor time to advocate his solution. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S1785 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 
2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); News Conference of Senator Leahy, Introduction of the 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, transcript available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~leahy/press/200203/031202.html. In contrast, regarding the House’s 
alternative approach, electronic searches uncover no entry in the congressional record, nor any 
press. 
 146. But see John J. Falvey Jr. & Matthew A. Wolfman, Commentary, The Criminal 
Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley: A Tale of Sound and Fury?, 1 No. 19 ANDREWS ENRON LITIG. 
REP., Oct. 7, 2002, at 15 (arguing that the change to section 1512 “largely overlaps with the 
[Senate-sponsored additions of sections 1519 and 1520] and with existing law”). 
 147. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (West Supp. 2003): 
Whoever corruptly—(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, 
or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or 
availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or 
impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
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The Senate, on the other hand, added two new provisions to 
Chapter 73. New section 1520 applies only to auditors.148 New section 
1519 appears to apply only to obstructive acts conducted with regard 
to tangible evidence.149 Moreover, the “justice” protected by new 
section 1519 seems to include only activities by federal agencies and 
departments, and bankruptcy cases under Title 11—and not general 
judicial proceedings.150 On the other hand, new section 1519 applies 
“in relation to or in contemplation of any matter” within the agency’s 
or department’s jurisdiction, and it is possible that courts will read 
this nexus requirement to be weaker than that applicable to section 
1512(c). 
How then does Sarbanes-Oxley change Chapter 73 in the context 
of civil suits between private parties? Possibly the only change for 
such cases is that the obstructer’s own generally obstructive acts 
would now be proscribed at some time prior to the filing of the 
complaint. Such self-help would now fall under section 1512(c) with 
its relaxed nexus requirement, rather than just under section 1503(a)’s 
 
(emphasis added). New section 1512(c)(2) appears to add general obstructive behavior by the 
obstructer herself to the list of activities regulated by section 1512. In terms of the obstructive 
activities covered, then, it appears to overlap with the omnibus provision, section 1503. Notice, 
however, that section 1512(c)(1) also specifically, and apparently redundantly, mentions the 
destruction and manipulation of tangible evidence. 
 148. See id. § 1520(a)(1): 
Any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer of securities to which section 
10A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-1(a)) applies, shall 
maintain all audit or review workpapers for a period of 5 years from the end of the 
fiscal period in which the audit or review was concluded. 
Section 1520 essentially adds, within the somewhat unlikely context of Chapter 73, another 
item—namely, “audit or review workpapers”—to the long list of statutory record retention 
requirements spread throughout the U.S. Code. See generally CCH GUIDE TO RECORD 
RETENTION REQUIREMENTS (as of July 1, 2001) (cataloging the federal statutory and 
regulatory record retention requirements). The new section instructs the SEC more precisely to 
define what kind of documents must be retained, and the impact of this new section will depend 
in large part on what that definition turns out to be. 
 149. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519: 
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes 
a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, 
obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within 
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed 
under Title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
 150. See id. (applying the provision to “any matter within the jurisdiction of any department 
or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11”). The late addition of bankruptcy 
proceedings to this provision may have been partly inspired by the contemporaneous 
announcement that Global Crossing was being investigated for shredding documents relevant to 
bankruptcy proceedings. See generally Berman, supra note 142 (announcing the Global Crossing 
investigation). 
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omnibus provision, which requires that the obstructed justice be 
pending.151 
Unfortunately, Congress did not take the opportunity to clarify 
just how much more relaxed section 1512(c)’s nexus requirement is 
meant to be. Although it is clear that the obstructed “official 
proceeding” need not be pending under section 1512(c), this leaves 
open many questions regarding how tightly targeted to a specific 
proceeding the tampering need be. New section 1512(c) would 
probably reach a defendant’s destruction of documents relevant to a 
particular plaintiff’s suit that is only anticipated and not actually 
pending. But what if the documents are destroyed to guard against 
whatever suit might arise, without having specific litigation in mind? 
For example, how would the provision apply to the ongoing 
destruction of safety test records by a manufacturer when there is no 
specific plaintiff—perhaps not even a specific buyer for the product? 
Arguably, such upstream behavior would still fall outside the bounds 
of new section 1512(c).152 At the very least, Sarbanes-Oxley does little 
to resolve the issue. 
 
 151. Recall that section 1519 with its arguably broader language of “matters,” “cases,” and 
“contemplation” appears to apply to judicial proceedings only when they arise under the 
bankruptcy laws in Title 11. 
 152. See, e.g., United States. v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 812–13 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting, in 
the context of other provisions of section 1512, the “official proceeding” requirement also 
applicable to new section 1512(c) as meaning that “[w]ithout at least a circumstantial showing of 
intent to affect testimony at some particular federal proceeding that is ongoing or is scheduled 
to be commenced in the future, this statute does not proscribe his conduct” (emphasis added)). 
But see United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1984) (employing an apparently 
weaker nexus requirement in connection with the same “official proceeding” requirement). 
This “official proceeding” requirement, which applies to new section 1512(c), does not 
apply to all provisions of section 1512. A comparison of the different nexus requirements 
applicable to other provisions of section 1512 may shed some light on what the nexus 
requirement for section 1512(c) is and is not. See, e.g., United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 
1249–50 (11th Cir. 1998): 
Sections 1512(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), and (b)(2)(A)–(D) [like new 1512(c)] all require 
that the proscribed conduct occur in the context of an “official proceeding”. . . . In 
contrast, §§ 1512(a)(1)(C) and (b)(3), the subsection under which this case arises, 
contain a different jurisdictional basis: the defendant must have committed the 
obstructive conduct with the intent to “prevent,” in § 1512(a)(1)(C), or “hinder, delay, 
or prevent,” in § 1512(b)(3) communication to a federal law enforcement officer or 
judge information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal 
crime. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s implicit comparison of this weaker nexus requirement (applying to, inter 
alia, new section 1512(c)) is illuminating. See id. at 1250: 
[F]ederal jurisdiction under § 1512(b)(3) [with its weaker nexus requirement] is based 
on the federal interest of protecting the integrity of potential federal investigations by 
ensuring that transfers of information to federal law enforcement officers and judges 
relating to the possible commission of federal offenses be truthful and unimpeded. By 
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To bring home the significance of Congress’s silence on this 
issue, consider how new section 1512(c), would bear upon two salient 
cases. 
c. Section 1512(c) and Andersen. Although the shredding 
episode that provided the main impetus for Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
obstruction provisions concerned an agency investigation, rather than 
a private suit (the focus here), it is instructive to consider how new 
section 1512(c) would have applied ignoring this distinction.153 Arthur 
Andersen, the partnership, was convicted under former (and new) 
section 1512(b) of corruptly persuading employees to obstruct justice 
by shredding documents.154 The “official proceeding” in question—
which was not pending at the time of Andersen’s obstructive acts, but 
was the specific object of Andersen’s intent—was an SEC inquiry into 
Enron’s special purpose entities.155 Were these same events 
prosecuted under new section 1512(c), the secretaries and staff who 
actually did the shredding—as opposed to those who “persuaded” 
them to do so—would also be criminally liable and possibly subject to 
roughly a year in prison.156 
Sarbanes-Oxley leaves unanswered the question whether 
Andersen would have been criminally liable under any portion of 
Chapter 73 if it had simply complied with its own policy of routinely 
destroying audit-related documents. A few years before, the SEC had 
made extensive use of Andersen’s internal documents in proving that 
Andersen knew of Waste Management’s improper accounting.157 In 
response to this debacle,158 Andersen devised a “document retention 
 
its wording, § 1512(b)(3) does not depend on the existence or imminency of a federal 
case or investigation but rather on the possible existence of a federal crime and a 
defendant’s intention to thwart an inquiry into that crime. 
 153. Although they do not apply to a general civil suit between private parties, new section 
1519 and section 1520 might have applied to the Andersen case. See supra notes 148–149; infra 
note 161. 
 154. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Indictment at 5, United States. v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. CRH-02-121 (S.D. 
Tex. filed Mar. 7, 2002). 
 156. See supra note 114. Compare this to the up to $500,000 fine that would have been paid 
by the partnership had it survived. Violations of section 1512(b) are punishable with fines or 
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000). 
 157. See Eichenwald, supra note 3. 
 158. See id. (“The problems created by the Waste Management records were never to be 
repeated.”). 
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policy” that required preservation of audit work files, but quick 
destruction of audit-related documents.159 However, 
early [in 2000], to cut costs, Andersen dismissed some employees 
who handled the newly required shredding, and paper began 
stacking up. By June [2001], accountants handling Enron in Houston 
were virtually buried in documents that, under the policy, should 
have been shredded long before.160 
If Andersen had been destroying audit-related documents as it went 
along, rather than after it learned of the SEC inquiry in October 2001, 
would it have been criminally liable under new section 1512(c)? 
Arguably not. Although section 1512(c) does not require that the 
obstructed official proceeding be pending, it does seem to require 
that a particular official proceeding be looming on the horizon.161 If 
Congress had wanted to criminalize the kind of upstream destruction 
that might have taken place under Andersen’s retention policy, it 
could have done so with specific language. Indeed, the courts’ 
demonstrated tendency to interpret Chapter 73’s ambiguities in favor 
of the accused162 would have indicated that specific statutory language 
was necessary to criminalize this kind of behavior.163 
d. Section 1512(c) and Aguilar. Aguilar,164 like Andersen, 
concerned an agency investigation rather than a private suit. But 
 
 159. See generally ARTHUR ANDERSEN, PRACTICE ADMINISTRATION: CLIENT 
ENGAGEMENT INFORMATION—ORGANIZATION, RETENTION AND DESTRUCTION, 
STATEMENT NO. 760 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.ethicsandlawyering.com/issues/files/ 
andersenretenpolicy.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 160. See Eichenwald, supra note 3. 
 161. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
What about sections 1519 and 1520? Even new section 1519, which employs the arguably 
broader “in contemplation of” language, seems to require a particular “matter” or “case.” If an 
individual shreds documents as she goes along so as to obstruct whatever matter or case may or 
may not arise, section 1519 may not apply. Certainly, § 1519 itself does little to make clear how 
specific one’s “contemplation” must be. 
Because Andersen was acting as an auditor, new section 1520 might also apply, though at 
least one commentator has doubted its application to the facts of this case. See Falvey & 
Wolfman, supra note 146 (“In the case of Arthur Andersen, for example, there was no evidence 
that the firm shredded audit workpapers, but rather that it shredded other audit-related 
documents. This new provision imposes a statutory requirement for a retention practice that 
public accounting firms already observe.”). 
 162. See supra Part II.A.1.a (discussing United States v. Aguilar). 
 163. Cf. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 378–84 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (employing 
similar logic in interpreting § 1505). 
 164. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
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because it also appears to have played a role in motivating the 
obstruction provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley,165 it is worth considering 
how new section 1512(c) would apply to its facts. Recall that Judge 
Aguilar was acquitted in that case under section 1503(a)’s omnibus 
provision because of an insufficient nexus between his obstructive act 
and ongoing grand jury investigations.166 There is at least a colorable 
argument that Judge Aguilar’s lie to the FBI agent would not result in 
his conviction under new section 1512(c) either.167 
Relative to section 1503, section 1512 relaxes the nexus 
requirement in two ways, neither of which seems to bridge the gap in 
Aguilar. First, as noted, unlike section 1503, section 1512 does not 
require that the “official proceeding” be “pending.”168 This relaxation 
is irrelevant to the Aguilar fact pattern, because the grand jury 
proceeding was pending anyway, and Judge Aguilar knew it to be 
so.169 Second, section 1512 does not require specific intent that the 
official proceeding be federal.170 This relaxation is probably also moot 
for Aguilar. Aguilar seems to have known about the particular federal 
grand jury convened against him.171 Instead, according to the court’s 
interpretation of the evidence in Aguilar, what Aguilar did not know 
firmly enough was whether the FBI agent to whom he lied would be 
called to testify.172 It is not clear why this lack of knowledge would not 
still be decisive under new section 1512(c).173 
 
 165. See supra note 141. 
 166. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600–01. 
 167. Note that on its face, new § 1519 would not apply because it is limited to obstructive 
acts performed on “records, documents or tangible objects.” 
 168. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(f)(1) (West Supp. 2003) (“[A]n official proceeding need not be 
pending . . . .”). 
 169. 515 U.S. at 600–01. 
 170. See § 1512(g) (“[N]o state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance—
(1) that the official proceeding . . . is before a judge or court of the United States . . . .”). 
 171. See 515 U.S. at 600–01. 
 172. Id. at 601. 
 173. § 1512(c). In interpreting former section 1512, 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000), some 
commentators seem to assert that FBI investigations are themselves “official proceedings,” and 
thus, in particular, “agency proceedings” “authorized by law.” See Lisa R. Rafferty & Julie 
Teperow, Obstruction of Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 989, 1008–09 (1998): 
[I]n order to secure a conviction under § 1512, an official proceeding need not be 
pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. Hence, an investigation 
by a federal agency may constitute an “official proceeding” within the meaning of § 
1512(e). Furthermore, if an individual realizes that a federal proceeding might be 
commenced and acts in such a manner as to affect potential testimony, conviction 
under § 1512 is permissible. 
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2. Contempt. To be held in contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401,174 a 
party must either commit the offending act in the court’s presence175 
or be in willful176 violation of a standing court order. Thus, an 
individual may be in contempt for violating a subpoena issued during 
discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e).177 But out-of-
court evidence tampering that does not violate a specific order is not 
criminal under section 401. Thus, even document destruction in direct 
response to a discovery request may not be criminal. In partial 
mitigation of this restriction, a party may attempt to obtain, 
immediately upon filing, a court order directing her opponent to 
retain all relevant documents, and practice guides and treatises often 
suggest doing so.178 Such orders, however, will never predate filing of 
the complaint. Thus, contempt effectively requires a pending 
proceeding. Consequently, its reach is even more restricted to 
downstream tampering than is obstruction of justice. 
In return for this stricter restriction to downstream activity—and 
in line with the sliding scale identified above—contempt sanctions are 
more summarily imposed. The presiding judge may herself initiate 
criminal contempt proceedings without involving the prosecutor. And 
 
Jeffrey R. Kallstrom & Suzanne E. Roe, Obstruction of Justice, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1081, 
1111–12 (2001) (repeating Rafferty & Teperow’s language essentially verbatim). This analysis 
seems to conflate the definition of an “official proceeding” with the requirement that it be 
“pending.” Moreover, the analysis appears too divorced from the main issue of the defendant’s 
state of mind regarding the connection between the obstruction and the justice, the issue which 
forms the core of the Supreme Court’s analysis of section 1503, see Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, and 
is arguably the heart of the matter in section 1512 as well. 
 174. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000): 
Power of court. A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or 
imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official 
transactions; (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, 
decree, or command. 
 175. Id. § 401(1). In some cases, the court’s “constructive presence” has sufficed. In re 
Indep. Pub. Co., 240 F. 849, 857 (9th Cir. 1917). 
 176. See De Marco, supra note 120, at 591–92. (“[C]ourts hearing contempt cases generally 
convict only those persons who purposefully intended to be contemptuous—those who intended 
to flout the authority of the court.”). 
 177. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e) (“Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a 
subpoena . . . may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued.”). 
 178. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.4, at 76 (“[P]rudent counsel should move 
for a document-preservation order at an early stage of the litigation.”). 
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the judge whose court was the object of the alleged “contempt” will 
then be the one to handle the contempt proceeding.179 
3. Perjury. There are three perjury statutes in Title 18’s Chapter 
79. Section 1622 concerns inducing another to commit perjury.180 
Sections 1621181 and 1623182 reach the act of perjury itself. 
Of the latter two concerning perjury per se, section 1623 applies 
farther downstream than section 1621. Section 1623 applies only to 
falsehoods perpetrated “in any proceeding before or ancillary to any 
court or grand jury of the United States.”183 In practice, “ancillary” 
proceedings have included depositions conducted under rules of 
procedure.184 In contrast, section 1621 applies whenever a person has 
“taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any 
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be 
administered.”185 Courts have construed this language to encompass 
 
 179. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (allowing a judge to summarily punish criminal contempt 
committed in her presence); see also Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1204–07 (outlining the 
application of section 401 to document destruction cases); Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 
1113–14 (listing differences between contempt and obstruction of justice). 
 180. 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (2000). 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000). Section 1621, “Perjury generally”, reads as follows: 
Whoever—(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in 
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, 
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, 
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary 
to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be 
true . . . is guilty of perjury. 
(emphases added). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000). Section 1623(a), “False declarations before grand jury or 
court”, reads as follows: 
Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand 
jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or 
uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, 
or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
(emphases added). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 963 (describing section 1623 as “construed to 
limit the operation of the statute to testimony actually submitted in the presence of the court or 
grand jury or in the course of a deposition pursuant to valid rules of procedure”). Compare 
United States v. Krogh, 366 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that a sworn deposition 
constituted an “ancillary proceeding”), with Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 111 (1979) 
(holding that a sworn statement given in the course of an interview in an attorneys’ office was 
too informal to qualify as an “ancillary proceeding” under section 1623). 
 185. 18 U.S.C. § 1621. 
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investigations, agency proceedings, and signed affidavits,186 all of 
which may be precursors to depositions, or grand jury testimony. 
In line with the sliding scale identified above, section 1623, which 
applies only later along the process time line, is otherwise broader in 
application.187 First, section 1623 requires only that the defendant 
knowingly make the false statement. Under section 1621 the falsity 
must be “willful.”188 Second, section 1623 applies to “mak[ing] or 
us[ing] any other information, including any book, paper, document, 
record, recording, or other material.”189 Section 1621, in contrast, 
applies only to a narrower range of activities constituting “stating or 
subscribing any material matter.” Third, under section 1623, falsity 
may be proven simply by establishing that the defendant made 
“irreconcilably contradictory declarations.”190 Section 1621, on the 
other hand, requires the government to prove precisely which of the 
contradictory statements was false.191 Last, while section 1621 has 
been interpreted to incorporate the common law “two witness 
rule,”192 section 1623 specifically eschews this formula,193 allowing 
 
 186. Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 962 (describing section 1621 as “construed to 
extend the operation of section 1621 to a diverse range of situations, not all related to judicial 
proceedings”); see, e.g., Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1938) (holding that 
perjury can be committed in an ex parte investigation); Natvig v. United States, 236 F.2d 694, 
695 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (affirming defendant’s conviction for perjury in a hearing before the 
Federal Communications Commission); United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1042 (11th Cir. 
1994) (affirming defendant’s conviction for perjury in a signed affidavit). 
Section 1621 also applies to congressional hearings. Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 
959 n.9; see, e.g., United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 660–61 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding a 
conviction under section 1621 where the defendant had perjured herself in a Senate hearing). 
 187. See Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 973 (“While § 1621 is broader than § 1623 
with regard to the range of proceedings where it applies, the opposite is true regarding the range 
of conduct condemned.”). 
 188. See also Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 964 (“Section 1623, unlike § 1621, does 
not require proof that the alleged false testimony was submitted willfully. Rather, it requires 
that such testimony have been knowingly stated or subscribed.”). 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000); see also Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 973–74 
(“Although it is infrequently invoked, the ‘make or use’ provision of § 1623 has been broadly 
construed.”). 
 190. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c). 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Lebon, 4 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he fact that a witness 
contradicts herself . . . does not establish perjury.”). For further discussion of this point, see 
Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 967 and sources cited therein. 
 192. This is the rule that one witness alone, with no other evidence of any form, is 
insufficient to prove perjury. See Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 972–73 and sources cited 
therein. 
 193. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e). 
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt by any constellation of admissible 
evidence.194 
B. Procedural and Evidentiary Sanctions 
The court that hears the underlying case may impose sanctions 
for evidence tampering under either the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or its “inherent power” to regulate process. The overall 
pattern for such sanctions is similar to that for the criminal statutes 
examined above. For the most part, procedural and evidentiary 
sanctions reach only evidence tampering perpetrated after the 
complaint has been filed. Moreover, even along the limited reaches 
where such sanctions apply, the farther downstream the tampering, 
the greater the sanction and the more summarily it is imposed. 
 
 194. Before leaving the topic of criminal sanctions it is worth considering the relationship 
between perjury and obstruction. Consider first the definitions of the crimes. It seems clear that 
both section 1621 and section 1623 perjury will usually also qualify as obstruction of justice 
under new section 1512(c)(2), especially in the context of civil suits between private parties. 
First, the perjurous acts of making or subscribing a false statement or making or using false 
records would most likely fall under the range of obstructive conduct proscribed by section 
1512(c)(2). See supra note 147. Second, the mens rea requirements for either brand of perjury 
would probably imply the mens rea requirements for obstruction in nearly every case. Compare 
18 U.S.C. § 1621, and 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c)(2) (West Supp. 2003) 
(requiring that the defendant have acted “willfully,” “knowingly,” and “corruptly” respectively). 
Third, it seems that a “proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United 
States,” and probably even any “competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a 
law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered” would qualify as an “official 
proceeding” under section 1512. Cf. POSNER, supra note 54, at 37 (stating, prior to the passage 
of new section 1512(c) that “‘obstruction of justice’ . . . includes perjury when committed in 
either a civil or criminal proceeding; [but] excludes perjury in other settings, for example before 
a congressional committee unless the committee is inquiring into possible violations of law”). 
After passage of new section 1512(c), “obstruction of justice” presumably includes perjury, as a 
general obstructive act under section 1512(c)(2), when committed before an “official 
proceeding,” defined in section 1515(a)(1) to include not only civil or criminal proceedings, but 
also federal agency proceedings authorized by law and congressional proceedings. See supra 
note 138 for the text of section 1515(a)(1) and supra note 147 for the text of section 1512(c). 
That said, there may still be situations where an oath is administered before a “competent 
tribunal, officer, or person, in [a] case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to 
be administered,” as per section 1621, and yet there is no “official proceeding” under sections 
1512(c) and 1515(a)(1). Recall that new section 1519, which appears to apply to a broader range 
of “justice” than does section 1512(c), does not, on its face at least, pertain to lying under oath. 
For a comparison of sentencing under the two provisions, see supra note 114. 
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1. Sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.195 
a. Failure to Obey a Court Order. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(b) authorizes sanctions if a party fails to obey a court 
order “to provide or permit discovery.”196 In addition to the orders 
specifically listed in Rule 37,197 a wide range of orders are subject to 
sanction. For example, it is now common practice for parties to obtain 
“evidence preservation orders,”198 the violation of which has been 
held sanctionable under Rule 37(b).199 
The often cited case of Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General 
Nutrition Corp.200 illustrates well how evidence tampering might 
trigger Rule 37(b) sanctions. Thompson, a national brand vitamin 
manufacturer, sued GNC, a vitamin retailer, for advertising 
Thompson’s products at a 20 percent discount, but purposefully not 
having enough in stock to meet expected demand, thus employing 
“bait and switch” advertising for its own private label.201 GNC’s 
 
 195. Although several federal rules touch on evidence tampering, only the most important 
are reviewed here. Relevant federal rules (of both procedure and evidence) not explicitly 
considered in Section II.B, generally, include Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) (sanctioning 
the bad faith presentation of affidavits in supporting or defending against a motion for summary 
judgment), Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) (exempting from the hearsay rule statements 
“offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and 
did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness”), and Federal Rule of Evidence 
1004(1) and (3) (allowing “other evidence” of contents of a writing, recording, or photograph 
when “originals” are lost or destroyed, unless these are lost or destroyed by a proponent in bad 
faith or the party in control of the originals fails to produce them). 
 196. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). 
 197. The list includes court orders to compel discovery, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(a), in light of a party’s failure adequately to (1) make the various “required 
disclosures” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) regarding how she plans to support 
her case, FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(A)), (2) answer questions put to her in a deposition or an 
interrogatory, or (3) permit inspection of documents and things upon proper request, FED. R. 
CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(B). Also specifically enumerated in Rule 37(a) are orders to submit to physical 
and mental examinations, FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2), 35(a), and orders to attend the parties’ 
scheduling conference for discovery, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), 37(b)(2). 
 198. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1225 (“Litigants have begun to avoid a part of the 
problem by securing court orders early in the litigation that all documents material to the 
litigation must be preserved for possible production at the request of opponents.”). 
 199. See Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1984) 
(imposing sanctions on GNC for failure to comply with an order from a special master); In re 
Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 613, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“A party 
may not destroy documents where a preservation order has been entered . . . .”); see also 
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.4, at 76 (describing, with examples from case law, how the 
violation of an order to preserve evidence can trigger sanctions under Rule 37). 
 200. 593 F. Supp. 1443. 
 201. Id. at 1444. 
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purchase, sale, and inventory records—in both hard copy and 
electronic form—were important evidence in the case. One year after 
Thompson filed its complaint, at a time when GNC still had these 
records in its possession,202 the court ordered GNC to preserve such 
records.203 GNC declined to pass this directive on to its internal 
departments and employees, and the records were destroyed.204 After 
GNC failed to produce the records in response to Thompson’s 
subsequent discovery request, the court ordered GNC to do so. At 
the same time, the court widened the scope of its original 
preservation order.205 No records were forthcoming. Ultimately GNC 
was sanctioned under Rule 37(b) for violating the court’s multiple 
orders to preserve and produce evidence.206 
In addition to illustrating how Rule 37(b) sanctions are triggered, 
the GNC case also illustrates the fact that the sanctions within the 
court’s discretion are broad-ranging.207 In the GNC case, the court 
struck GNC’s answer, entered default judgment against it on 
Thompson’s claims, dismissed GNC’s own claims against 
Thompson,208 and required GNC to pay (with interest) the attorneys’ 
 
 202. Id. at 1445 (finding of fact 7). 
 203. Id. (finding of fact 18). 
 204. Id. at 1447–48 (findings of fact 19–28). 
 205. Id. at 1449–50 (finding of fact 35). 
 206. Id. at 1455. 
 207. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)–(E) enumerates a number of sanctions. 
To the detriment of the violator and with varying relationship to the nature of the violation, the 
court may take certain facts as given, refuse to hear certain claims or defenses, refuse to admit 
certain evidence, strike certain pleadings, stay or dismiss part or all of the action, render 
judgment by default, hold the violator in contempt of court, or any logically consistent 
combination of the above. Additionally, under Rule 37(b)(2), the court may force payment of 
certain costs and attorneys’ fees. 
The court has wide discretion to choose which of these enumerated sanctions to impose. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (authorizing the court to make any “such orders in regard to the failure 
as are just”); Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1226 (“Once a court is willing to invoke the sanctions of 
rule 37(b), it has wide discretion in its choice of orders.”). But courts are reluctant to go beyond 
this list. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 8A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 
2289 (2d ed. 1994): 
[T]he five lettered paragraphs of Rule 37(b)(2), setting out some eight possible 
sanctions, are not mutually exclusive. The court may impose several of these specified 
sanctions at the same time. . . . 
. . . . 
The court is not limited to the kinds of orders specified in Rule 37(b)(2), though 
courts have been reluctant to impose novel sanctions of a sort not mentioned in the 
rule. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 208. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 1456. 
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fees that Thompson had incurred in attempting to compel discovery 
of the records, conducting discovery on the destruction thereof, and 
pursuing sanctions under Rule 37(b).209 
Compared to exercise of the court’s inherent powers, as 
discussed below in Section B.2, Rule 37(b) sanctions are—by their 
nature—summarily imposed. The court need only satisfy itself that 
the litigant violated a valid and unambiguous court order.210 The 
litigant’s intent, for example, is generally not at issue.211 
Nevertheless, the prerequisites for imposing Rule 37(b) sanctions 
guarantee that such sanctions will be imposed only for tampering that 
occurs late in the game. Though “court order” is broadly defined 
under the rule, imposition of Rule 37(b) sanctions generally requires 
the existence of a court order of some kind.212 Moreover, courts 
 
 209. Id. at 1456–57. 
 210. See, e.g., id. at 1455–56 (imposing discovery sanctions for bare violation of an order). 
The existence of a valid order is not just sufficient but in fact necessary. See GREGORY P. 
JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 48(A), at 582–83 (3d ed. 
2000) (discussing the requirement of a court order for the imposition of sanctions); Shepherd v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a violation can occur only 
where there is an identifiable discovery order); Holcomb v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 774 F.2d 398, 
400–01 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]f the order of court which the plaintiffs and their attorneys 
disobeyed was not itself a valid order, then the sanctions must necessarily fall.”). 
 211. See Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 1455–56 (not requiring a finding of bad 
intent); cf. id. at 1454 (examining, in determining whether to exercise the court’s inherent 
powers, whether GNC acted in bad faith). 
 212. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, § 2289 (“Rule 37(b) usually has no application if 
there has not been a court order.”). However, the order may be oral, JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 
48(A), at 582; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, § 2289, and in some cases even “constructive,” 
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.4, at 76; JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 48(A), at 583. 
Note that some courts have held a party in violation of an order for its failure to produce 
documents that it previously destroyed. See Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 
72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Even though a party may have destroyed evidence prior to issuance of the 
discovery order and thus be unable to obey, sanctions are still appropriate under Rule 37(b) 
because this inability was self-inflicted.”); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 
1979, 90 F.R.D. 613, 620–21 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that American Airlines’ failure to produce 
a report due to its undisclosed destruction of that report was a “failure to respond” within the 
context of Rules 34(b) and 37(b)). 
Note, also, that under other provisions of Rule 37, a standing court order is not a 
prerequisite for behavior to be sanctionable. These provisions are less applicable to evidence 
tampering. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) (authorizing sanctions when a party improperly and 
harmfully fails to make, update, or correct required disclosures under Rule 26); FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(c)(2) (requiring that a party that fails to admit the genuineness of a document or the truth of 
a matter, as requested under Rule 36 must pay the other side’s expenses in proving such, if the 
document turns out to be genuine or the matter true); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d) (allowing sanctions 
for ignoring a discovery request outright); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, § 2291 
(interpreting Rule 37(d) as not applicable to partial failures of cooperation). But see GORELICK 
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generally issue such orders only upon motion by the other side.213 
Thus, a defendant will almost always enjoy some window of 
opportunity between notice of the plaintiff’s claims, via service of the 
summons and complaint, and the issuance of an order to permit 
discovery of or to produce or preserve certain evidence.214 
In the GNC case, for example, a year passed between when 
Thompson filed its complaint and when the court issued its first order 
directing GNC to preserve the business records.215 Recall that at the 
time the order was issued, GNC had not yet destroyed the records. If 
GNC had destroyed the records in the window between the filing of 
the complaint and the issuance of the preservation order, sanctions 
under Rule 37(b) would not have been appropriate. (The court might 
have imposed sanctions under its inherent powers, as discussed 
below). And even if Thompson had made its request for production 
and its motion for an order to preserve at the same time as it filed its 
complaint, presumably there would still have been an interval 
between GNC’s official notice of Thompson’s claims and 
procurement of the preservation order. 
In effect discovery sanctions, with their relatively wide range and 
toothy character, are imposed upon the tamperer only if her 
opponent has made it quite clear that the evidence at issue is 
important to his case. The tamperer who risks these sanctions is not 
merely on notice of her opponent’s claims or defenses. Nor is she 
merely in possession of a discovery request indicating that her 
opponent hopes to use this evidence to prove his case. Rather, the 
tamperer sees that this evidence is so important to her opponent’s 
case that the opponent is willing to go out of his way to motion the 
 
ET AL., supra 12, § 3.6, at 84–85 (attempting to establish a link between sanctions under Rule 
37(d) and document destruction perpetrated prior to an order to preserve or produce). 
 213. See JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 48(A)(1), at 585 (“Except in the case of failure to 
disclose . . . the opposing party is required first to move for an order compelling discovery under 
Rule 37(a).”); R. W. Int’l Corp. v. Welch Foods, Inc., 937 F.2d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding a 
failure to follow the “protocol” of Rule 37 where the opposing party, “[i]nstead of . . . 
adjourning the deposition and seeking an order to compel [discovery] . . . elected to bypass Rule 
37(a) and seek immediate dismissal of the suit” and holding that “[u]nder such circumstances, 
the district court’s premature resort to Rule 37(b)(2) [could not] be upheld”). 
 214. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1222: 
Incredibly, [Rule 37(b)] provides no explicit sanctions against parties who 
unjustifiably frustrate anticipated, or even served, discovery requests for documents 
by using the office paper shredder. Only when a party destroys documents in the face 
of a court order to preserve or produce documents does the rule seem to levy 
sanctions. 
 215. See Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 1445. 
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court for an order of preservation or an order to produce. This 
characteristic of discovery sanctions will become important in Part 
IV. 
b. Certification. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 26(g) 
can also be sources of sanctions for evidentiary foul play.216 For 
example, Rule 11 may apply if a plaintiff lies about facts in her 
complaint,217 a defendant denies in his answer a factual assertion by 
the plaintiff that he knows to be true,218 or either party submits a false 
affidavit to accompany a motion or pleading.219 
In the recent case of Margo v. Weiss,220 for example, ex-members 
of the 1960s musical group the “Tokens” sued for a declaratory 
judgment that they were co-owners of copyright in the song, “The 
Lion Sleeps Tonight.”221 Years before, the Tokens had relinquished 
copyright in the song, whose melody was based on an African lullaby, 
after learning that the “Weavers” had earlier recorded a song, 
“Wimoweh,” based on the same tune.222 Decades later, the Tokens 
found out that the lyricists on their later version had cut a separate 
deal with the “Wimoweh” copyright holder to retain songwriter 
royalties.223 In response, the Tokens filed suit to restore their own co-
ownership.224 Unfortunately, as each Token independently confirmed 
in his deposition, the Tokens had learned of the lyricists’ side deal 
more than three years before filing their suit, meaning that their suit 
was time-barred.225 After defense counsel informed them of this fact, 
the Tokens filed affidavits (with an amended complaint) that 
 
 216. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.6, at 84–85. Note, however, that although the 
original version of this chapter was written in 1989 and there have been significant changes to 
Rule 11 since then, the 2004 cumulative supplement of this treatise does not update assertions 
made about this rule. See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE, § 3.6, at 
103–04 (Supp. 2004). Yet another source of sanctions is 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000), the history of 
which parallels that of Rule 11. See JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 2(C), at 40–42. 
 217. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (stating that submission to the court is a certification that 
the submitted allegations have or are likely to have evidentiary support). 
 218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4) (stating that submission of denials to the court are 
certifications that the denials are warranted on the evidence). 
 219. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 544–45 
(1991) (treating affidavits as “other papers” under Rule 11). 
 220. 213 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 221. Id. at 57. 
 222. Id. at 57–58. 
 223. Id. at 58. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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“updated,” as it were, their deposition testimony—the group now 
claiming in ensemble to have first been informed of the lyricists’ side 
deal several years later than originally stated, and within the statutory 
period.226 The district court granted the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion and applied Rule 11 to force both the Tokens and 
their lawyers to pay $22,000 of the defendant’s attorneys’ fees.227 
Notwithstanding this conspicuous example, it is difficult to 
ascertain how frequently the current version of Rule 11 is applied in 
practice for any purpose, let alone for the purpose of punishing 
fabrication. Strengthening amendments to the Rule in 1983 
purportedly set off an explosion of “satellite litigation.”228 In response, 
Rule 11 was in some respects toned down in 1993.229 Systematic 
empirical work on the Rule seems to have followed a similar cycle, 
with much activity between 1983 and 1993230 and little thereafter. Less 
rigorous sources of evidence, however, do seem to indicate a reduced 
role for the amended Rule. On the basis of Rule 11’s new text, Justice 
Scalia argued that it had been rendered “toothless.”231 Personal 
observation of practice under the amended Rule led Federal District 
Judge Milton Shadur to proclaim that “Rule 11 is pretty much 
 
 226. Id. at 58–59. 
 227. Id. at 59. 
 228. Compare Lawrence C. Marshall, et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 943, 950–52 (1992) (finding significant Rule 11 activity in a survey study of selected 
districts in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits) with BURBANK, supra note 58, at 60–62 
(finding that, for the Third Circuit, Rule 11 motions were made in only .5 percent of all pending 
civil cases during the period July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1988, and that 71 percent of attorneys had 
sought Rule 11 sanctions no more than once since the 1983 amendments to that rule), and 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 
11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1957 (1989) (“[M]y personal speculation is that such a study in the 
Seventh Circuit might conform the worst fears of Rule 11’s critics.” (emphasis added)). 
Regarding reported cases, see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 
11: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 93, 107 (1993): 
[T]he volume of increase has been staggering: in the first 38 years of practice under 
the original rule, there were about 20 reported decisions addressing the rule; while in 
the first nine years of practice under the 1983 Amendment, there were some 6,000 
reported decisions under the rule, including 600 decisions by courts of appeals and 
four decisions by the Supreme Court. 
 229. See generally Cynthia A. Leiferman, The 1993 Rule 11 Amendments: The 
Transformation of the Venomous Viper into The Toothless Tiger?, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 497 
(1994) (reviewing the 1993 textual changes to Rule 11). 
 230. See, e.g., BURBANK, supra note 58, at 60–62; Marshall et al., supra note 228, at 950–52. 
 231. Communication from the Chief Justice of the United States Transmitting Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2072, reprinted in 146 
F.R.D. 507, 507 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined in relevant part by Thomas, J.). 
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dead.”232 Others have made similar pronouncements on the same 
basis.233 And the volume of reported activity under Rule 11, however 
imperfect an indicator of actual litigation behavior,234 appears to have 
declined markedly.235 
There is also some discussion in the treatises and cases of the 
possibility of using Rules 11 and 26(g) to sanction the destruction or 
suppression of evidence that occurs before issuance of a court order—
thus picking up where Rule 37(b) leaves off.236 Nonetheless, there is 
scant evidence that either rule has ever actually been applied in this 
manner.237 Possibly, the reason is redundancy. Courts tend to deal 
 
 232. Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, 81 A.B.A. 12, 12 (1995) (quoting Judge 
Milton Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois). Note that Judge Shadur sits in the Seventh 
Circuit which, in contrast to the Third Circuit, was the site of significant Rule 11 activity prior to 
the 1993 amendments. See supra note 228. 
 233. Id. (reporting the similarly morbid impressions of other judges and practitioners—
again, mostly from the Seventh Circuit); Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 626, 643 (1998). 
 234. See, e.g., BURBANK, supra note 58, at xiii, 4, 55, 59. 
 235. Duncan, supra note 232, at 12 (reporting results of law firm’s study of Rule 11 motions 
reported on Westlaw: “In November 1994, almost one year after the new amendments, there 
were 34 percent fewer motions filed than the same month a year earlier.”). 
 236. The possible hook for sanctions under these rules is that an attorney has failed to 
conduct “reasonable inquiry” in responding to a discovery request as required under, for 
example, Rule 26(g) if she or her client have in fact destroyed or suppressed the documents that 
were supposed to be turned over for inspection. See Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. 
Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 558 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 
3.7, at 85 (discussing the holding of Turnage). Further, if the party then fails to account for the 
content of these destroyed or suppressed documents in filing other nondiscovery papers with 
the court, then these too are submitted without reasonable inquiry, thus invoking Rule 11. See 
Turnage, 115 F.R.D. at 558 n.4; see also Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Turnage for this proposition); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.7, 
at 85 (discussing the holding of Turnage). Note, however, that the 2004 cumulative supplement 
to Gorelick’s treatise does not update this discussion to account for the 1993 amendments to 
Rule 11. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 216, § 3.7, at 104. 
 237. Regarding Rule 11, there appears to be no case allowing use of the Rule to sanction the 
destruction or suppression of evidence that occurs before issuance of a court order. Rule 11 by 
its own terms does not apply to discovery-related papers. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d). And at least one 
court seems to have interpreted this limitation in a manner inconsistent with Gorelick, Marzen, 
& Solum’s expansive reading of the Rule. See supra note 12; Bakker v. Grutman, 942 F.2d 236, 
241 (4th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Rule 11 to preclude “preemption of Rules 26 and 37 for the 
sanction of discovery responses and abuses”). 
Rule 26(g) is rarely employed at all. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, § 2052: 
At the time the 1983 amendments were adopted it was supposed that Rule 26(g) was 
at least as important, and would be at least as much used, as Rule 11. That has not 
been the case. Rule 11 has been invoked many times, while Rule 26(g) has not been 
much used. 
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with pre-order evidence destruction by stepping outside the four 
corners of the Rules and exercising their so-called “inherent 
powers.”238 
2. The Court’s Inherent Powers. Although courts have ventured 
farthest upstream by exercise of their “inherent powers,” the same 
two regularities apply to this source of sanctioning authority. First, as 
a general rule, courts have been reluctant to use such powers to 
punish foul play that is perpetrated farther upstream than the filing of 
the plaintiff’s complaint.239 Second, to the limited extent that these 
inherent powers reach farther upstream than Rule 37(b), additional 
requirements are placed on the imposition of sanctions,240 and the 
sanctions themselves are generally less severe.241 
a. “On Notice” Requirement Generally. When sanctioning a 
litigant under the Rules for disobeying a court order, the analysis is 
relatively cut and dried.242 When considering whether sanctions for 
evidence destruction are appropriate in the absence of a court order, 
courts conduct a murkier and more drawn-out analysis. Courts 
generally ask whether the litigant acquired a “duty” to preserve the 
 
JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 41(A), at 533 (“There is a relative scarcity of case law under . . . Rule 
26(g) . . . . [F]orce of habit exerts a strong pull. Lawyers and judges still think largely in terms of 
Rule 37 to resolve discovery disputes.”). 
 238. See, e.g., Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 72 (“Courts thus have the power to sanction the 
destruction of evidence, whether that authority is derived from Rule 37 or from their inherent 
powers.”); see also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.5, at 77: 
For destruction of evidence beyond the reach of Federal Rule 37 . . . courts have 
found it necessary to invoke authority existing outside the rules of procedure. They 
have found it in a doctrine known as inherent power. Inherent power has been 
expressly invoked by numerous courts to justify imposition of sanctions for evidence 
destruction. 
Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1231 (“[T]he federal trial courts have used their ‘inherent power’ to 
levy sanctions on parties to define a legal obligation to preserve evidence not otherwise 
specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Professor Oesterle is specifically opposed 
to the resort to inherent powers. Instead, he proposes an amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1231, 1239–41. 
 239. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.12, at 103 (“[M]ost courts have imposed 
sanctions for destruction of evidence only after suit has formally begun.”); GORELICK ET AL., 
supra note 216, § 3.12, at 126 (“The belief that sanctions are not available for destruction of 
evidence before suit is filed may stem, in part, from the limited reach of Rule 37.”). 
 240. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, at 98–99 (analyzing both inherent powers and Rule 
37(b) sanctions together and making a similar point in terms of whether notice was “actual” 
(i.e., essentially, whether an order was violated)). 
 241. See discussion of Lewy v. Remington, infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 242. See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
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evidence.243 In large part, this is a question of whether the destroyer 
was “on notice” that the destroyed evidence would be relevant.244 In 
general, a party is not “on notice” until suit is filed.245 And in the few 
cases where parties were held to be “on notice” prior to filing, the 
destroyer’s expectations were usually tightly focused around a 
particular lawsuit against a particular opponent.246 
Cappellupo v. FMC Corp.,247 often cited for its imposition of 
sanctions for pre-filing destruction,248 illustrates these points. In that 
gender-based employment discrimination case, the court did in fact 
invoke its inherent power to sanction249 defendant/employer’s pre-
complaint destruction of documents regarding employment practices 
and records of past complaints of discrimination.250 What is less often 
noted, however, is that FMC began destroying the documents only 
one month before service of the complaint251 and continued 
 
 243. See, e.g., Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 72; Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 
F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984); see also KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 1–15 
(emphasizing the “duty” formulation more than other treatises). 
 244. See Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 1455: 
Sanctions may be imposed against a litigant who is on notice that documents and 
information in its possession are relevant to litigation, or potential litigation, or are 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and destroys 
such documents and information. While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain 
every document in its possession once a complaint is filed, it is under a duty to 
preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably 
likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the subject of a pending discovery 
request. 
Although this language is frequently quoted in discussions of inherent power, see, e.g., Turner, 
142 F.R.D. at 72; GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.11, at 93, it is worth noting that the 
findings of fact from the General Nutrition Corp. case itself seem to indicate that all or virtually 
all destruction followed a court order, and thus that invocation of the court’s inherent power 
was apparently superfluous in that case. 
 245. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.12, at 104 (“Courts have imposed sanctions 
for precomplaint destruction of evidence in [only] a half dozen cases.”). 
 246. See infra notes 247–254 and accompanying text; cf. KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 20. 
(“[C]ompanies do not have a general duty to retain all documents on the theory that a lawsuit 
might possibly be filed at some unspecified future time.”). 
 247. 126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989). 
 248. See, e.g., Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 72 (citing Cappellupo for this reason); Patton v. Newmar 
Corp., 520 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Nesson, supra note 12, at 797 n.21 (same); 
Lino Lipinsky et al., Duty to Preserve Electronic Evidence After Enron and Andersen, COLO. 
LAW., June 2003, at 58 n.8 (same). 
 249. The sanction amounted to twice the plaintiffs’ “expenditures resulting from defendant’s 
document destruction.” Capellupo, 126 F.R.D. at 553. 
 250. Id. at 547. 
 251. Id. at 548, 550 (finding that destruction began in early October 1983, while the 
complaint was received in early November of the same year). 
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destroying documents for quite some time after the complaint was 
filed.252 Moreover, the destruction began only after one of the 
plaintiff/employees approached the defendant’s equal employment 
opportunity manager and told her that “she was ‘fed-up’ with [its] . . . 
gender-based treatment and she was contemplating bringing a class 
action gender discrimination charge against the company, based upon 
her experiences and observations.”253 
How important is it that the defendant in Cappellupo knew of 
these specific plaintiffs’ intentions to sue? The defendant had 
previously had similar legal troubles at another business location.254 
And one is thus led to speculate whether the court would have 
imposed sanctions if the defendant had destroyed the same 
documents merely in anticipation of the possibility that some as yet 
unspecified employee would file a gender discrimination suit also at 
plaintiffs’ location. 
As with obstruction of justice, the authority for imposing 
inherent powers sanctions when there is no specific plaintiff is 
unclear. In formulating the requirement of notice, courts often talk 
about the anticipated litigation.255 With few exceptions, it appears that 
this encompasses the specific plaintiff. Thus, even if the defendant can 
imagine the nature of the claim, so long as she cannot anticipate the 
particular plaintiff who will bring it, she generally is not “on notice.” 
And she may destroy documents relevant to this, as yet, faceless claim 
without invoking sanctions. A designer of a defective product, for 
example, is likely free to destroy negative safety test results before 
the first unit is sold, probably also before the first plaintiff is injured, 
 
 252. Id. at 549 (“Document destruction continued from early October, [sic] 1983, through all 
of 1984, and beyond.”). 
 253. Id. at 546. Thereafter, the defendant “made the decision to systematically destroy . . . 
documents relating to . . . employment practices and the employee relations department’s 
personally-held records relating to equal employment opportunity and employee complaints of 
discrimination.” Id. at 547. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See, e.g., id. at 551 (“Defendant’s senior officials and senior employees were on notice 
of this potential lawsuit and were acutely aware of its subject.”); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 747 P.2d 911, 914 (Nev. 1987) (“[E]ven where an action has not been commenced and 
there is only a potential for litigation, the litigant is under a duty to preserve evidence which it 
knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action.”); KOESEL, ET AL., supra note 40, at 
4–8 (explaining that there is no duty to preserve evidence until a case is filed). 
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and maybe even after the first plaintiff is injured if the injury precedes 
the first complaint letter from a customer.256 
Two exceptions to this general rule in the case law receive 
arguably too much attention in the treatises. Consider these in turn. 
b. Carlucci and Selective Destruction. In Carlucci v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp.,257 a federal district court excoriated Piper Aircraft for 
its long-standing practice of selectively destroying flight test records 
that it thought would be damaging in future lawsuits against 
unspecified victims.258 The leading treatise on evidence destruction 
seems to imply that the court entered a default judgment and assessed 
fees against Piper based on this upstream, destructive behavior.259 
But though clearly disapproving of Piper’s upstream destruction, 
the Carlucci court was also careful to note, in the same breath, not 
only that Piper’s selective destruction “continued after the 
commencement of this law suit,”260 but also that Piper violated several 
court orders by failing to produce documents that existed at the time 
the order was issued.261 Even more, the court found that Piper’s foul 
play extended beyond destruction: it had “consistently disobeyed 
orders, obstructed discovery, delayed proceedings and made 
misrepresentations to the court.”262 Piper’s upstream evidence 
destruction may well have been superfluous to the court’s imposition 
of sanctions in this case. 
Thus, notwithstanding the court’s disapproval of this upstream 
activity, this district court case is scant authority for the proposition 
 
 256. This assumes that no regulation requires the retention of such documents. See generally 
CCH GUIDE TO RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 148 (cataloguing regulatory 
retention requirements). 
 257. 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d, 775 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 258. Id. at 485–86. 
 259. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.12, at 105 (offering Piper’s document 
destruction as an example of “when a party is engaged in a series of lawsuits and destroys 
evidence after litigating the first lawsuit but before another lawsuit has been filed”). 
 260. 102 F.R.D. at 485–86. 
 261. See id. at 482: 
The fact that Piper has not produced a single document (other than the official 
report) relating to its involvement in the . . . investigation [of the crash] is very 
damaging in view of defense counsel’s representation to [the] Judge . . . that such 
documents existed. Furthermore, defendant has admitted that it destroyed the 
originals of the Product Condition Reports . . . despite Judge Paine’s order requiring 
their production. 
 262. Id. at 488. 
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that such behavior on its own is sanctionable at all, let alone by entry 
of default judgment against the spoliator. 
c. Lewy and Document “Retention” Policies. Even to the extent 
that Piper’s upstream destruction would have been independently 
sufficient to inspire sanction, Piper may well have avoided the 
problem by not being as selective (or at least as obviously selective263) 
in its choice of what documents to destroy. Companies often take 
what is essentially a document destruction policy, grant it the 
semblance of nonselectivity, and dub it a “document retention” 
policy.264 The prevalence of such policies265 is consistent with 
indications in both scholarly articles and practice guides that the 
policies help to shield the manipulator against inherent powers 
sanctions for upstream destruction.266 
 
 263. See id. at 481 (reciting strong evidence of selective destruction for the purpose of 
avoiding exposure to liability). 
 264. Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1185–86: 
Businesses routinely destroy documents in order to keep the documents out of the 
hands of opponents in future legal proceedings. An amusing set of euphemisms has 
grown up around the practice: programs of “preventive maintenance” or “law 
compliance” include a “document retention” schedule to eliminate “misleading,” 
“improvident,” or “erroneous” documents for the purpose of “optimizing the 
position” of the corporation in the event of litigation. 
 265. For an early discussion of document retention policies in the scholarly literature, see 
Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 688–89. See also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 8.2, at 276 
(“The vast majority of large business enterprises now has some formal document-management 
program.” (citing John M. Fedders & Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Document Retention and 
Destruction: Practical, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW REV. 5 (1980))); 
Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1185–86 (“[M]any corporations purposefully operate programs to 
destroy evidence . . . primarily to reduce litigation ‘exposure.’”); Solum & Marzen, supra note 
38, at 1183 (“The routine destruction of documents, often accomplished through formal 
‘document management’ programs, has become commonplace.” (citing AM. SOC’Y OF CORP. 
SEC’YS, INC., SURVEY OF RECORDS RETENTION PRACTICES 2 (1971))). 
Document retention programs are even more often the subject of articles in the practice 
literature. See generally GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, app. A (providing sample policies); id. 
app. B (same); KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 16–26 (discussing the importance of 
documentation retention policies and providing advice on how to implement them); Fedders & 
Guttenplan, supra (providing general advice on document retention policies); Donald S. 
Skupsky, Discovery and Destruction of E-Mail, in THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS: A LAWYER’S 
GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 47–59 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr. ed., 1996) (discussing how 
e-mail messages are stored and can be used against the author, making recommendations about 
how to handle e-mail). 
 266. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 8.1, at 275 (“In most cases to date, courts have 
refused to sanction destruction of evidence under the auspices of those programs . . . .”); 
KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 25 (recommending, as a means of dealing with litigation risk, 
the implementation of a document retention policy to “include at least annual purging periods 
when employees must review records under their control and dispose of those that have 
exceeded their retention periods or are otherwise inappropriate for retention”). 
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The shield is not invincible. Several courts have expressed a 
willingness to pierce the veil of routine destruction. The high water 
mark in this regard is the case of Lewy v. Remington Arms Co.267 
Unloading a particular model of Remington rifle required 
moving the safety to the fire position.268 When Lewy did so in his 
basement, the gun went off, and the bullet went through the ceiling, 
wounding his mother who was standing on the floor above.269 To 
establish a design defect, Lewy introduced similar-incidents evidence 
consisting of Remington’s records of customer complaints and returns 
prompted by the same model’s propensity to fire upon safety 
release.270 Lewy also “introduced customer complaint letters, 
responsive correspondence prepared by Remington, and depositions 
and live testimony of some of the customers who complained to 
Remington.”271 Still more similar-incidents evidence—in the form of 
customer complaints and gun examination reports—had been 
destroyed by Remington under its document retention policy, 
according to which “records . . . were kept for a period of three years 
and if no action regarding a particular record was taken in that period 
it was destroyed.”272 
Remington’s destruction of these records provoked the following 
jury instruction from the trial judge: 
If a party fails to produce evidence which is under his control and 
reasonably available to him and not reasonably available to the 
adverse party, then you may infer that the evidence is unfavorable to 
the party who could have produced it and did not.273 
On appeal Remington argued that this instruction was improper 
because the destruction had taken place “pursuant to routine 
procedures.”274 Importantly, the Eighth Circuit did not affirm the trial 
court’s instruction. Rather it announced that it was unable to decide 
 
 267. 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 268. Id. at 1105. 
 269. Id. But see KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 21 (stating that Lewy’s bullet hit his wife). 
 270. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1108. For a lucid discussion of the admissibility of similar incidents 
evidence, see GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 187–91 
(1996). 
 271. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1108. 
 272. Id. at 1111. 
 273. Id. 
 273. Id. (quoting 3 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS § 72.16 (4th ed. 1987)). 
 274. Id. 
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whether the instruction was proper based on the record before it.275 
Having already decided to remand the case for other reasons, the 
Eighth Circuit provided the court below with a list of three “factors” 
that it was to consider in determining whether to issue such an 
instruction, should the plaintiff again request it.276 First, the court was 
to consider “whether [Remington’s] three year retention policy [was] 
reasonable” for “documents such as customer complaints.”277 
“Second, in making this determination the court [could] consider 
whether lawsuits concerning the complaint or related complaints have 
been filed, the frequency of such complaints, and the magnitude of 
the complaints.”278 Lastly, the court was to determine “whether the 
document retention policy was instituted in bad faith.”279 The Eighth 
Circuit’s strongest statement against the propriety of Remington’s 
document retention policy was appended—with ambiguous logical 
relationship—to the enumeration of these three factors: “[I]f the 
corporation knew or should have known that the documents would 
become material at some point in the future then such documents 
should have been preserved. Thus, a corporation cannot blindly 
destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly 
innocuous document retention policy.”280 
Lewy has received special emphasis in the treatises.281 In fact, 
there are several reasons why Lewy is less important than one might 
glean from this elevated position. In the first place, although it was 
decided a decade and a half ago, Lewy has gotten far less play in the 
courts than it has in legal commentary. Even within the Eighth 
Circuit, Lewy is rarely cited to justify sanctions for upstream 
destruction under a document retention policy.282 Outside the Eighth 
 
 275. Id. at 1112. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 216, at 24–25, 47, 363, 364, 368–69, 370–71, 374, 
380 (discussing Lewy); KOESEL, ET AL., supra note 40, at 21. 
 282. For a limited exception, see Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 204 F.R.D. 425, 
432, 436 (E.D. Ark. 2001) where the court granted a permissive adverse inference instruction 
against Union Pacific for recording over “dispatch tapes” under its document retention policy 
one year before the case was filed, but after the train crossing accident that killed plaintiff’s 
decedent. But see Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 
33352759, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (declining to grant permissive inference for deletion 
of relevant e-mails prior to filing of complaint relevant to antitrust suit). 
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circuit, Lewy appears to have been cited for its approach to document 
retention policies in only one published opinion, Turner v. Hudson 
Transit Lines, Inc.283 That case, litigated in the Southern District of 
New York, involved a bus accident on the New Jersey Turnpike and 
the plaintiff/passenger’s allegations that the bus’s brakes were 
faulty.284 Despite an approving citation in the opinion to Lewy’s 
strongest language, the facts clearly indicate that the defendant/bus 
company destroyed maintenance records only after the plaintiff filed 
an amended complaint specifically alleging faulty brakes.285 Indeed, 
such destruction was actually in violation of, not pursuant to, the bus 
company’s own “document retention policy.”286 
The second reason to question Lewy’s reach is that its language 
is particularly elastic. Neither the independent meaning of the three 
factors listed by the court nor their logical relationship has ever been 
adequately clarified.287 Merely listing three factors to consider gives 
no guidance on whether the three factors are to be regarded as 
independent necessary conditions, independent sufficient conditions, 
or whether a shortage of one factor may be compensated for with a 
surplus of another. Similarly, words like “reasonable” are empty 
shells without application to specific fact patterns. 
In the specific fact pattern of the Lewy case, the docket shows 
that on remand the plaintiffs again asked for the adverse inference 
instruction, but this time the trial judge, a different judge, declined to 
issue it.288 Although the new judge provided no justification for this 
ruling,289 one may reasonably infer that he considered the Eighth 
Circuit’s three factors and found Remington’s document retention 
practice “reasonable” and not in “bad faith,” despite the long list of 
similar fire-upon-safety-release incidents. This ruling was not 
appealed: conversations with plaintiffs’ lawyers indicate that they let 
 
 283. No. 89 Civ. 4252 (PKL), 1992 WL 51570, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 09, 1992). 
 284. Id. at *1, *3. 
 285. Id. at *2–*3. 
 286. Id. at *3. 
 287. Compare Stevenson, 204 F.R.D. at 428 (“This is not a three-part test where each factor 
must be met, but rather three factors to be considered in determining whether sanctions should 
be imposed.”), with Concord Boat Corp., 1997 WL 33352759, at *6 (“[T]he Court finds that bad 
faith is arguably a prerequisite to giving an adverse inference jury instruction. If it is not a 
prerequisite per se it is definitely the primary factor to consider in weighing the appropriateness 
of the instruction.”). 
 288. Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. L, Lewy v. Remington Arms, 836 F.2d 1104 
(8th Cir. 1988) (No. 83-3172-CV-S-2). 
 289. Civil Docket Continuation Sheet at 31, Lewy (No. 83-3172-CV-S-2). 
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the ruling on the instruction slide, focused as they were on what they 
considered to be more important issues.290 
The third reason to doubt Lewy’s significance is that the 
evidence destruction battle in that case was fought over a non-party-
specific, and merely permissive, inference instruction. The battle was 
not over entry of a default judgment against Remington, nor over 
striking Remington’s answer, nor over imposing sizable monetary 
sanctions, nor over a ruling on a mandatory inference that the 
destroyed records were damaging to Remington, nor over a 
presumption that would shift onto Remington the burden of 
production on the issue of whether the rifle’s design was defective,291 
nor even over Lewy’s attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with 
procuring the instruction.292 As Professor Nesson has argued, it is hard 
to consider an adverse inference a sanction at all. A negative 
inference from spoliation seems no worse than the negative inference 
that the evidence would have inspired had it not been destroyed and 
instead had been admitted into evidence.293 
Excepting fee awards, this adverse inference instruction—
frequently referred to as the “spoliation inference”—is often the most 
severe sanction issued under the court’s inherent powers when these 
powers are extended beyond the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.294 Conversely, it is interesting to note that the enumerated 
 
 290. Telephone Interview with Rich Miller, Attorney (Aug. 30, 2002). 
 291. Cf. Friedman, supra note 122, at 1968 (“[I]t is probably rather rare that a case of 
spoliation is sufficiently serious to justify a true presumption, actually shifting the burden of 
production, rather than simply supporting the case of the spoliator’s opponent.”). 
 292. Indeed, not only was the punishment merely an adverse inference based on missing 
evidence, it was also an adverse inference instruction in a case in which the evidence that did 
make it to the jury—including customer complaints from the immediately preceding three-year 
period and the testimony and personal records of similarly situated customers who were 
uncovered by Lewy’s lawyers—seems to have been sufficient on its own to support a finding 
that the rifle was defective. See Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1107–08 (8th Cir. 
1988). In this regard, one should note that Lewy and his mother (both plaintiffs in this case) 
obtained a favorable verdict on remand, without the benefit of the instruction, and were 
awarded damages totaling $165,000. Lewy v. Remington Arms Co, Judgment in a Civil Case, 
No. 83-3172-CV-S-4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 1989). 
 293. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 797. But see Friedman, supra note 122, at 1964 (“[M]issing 
evidence inference is extremely useful and powerful. Its strength lies in large part in its 
informality . . . .”). 
 294. See Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordering the lower court 
on remand to revise the adverse inference instruction given so as not to require a finding of bad 
faith); Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112 (requiring the lower court on remand to consider several factors 
regarding Remington’s document retention policy before giving adverse inference instruction); 
Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982) 
080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC 9/17/2004  2:04 PM 
1278 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1215 
sanctions under Rule 37(b) for violation of a court order, as discussed 
above, do not even include the adverse inference instruction.295 In the 
context of evidence destruction, the weakest remedy in Rule 37(b)’s 
list is that the fact finder take as given facts the opponent would have 
proven with the destroyed evidence.296 This remedy is quite a bit 
stronger than inviting the jury to make inferences from an absence of 
evidence that the jury may have made in any event.297 
d. Lewy, Carlucci, and Virtual Filing. Even if one considers 
Carlucci and Lewy to have made inroads into upstream destruction, it 
is important to note that they both share a particular characteristic 
that makes the evidence destruction in those cases practically 
equivalent to destruction after filing. In both cases the defendants had 
previously faced a series of similar incidents, some of which had 
resulted in other lawsuits.298 Both cases concerned defects in product 
design—in Lewy, firing on safety release, in Carlucci problems with 
aerodynamic stability—that had already affected a number of 
customer/plaintiffs in essentially the same way.299 In practical effect, 
notice of the first few suits was as good as notice of the rest to come. 
Similarly, in other cases that have stretched the court’s inherent 
powers, the evidence was destroyed prior to filing, but following a 
serious accident to a specific plaintiff that was likely to lead to 
 
(upholding lower court’s use of adverse inference instruction based on both evidentiary and 
policy rationales); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 204 F.R.D 425, 436 (E.D. Ark. 2001) 
(instructing the jury that destroyed records would have been adverse to the defendant). 
 295. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). The court would not be precluded from employing this 
remedy. See supra note 207. 
 296. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 
 297. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 2.8, at 36–37 (arguing that spoliation evidence is 
relevant and should at least be admitted, if not made the subject of an adverse inference 
instruction); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 216, at 17–26 (same). But see 22 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5178 (1978) 
(arguing against admissibility). On balance, courts exercise the same caution in admitting 
spoliation evidence as they do in admitting evidence of flight. See, e.g., Caparotta v. Entergy 
Corp., 168 F.3d 754, 757–58 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding inadvertent spoliation more prejudicial than 
probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403). Part of this caution derives from the perceived 
risk of an improper character inference from the bad act of spoliation, for example, to the bad 
act of unsafe product design. See id. at 756 (“[A]n adverse inference drawn from the destruction 
of records is predicated on bad faith by the defendant.”). 
 298. See Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1107–09; Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 478–79 
(S.D. Fla. 1984). This point is emphasized in GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.12, at 105, 
which categorizes Carlucci in this group of cases, and KOESELL, ET AL., supra note 40, at 20–21, 
which categorizes Lewy under a similar heading. 
 299. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1105; Carlucci, 102 F.R.D. at 474. 
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litigation. In Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,300 for example, 
the plaintiff’s decedent was hit by a train at a railroad crossing. 
Shortly after the accident, but before filing, the defendant railroad 
recorded over tapes of concurrent conversations between the train 
crew and the dispatcher.301 Arguably, notice of the decedent’s death 
was as good as notice of the survivor’s lawsuit. 
3. New Trial and “Fraud upon the Court”. When foul play 
comes to light only after final judgment, courts are usually reluctant 
to reopen the case.302 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make it 
difficult to reopen the case ten days beyond entry of judgment,303 and 
even more difficult after a year has passed.304 Beyond a year, the only 
possibility for relief is the court’s inherent power to vacate the 
judgment upon finding that it was obtained by a “fraud upon the 
court”.305 But “fraud upon the court” is a term reserved for bribery of 
a judge or, perhaps, fraud perpetrated by an “officer of the court.” 
Plain old spoliation or even perjury by a party or witness is not 
enough.306 
 
 300. 204 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Ark. 2001). 
 301. Id. at 429–31. 
 302. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 798 (“Once a trial is over, the risk from disclosure of 
previously suppressed evidence diminishes . . . . rapidly . . . . [I]f you can suppress evidence for a 
year after the verdict, you are home-free.”). 
 303. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b) (“Any motion for a new trial shall be filed no later than 10 
days after entry of the judgment.”). 
 304. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (stating that relief from a judgment or order based on factors 
such as mistake or fraud may only be obtained for up to one year following a proceeding). 
 305. Id. 
 306. See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2870 
(3d ed. 1995): 
[T]he courts have refused to invoke this concept in cases in which the wrong, if wrong 
there was, was only between the parties in the case and involved no direct assault on 
the integrity of the judicial process. Nondisclosure by a party or the party’s attorney 
has not been enough. 
The cases in which it has been found that there was, or might have been, a “fraud 
upon the court,” for the most part, have been cases in which there was “the most 
egregious conduct involving a corruption of the judicial process itself.” The concept 
clearly includes bribery of a judge or the employment of counsel in order to bring an 
improper influence on the court. 
. . . . 
Cases of perjured evidence are troublesome. There are a few cases in which the 
courts have said that this was a fraud upon the court, even in the absence of any 
suggestion that any officer of the court was a party to the perjury . . . . But there is a 
powerful distinction between perjury to which an attorney is a party and that with 
which no attorney is involved. 
(footnotes omitted). 
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C. Independent Civil Actions: The Gentle Arc of the Spoliation Tort 
Can a private litigant bring an independent tort action against a 
litigation opponent for damage to the litigant’s case caused by the 
opponent’s evidence tampering?307 Despite the general position 
among scholars that such actions should be maintainable,308 the 
answer, in most jurisdictions, is “no.”309 
There was some controlled rejoicing when a California trial court 
recognized an independent tort of spoliation in the mid-1980s.310 But 
only a small minority of jurisdictions followed suit.311 Moreover, in the 
late 1990s, California’s Supreme Court shut down the spoliation tort 
in that jurisdiction as well.312 At this point, courts in only about a 
dozen states have recognized some form of spoliation tort.313 In fewer 
 
 307. Consistent with this Part’s focus on the federal system, note first that, in principle, the 
underlying case might be one that was or could have been brought in federal court. 
Furthermore, a federal court might obtain subject matter jurisdiction over the derivative 
spoliation claim by either diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1367 
(2000). There is also a federal civil rights cause of action for certain kinds of obstruction of 
justice. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (2000). 
 308. See generally Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Uncertainty: Making Evidential 
Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891 (1997). See also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 
12, § 4.1, at 140 (“[D]estruction of evidence itself gives rise to liability rather than enhancing, 
through inferences and constructive admissions, the likelihood of recovery on some other 
basis.”). But see Friedman, supra note 122, at 1981–86 (arguing, in specific response to Porat and 
Stein, supra, that the role for a tort action for evidentiary damage is “quite a narrowly confined 
one” and probably restricted to cases where evidentiary damage is caused by a third party). 
 309. See Porat & Stein, supra note 308, at 1893 (“Liability for evidential damage is 
recognized by the law only in exceptional cases, typically involving intentional destruction or 
suppression of pivotal evidence. Subject to these exceptions, which are yet to crystallize into 
bright-line rules, evidential damage is generally irremediable.”). 
 310. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing 
the tort of spoliation in a prospective products liability action); see also GORELICK ET AL., supra 
note 12, § 4.3, at 142–43 (citing Smith with approval). 
 311. See generally KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 75–172 (reviewing each state’s laws as of 
2000). 
 312. See Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 233 (Cal. 1999) (rejecting tort 
of third-party spoliation); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 
1998) (rejecting tort of first-party spoliation). 
 313. See generally KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 75–172. According to Koesel, the states 
that currently recognize an independent tort of spoliation include (with qualifications noted): 
Alabama (only for third-party spoliation, but also for negligent spoliation); Alaska (only for 
intentional spoliation, not for negligent spoliation); District of Columbia (possibly only for 
third-party spoliation, but includes both negligent and reckless spoliation); Florida (not yet 
considered by Florida Supreme Court); Idaho (not expressly adopted); Illinois; Indiana 
(apparently limited); Kansas (rejected by Kansas Supreme Court, but accepted in “some 
circumstances” by federal district court applying Kansas law); Louisiana (not yet considered by 
Louisiana Supreme Court); Montana (limited to third-party spoliation, but includes both 
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still, has recognition been endorsed by the state’s highest court.314 
According to one practice guide, which catalogues the law of all fifty 
states in this regard, recent decisions “signal a trend away from 
adopting spoliation of evidence as a separate tort.”315 
Even in those jurisdictions that recognize the tort, its incremental 
practical effect may be more modest than first appears. Consider, for 
example, the central case of intentional spoliation by a party 
opponent.316 At first glance, the tort seems greatly to expand the set of 
remedies and sanctions by offering monetary compensation—beyond 
fee reimbursement—to the victim of the spoliation. But in a sense the 
set of procedural and evidentiary remedies for foul play do already 
compensate the victim, albeit in a procedural and evidentiary 
currency. Such remedies include, for example, taking certain facts as 
given or allowing an adverse inference instruction.317 These remedies 
translate into monetary awards by increasing the chance of a 
favorable verdict in the underlying case or increasing the level of 
damages awarded.318 In principle, then, the spoliation tort, which 
compensates for expected favorable verdicts foregone,319 covers the 
same injury as procedural and evidentiary remedies.320 It would seem, 
therefore, that the curative effects of procedural and evidentiary 
 
negligent and intentional spoliation); New Jersey (not yet considered by New Jersey Supreme 
Court; lower courts are split); New Mexico (requiring specific and malicious intent); Ohio (only 
intentional); and Pennsylvania (only for third-party spoliation). Cf. id. at 50–51 (producing a 
similar list). Koesel also indicates that several leading jurisdictions, including New York, 
California, and Massachusetts, have specifically declined to recognize the spoliation tort. Id. at 
84–87, 138–40, 117–19. 
 314. See, e.g., id. at 65 (“[T]he Supreme Court of New Mexico recently reaffirmed its 
recognition of the spoliation tort . . . .”). 
 315. Id. at 65–66. 
 316. Cf. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.1, at 140 (describing the creation and 
evolution of the spoliation tort in common law jurisprudence); KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 
50–67 (providing elements of the tort of spoliation and recent common law developments 
relating to the tort). 
 317. See supra Part II.B. 
 318. See Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]n an action 
for negligent or reckless spoliation of evidence, damages arrived at through just and reasonable 
estimation based on relevant data should be multiplied by the probability that the plaintiff 
would have won the underlying suit had the spoliated evidence been available.”). 
 319. See Petrik v. Monarch Printing Co., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“[W]hat 
plaintiffs lost, and what they were to be compensated for, was an ‘expectancy’—the value of the 
opportunity to win their suit.”). 
 320. Cf. Friedman, supra note 122, at 1984 (arguing the stronger proposition that whenever 
recovery is warranted under the spoliation tort it would also be warranted in the underlying 
action). 
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remedies would have to be subtracted in calculating spoliation tort 
damages.321 Possibly, in the spirit of the contractual duty to mitigate,322 
or the tort doctrine of avoidable consequences,323 attempting to secure 
preverdict remedies would be a prerequisite for later recovery.324 
Thus, the incremental effect of the spoliation tort must lie in the 
narrow intersection between those injuries that procedural and 
evidentiary sanctions could not cure, and those injuries that are 
nonetheless concrete enough to be compensable in tort.325 
That said, other potential sources of incremental effect do 
become apparent when one moves beyond the traditional spoliation 
model. First, in some jurisdictions the spoliation tort reaches 
negligent spoliation.326 Second, in some jurisdictions the tort applies to 
spoliation by nonparties—as when the garage to which the damaged 
car is towed junks the car despite plaintiff’s repeated requests to 
preserve it for evidence.327 Third, in some jurisdictions there is 
authority that the victim of spoliation may bring a separate claim 
 
 321. It appears that no case has addressed this issue directly. Some support is offered by 
Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087, 1094–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In that case, plaintiff 
joined to an underlying contract claim a spoliation tort claim regarding defendant’s behavior in 
the same suit. Defendant argued that it would be improper for the plaintiff to recover on both 
claims because this would be in effect double counting. The court responded that it would not 
be improper to the extent that the spoliation lowered plaintiff’s award on the contract claim: 
A party significantly impaired by the destruction of evidence may still be able to 
prevail in an action for breach of contract on the basis of existing evidence, albeit to a 
lesser extent and for reduced damages . . . .[T]he spoliation claim permits recovery for 
those missing damages that but for [defendants’] destruction of evidence, [plaintiff] 
otherwise would have been able to prove. The total measure of damages remains the 
same—namely, the amount of money due [plaintiff] under the contract. Cf. Friedman, 
supra note 122, at 1985 (implicitly assuming that subtraction is proper). 
 322. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.15 (4th ed. 
1998). 
 323. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 458 
(5th ed. 1984) (“The Rule of avoidable consequences comes into play after a legal wrong has 
occurred, but while some damages may still be averted . . . .”). 
 324. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998) (requiring 
mitigation by raising spoliation issues in the underlying suit); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 
4.21, at 165 (stating that the plaintiff must ask “for discovery sanctions or for the spoliation 
inference in the underlying action” and that “if these remedies prove insufficient, then the 
spoliation tort action may be brought”). 
 325. Cf. Friedman, supra note 122, at 1984 (asserting in effect that this intersection is 
empty); see also KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 53 (finding that courts that decide against 
recognizing the spoliation tort are primarily persuaded by the “uncertainty of damages,” as well 
as the existence of other adequate remedies). 
 326. These are Alabama, Montana, Florida, and the District of Columbia. KOESEL ET AL., 
supra note 40, at 55. 
 327. Id. at 66. 
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following final judgment in the underlying action when it has learned 
of the spoliation after it was too late to raise the issue in the 
underlying action.328 Nonetheless, if current trends continue, even 
these incremental effects will be confined to a small and ever 
shrinking list of jurisdictions. 
D. Professional Responsibility 
Rules of professional responsibility and conduct essentially add 
another layer of sanction to the battery of laws and rules prohibiting 
evidentiary foul play in the case where the perpetrator is an 
attorney.329 In general, however, they do not expand the range of 
sanctionable behavior. 
With respect to evidence destruction, such rules stipulate that 
attorneys may not “unlawfully” destroy evidence, nor counsel clients 
to do the same.330 On its face, this does not reach beyond the laws and 
 
 328. Id. at 62–64; Nesson, supra note 12, at 798. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b), (d) 
(allowing amendments to conform to the evidence and supplemental pleadings, respectively). 
On the other hand, some courts have held that when the victim discovers the spoliation before 
trial, the victim must join the spoliation claim with the underlying action. KOESEL ET AL., supra 
note 40, at 62–63; see also Nesson, supra note 12, at 798 (“If efforts to obtain a new trial fail, the 
spoliation victim might bring an independent suit for the tort of spoliation. Only [a few] states 
have expressly recognized such a tort, however . . . .”). 
 329. Such sanctions include disqualification from serving as attorney in the instant case, 
Briggs v. McWeeny, 796 A.2d 516, 542 (Conn. 2002); suspension from the practice of law for a 
fixed period with reentry contingent upon passing the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination, Statewide Grievance Comm. v. DeLucia, No. CV02080512, 2003 WL 1900869, at 
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2003); indefinite suspension, In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Mo. 
2002) (en banc); revocation of attorneys’ pro hac vice status, Bank of Hawaii v. Kunimoto, 984 
P.2d 1198, 1219 (Haw. 1999); disbarment, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 818 A.2d 219, 
237 (Md. 2003); refusal to grant the offending lawyer’s party’s request to exclude evidence, 
Bradley v. Brotman, 836 So. 2d 1129, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); setting aside of the verdict 
in the primary suit, United States v. Adens, 56 M.J. 724, 735 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2002); 
specifying that designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, precluding 
the introduction of certain evidence at trial, striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying 
further proceedings pending compliance with an order that has not been followed, dismissing 
the action in full or in part, entering default judgment on some or all the claims, an award of 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 
10, 18 (S.C. 2001); and the imposition of both state and federal sanctions for the same violation, 
In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). See supra note 97 (discussing the 
common assertion that these rules are rarely enforced—however written). 
 330. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2002) (“A lawyer shall not: (a) 
unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a 
document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1980) (“In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . 
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.”); id. DR 7-
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rules discussed above. Indeed, the reach may be narrower, because 
“unlawful” may be interpreted to mean “criminal.”331 Only one 
jurisdiction has explicitly made clear that evidence destruction may 
be sanctionable even where that destruction does not rise to the level 
of criminal behavior.332 
Another rule of professional responsibility prohibits conduct that 
is “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”333 On its face such a 
provision might reach beyond unlawful behavior.334 But despite the 
advocacy of several commentators, apparently only one jurisdiction 
has explicitly adopted this broad interpretation.335 
With respect to the fabrication of evidence, the rules essentially 
prohibit lawyers from committing perjury when they make 
representations to the court.336 Thus when a lawyer perjures herself, 
 
109(A) (“A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to 
reveal or produce.”). 
 331. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 7.7, at 258 (questioning whether such rules 
prohibit only that behavior made unlawful by the criminal law and noting that in some 
jurisdictions, “the obstruction of justice statute is severely limited or does not extend to civil 
litigation”). 
 332. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 216, § 7.7, at 358–59 (citing the single jurisdiction, the 
District of Columbia, which has supposedly broadened the reach of its Rules of Professional 
Conduct to prohibit “obstruction” of an imminent or pending proceeding, which in any event 
would seem to be illegal under modern obstruction of justice statutes). But see GORELICK ET 
AL., supra note 12, § 7.7, at 255–60 (arguing strenuously that the definition of “unlawful” should 
be extended). 
 333. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (“It is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to: . . . (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”); 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (“A lawyer shall not: . . . (5) [e]ngage 
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”). 
 334. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A 
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 566 (1985) (“Rule 8.4(d) 
signifies that there are other offenses [in addition to crimes or violations of other Model Rules] 
against a tribunal or against the administration of justice not covered in those Rules.”). 
 335. District of Columbia Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Op. 119, at 4 (1983). See 
Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1128–30 (referring to the District of Columbia’s application 
of this provision). Later work by the same authors is not as clear about the rarity of this 
interpretation. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, at 261 (using the Missouri case of In re Bear 
578 S.W.2d 928, 935 (Mo. 1979) as the only “example” of the proposition that “decisions under 
the Model Code [refused] to limit the duty not to destroy evidence to cases in which such 
destruction would be unlawful”). Yet in Bear, the attorney erased a tape recording of the 
police’s post-Miranda interrogation of the juvenile suspect, which would seem to be illegal on 
many scores. 
 336. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 advisory committee’s note 3: 
An advocate is . . . usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters 
asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, 
or by someone on the client’s behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. . . . However, 
an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the 
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additional professional sanctions are layered on top of the usual 
criminal sanctions.337 Lawyers also have an uncertain obligation to 
uncover or prevent their clients’ perjury—one that is tempered by the 
“obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force” and the 
general view that an advocate “is not required to present an impartial 
exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a 
cause.”338 
E. Summary 
Criminal law, civil procedure, tort law, and rules of professional 
responsibility all prohibit evidence tampering in suits between private 
parties. From these diverse and tortuous prohibitions two general 
patterns emerge. 
First, all of these sanctions are concentrated far downstream of 
the litigation-inspiring event: A party may be in contempt of the court 
only if before the court; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 only 
comes into play after the complaint has been filed; perjury can only 
be committed under oath; and the omnibus obstruction of justice 
provision section 1503 requires that the proceeding be pending. 
Moreover, with regard to the exercise of inherent powers, a careful 
reading of the cases indicates that the courts have been reluctant to 
exercise such powers to sanction pre-filing destruction. This 
reluctance is all the greater when no specific plaintiff looms on the 
horizon. A fortiori, document “retention” policies that are not 
specifically directed at destroying potentially damaging records 
appear to remain a largely effective means of insulating document 
destruction from this source of sanction. Even section 1512(c), the 
newest obstruction of justice provision, which makes general 
obstructive behavior criminal even when there is no pending 
proceeding, may not extend to defendants who destroy evidence as 
part of routine document “retention” policies, or who, more 
generally, do not have a specific suit with a specific opponent in mind. 
Second, even in the downstream reaches of the litigation flow 
wherein tampering is punished, the farther downstream the 
 
lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer 
knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably 
diligent inquiry. 
 337. Id. scope (“Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a 
basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”). 
 338. Id. R. 3.3 advisory committee’s note 2. 
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tampering, the more far reaching the prohibition. Of the two perjury 
statutes, for example, section 1623, which prohibits lying only in 
judicial proceedings and depositions, is in other respects broader in 
scope than its counterpart section 1621, which applies any time a 
statement is made under oath. Likewise, the fact that contempt may 
be summarily imposed corresponds with its use far downstream. 
A similar pattern emerges from the untidy array of procedural 
and evidentiary sanctions. Here Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
37(b) and inherent powers stand out as the main sources of 
sanctioning authority in practice. A court order to compel discovery 
under Rule 37 is only issued at the insistence of the opposing party. 
But if that order is later violated penalties will be summarily and 
almost certainly imposed. If the court wishes to punish tampering 
somewhat farther upstream, it must use its inherent powers. The 
imposition of sanctions under this authority is hardly summary. The 
court must find that the offender had a “duty” to preserve the 
evidence, an inquiry which implicates the “reasonableness” of the 
destruction as well as the nexus between the destruction and the 
litigation. Moreover, as compared to the list of sanctions laid out in 
Rule 37(b), the typical inherent powers sanction is relatively lenient—
an adverse inference instruction, which would seem to place the 
spoliator in the same position she would be in if she had not spoliated. 
III.  IS THE LAW TOO LAX? 
According to your grandfather, a job worth doing is a job worth 
doing well. According to your management consultant, 20 percent of 
the effort yields 80 percent of the results. Neither admonishment, of 
course, is as universally valid as these advisors make it seem. The 
right amount of effort to devote to a task depends upon the relative 
trajectories of costs and benefits as effort is increased. Sometimes, for 
example, the benefits quickly level off, and 20 percent is nearly as 
good as 80 percent, at one quarter the cost. Sometimes, in contrast, 
the benefits are initially elusive, and 80 percent, though four times 
more expensive, is fifty times more effective. 
When it comes to society’s task of policing evidentiary 
manipulation, the trajectory of social benefits is starkly dependent on 
what one takes to be the object of trial. This in turn produces 
significant differences in what one views as the right amount of anti-
tampering enforcement. As shown in this Part, under the 
conventional view of trial as a search for truth, there is good reason to 
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believe that the effectiveness of anti-tampering enforcement grows, 
over much of its range, with each additional degree of effort devoted 
to the task.339 It follows that, from a truth-finding perspective, policing 
evidentiary foul play is likely to be one of those jobs that is worth 
doing well, if it is worth doing at all. 
And yet, your grandfather would probably be disappointed by 
the current system of anti-tampering enforcement. As demonstrated 
in Part I, the law apparently regards antimanipulation enforcement as 
a job worth doing halfheartedly. One possible response is to conclude 
that the litigation system is now, and has been for some time, in a 
state of fundamental disrepair. An alternative reaction, however, is to 
entertain the possibility that uncovering microhistorical truths about 
past transactions and occurrences is not, in fact, the primary purpose 
of trial—that trial’s primary purpose lies not in discovering what 
happened, but in shaping what happens. 
Shifting perspective from already filed cases to still undecided 
conduct does in fact raise the very real possibility that the current 
system is more savvy than sloppy. As this Part establishes, if trial is 
regarded as but one component of a larger mechanic directed at 
shaping everyday behavior, the effectiveness of anti-tampering 
enforcement declines with each additional degree of effort devoted to 
the task. It follows that, from a primary activity incentive perspective, 
anti-tampering enforcement may very well be a job worth doing 
“poorly”; a task for which 20 percent of the effort does indeed yield 
80 percent of the benefit. 
Although fleshing out the foregoing claims is a central purpose of 
this Part of the Article, a number of other points of independent 
interest lie en route, and these will also be developed. 
As the preceding discussion suggests, the key to comparing 
optimal enforcement levels under alternative social objectives is to 
compare how the incremental social benefits of additional 
enforcement depend upon the current level of enforcement. But 
before understanding how incremental benefits change, one must first 
understand their source and nature. This is the object of this Part’s 
first Section. Section A establishes that such incremental benefits are 
markedly different depending on whether one views truth-finding or 
primary activity incentive-setting as the object of trial. 
 
 339. See infra Part III.B. 
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The analysis in Section A has independent conceptual interest 
apart from its role in the comparison of optimal enforcement levels. It 
adds to our understanding of the extent to which primary activity 
incentive setting is not—as most would assume340—an ally for truth-
seeking in the competition among social objectives that shapes 
procedural and evidentiary law. 
After establishing this difference in the nature and source of 
incremental social benefits, the analysis moves on to examine the 
implications of this difference for the law of anti-tampering 
enforcement. Section B returns to the comparison of how the 
incremental benefits of additional enforcement depend on the current 
level of enforcement. Based on this comparison, it concludes that the 
law’s halfhearted regulation of evidence tampering is far more easily 
reconciled with a primary activities approach to trial than with the 
conventional conception of that institution as a truth-seeking 
exercise. 
Section C then considers the optimal method of enforcement, as 
opposed to its optimal level. The inclusion in this Part of some 
discussion of the law’s chosen method of enforcement is warranted by 
the fact that some portion of the general claim that the law is too lax 
is probably best regarded as a criticism of enforcement method, 
rather than overall enforcement intensity. Consider, for example, the 
claim, examined in Part I, that too few perjurers are caught. This 
claim by itself is incomplete as a statement about the overall intensity 
of enforcement because it does not take into account how much the 
law invests in sanctioning those who are caught. The claim gains 
coherence, however, if it is interpreted as a criticism of the law’s 
chosen balance between sanction level and detection frequency—in 
particular, that the law relies too little on detection and too much on 
sanction. Likewise, commentary that specifically derides the law’s 
refusal, as discussed in Part II, to go back and correct tampered 
litigation outcomes is directed not at the law’s overall enforcement 
level, but at the fact that the law has chosen to downplay a particular 
type of remedy. Section C of this Part concludes that both of these 
aspects of the law’s chosen method of enforcement—its de-emphasis 
on both detection and correction—are also more easily reconciled 
with primary activity incentive setting than with truth-finding. Thus 
whether one measures laxity in levels or in methods, the primary 
activity approach is a better fit for the data of existing law. 
 
 340. See, e.g., supra note 14. 
080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC 9/17/2004  2:04 PM 
2004] EVIDENCE TAMPERING 1289 
Many of the arguments made in this Part are supplemented by 
discussion and formal analysis in the Appendix.341 
A. The Purpose of Policing Evidence Tampering 
1. Thought Experiment. To fix ideas, we will focus throughout 
this Part on the following thought experiment involving the law of 
product liability. Upstream, in the primary activity, a manufacturer 
decides whether to adopt a safe design for its product. Downstream, 
closer to, or even during litigation, the manufacturer decides whether 
to destroy documents relevant to product safety, including, for 
example, those produced by product testing.342 The question for 
consideration in this Section A: what are the social benefits of 
marginally increasing the expected sanction for document destruction 
in this setting? In particular, how do the social benefits of this policy 
differ when the object is to provide incentives for safe product design 
rather than to find the truth about whether a safe design was 
adopted? 
2. A Taxonomy of Potential Evidence Tamperers. The best 
place to begin the analysis is downstream, with the following inquiry: 
when would the manufacturer destroy evidence? No doubt, the moral 
sensitivity of managers and employees is one determinant. But, given 
the focus here on Holmes’ “bad person,”343 let us consider a colder 
calculus. Thus, imagine that the manufacturer destroys documents 
when it believes that the documents’ expected impact on the outcome 
of prospective litigation would be unfavorable enough to justify 
bearing the expected private costs of the destruction.344 
 
 341. The Appendix considers several important details and caveats, including 1) the role 
played by the trajectory of social costs, 2) the role of the “infra-marginal nontamperer,” as 
defined within, and 3) the role played by changes in the density of “marginal tamperers,” also as 
defined within. See infra app. 
 342. This hypothetical is evocative of several prominent cases of evidence destruction. See, 
e.g., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1111–13 (8th Cir. 1988); Capellupo v. FMC 
Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 549–51 (D. Minn. 1989); Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 
485–86 (S.D. Fla. 1984). See supra Part II.B.2 for a detailed discussion of these cases. 
 343. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 344. This calculus is suggested in some of the practice literature. See GORELICK ET AL., 
supra 12, § 9.1, at 298 (“[I]f the content of certain documents is worse than the inference that 
would be drawn from their destruction and there is no current, pending, or imminently 
foreseeable request for them, they may be destroyed.”). See also Nesson, supra note 12, at 794–
805 (reviewing the “bad man’s” decision to spoliate). 
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The impact of evidence destruction on the outcome of the 
litigation depends on the degree to which the outcome of the case 
hangs on the kind of evidence that the manufacturer is considering 
destroying. This, in turn, depends on the magnitude of the damages at 
issue in the suit as well as the chance that the evidence to be 
destroyed would be decisive in determining what, if any, damages are 
imposed. 
The manufacturer’s private cost of evidence destruction, on the 
other hand, includes both the expected losses from any ancillary 
litigation punishing the destruction—including both the expected 
outcome of this satellite litigation and the expected costs of lodging a 
defense therein—and the cost of any additional activities undertaken 
in an attempt to avoid such secondary litigation losses—such as would 
be incurred in destroying the evidence of the destruction itself. 
Both in terms of perception and reality, these private costs and 
benefits of destroying documents will differ widely across 
manufacturers. But given any level of anti-tampering enforcement, it 
suffices for our purposes to identify three “types” of manufacturers. 
First, there are the marginal tamperers: those for whom tampering is 
just barely worthwhile given their perception of the current array of 
private costs and benefits.345 Second, there are the inframarginal 
tamperers: those for whom the private benefits of tampering exceed 
the private costs by a discreet amount so that they would continue to 
tamper despite any marginal increase in the private cost of doing so 
borne from additional enforcement. Last are the inframarginal 
nontamperers: those who choose not to tamper and would continue 
to make the same choice even were anti-tampering enforcement 
reduced on the margin. 
With this typology in place we will now review the benefits of 
increasing anti-tampering enforcement in terms of how it affects each 
of these classes of manufacturers. In particular, because truth-finding 
and primary activity approaches divide mainly over their effects on 
the first two types—the marginal and inframarginal tamperers—we 
will focus on these in the analysis to follow. First, we consider the 
benefits of increasing anti-tampering enforcement under the truth-
finding approach, and then, under the primary activity incentives 
approach. 
 
 345. Put another way, a “marginal tamperer” is a tamperer that stops tampering in response 
to either a marginal decrease in the private benefits of tampering or a marginal increase in the 
private costs. 
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3. Truth-Finding Benefits of Anti-Tampering Enforcement. The 
truth-finding benefits of a marginal increase in anti-spoliation 
enforcement come from two sources. First, the marginal tamperer 
stops destroying documents. Because these documents now make it to 
court, the verdict imposed will tend to be closer to the ideal verdict in 
these cases. Second, increasing anti-tampering enforcement also has 
an inframarginal truth benefit. Additional enforcement effort not 
only prevents spoliation, it may also increase the frequency with 
which document destruction is detected. When such destruction is 
detected, case outcomes can be rectified—e.g., by means of a 
spoliation inference instruction.346 
4. Primary Activity Benefits of Anti-Tampering Enforcement. 
The primary activity incentive to adopt a safe design is generated by a 
combination of two factors. First, there is the array of anticipated 
litigation payoffs contingent on ending up as each possible type of 
downstream tamperer. Second, there is the manner in which choosing 
a safe, rather than unsafe, design affects the likelihood of ending up 
as each kind of tamperer. A policy change increases the incentive for 
safe design to the extent that it worsens the payoffs of types that are 
more likely following unsafe design and improves the payoffs of types 
that are more likely following safe design. Consider, for example, 
what would happen to primary activity incentives if a policy change 
worsened the litigation position of the inframarginal tamperer, all else 
the same. If adopting a safe design minimizes the likelihood of ending 
up as an inframarginal tamperer, this policy change would increase 
the incentive to adopt a safe design. 
a. Converting the Marginal Tamperer. As noted, increasing the 
private cost of evidence destruction will cause the marginal tamperer 
now to refrain from destroying evidence. But the fact that this 
marginal tamperer has markedly changed its behavior does not mean 
that its litigation payoff—as the manufacturer perceives this potential 
payoff from a primary activity perspective—has also markedly 
changed. In fact, its litigation payoff will remain virtually the same. 
While it is true that the verdict and remedy imposed in the primary 
litigation are now more likely to go against this manufacturer for the 
fact that it is no longer destroying these documents, it is also true that 
this manufacturer is no longer engaging in the evidence destruction 
 
 346. See Part II.B.2, supra, for a description of this device. 
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and so is no longer facing the expected private costs of this form of 
obstruction. Because this tamperer is marginal—i.e., because it had 
perceived destruction’s private benefits to be roughly commensurate 
with its private costs—these two effects cancel each other in their 
effect on the tamperer’s all-in litigation payoffs. Thus, increasing the 
private cost of evidence destruction merely transmutes the marginal 
tamperer’s litigation loss from the private cost of evidence destruction 
to the private cost of worsened litigation outcomes.347 
The crucial point here is that the primary activity incentives 
created by litigation are as much a matter of private litigation costs as 
of litigation outcomes—an aspect of the primary activity approach 
that distinguishes it from the verdict centrism of the truth-seeking 
approach. From the prospective litigant’s perspective, as it is choosing 
its behavior in the primary activity, the principal concern is the degree 
to which it would be worse off in litigation if it chooses the “bad act”: 
in the example at hand, marketing an unsafe product. Whether the 
litigant is worse off for having to “pay” expected private destruction 
costs, or worse off for having to pay in the form of a less favorable 
expected verdict is immaterial. Supposing, on the contrary, that the 
manufacturer in the example cares more about dollars in the form of 
damages than it does about dollars in the form of tampering costs is 
like imagining that the manufacturer plans its affairs with only gross 
income in mind, ignoring the effect of taxes. 
Thus, to the extent that the potential litigant anticipates that it is 
either more or less likely to be a marginal tamperer as a result of 
“misbehaving” in the primary activity, its incentive to refrain from the 
bad action remains essentially the same after anti-tampering 
enforcement is increased. 
It may well be that the most salient, dramatic and, morally 
uplifting aspect of heightened anti-tampering enforcement is its 
ability to make an honest litigant out of the spoliator. And, in fact, it 
is true, as noted, that this is one of the two important functions of 
anti-tampering enforcement when truth-finding is taken to be the 
purpose of trial. From the perspective of setting primary activity 
incentives, however, the social benefit of additional enforcement 
effort cannot derive from its ability to convert the marginal sinner 
 
 347. This analysis continues to hold when, realistically, the manufacturer’s interest in the 
outcome of the present suit reaches beyond the current litigation to suits by future plaintiffs. 
Accounting for future litigation just requires a redefinition of who is marginal. By the same 
logic, it continues to hold under a variety of fee- and cost-shifting rules. 
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into the marginal saint. If there is a social benefit of additional 
enforcement, it must lie elsewhere. 
b. Taxing the Inframarginal Tamperer. Counter to intuition, the 
main primary activity incentive benefits of additional enforcement 
come mainly through the effect on those whom the additional 
enforcement fails to deter. These inframarginal evidence destroyers, 
though they continue to destroy evidence in the face of additional 
enforcement, are positively worse off in litigation due to the 
enhanced enforcement.348 To the extent that safe design lessens the 
manufacturer’s chance of ending up in this worsened position, the 
incentive to choose a safe design increases. 
In more detail, increased anti-tampering enforcement reduces 
the inframarginal tamperer’s litigation payoffs for several reasons. 
First, the tamperer is more likely to be called to task for its 
destruction in a secondary proceeding. This means not only that it is 
more likely to face sanctions in satellite litigation, but also that it is 
more likely to have to pay the cost of defending itself against an 
obstruction indictment or a motion for procedural or evidentiary 
sanctions. Second, in the primary layer of litigation, to the extent that 
the probability of detection is increased, spoliation will be less often 
successful at improving litigation outcomes. Thus, the inframarginal 
spoliator will now be partially denied access to what was a relatively 
cheap method of minimizing litigation losses. Third, prior to the 
primary litigation, the inframarginal tamperer will now be inclined to 
expend additional effort in perpetrating her destruction in order to 
avoid detection and sanction. 
Reducing litigation payoffs for the inframarginal tamperer 
improves the manufacturer’s primary activity incentives to the extent 
that choosing an unsafe product design makes it more likely that the 
manufacturer will find itself in the position of the inframarginal 
tamperer in prospective litigation. Because it is now a worse fate to 
 
 348. Several commentators have brushed lightly against this point’s outer reaches. See, e.g., 
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.15, at 19 (“[A] strict [document destruction] regime could 
generate a . . . chilling of the production of useful documentary evidence . . . . Chilling the 
creation of documents evidencing unlawful activity, however, directly increases the cost of 
lawbreaking itself.”); Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 717 (discussing author’s proposed statute 
requiring retention of antitrust documents: “[T]he proposed statute would not completely 
frustrate those who would purposefully violate the substantive laws. Refuge could often be 
found in the simple expedient of not making records. At least this route would be inconvenient 
for them because it is usually better business practice . . . to make [such a] record . . . .”). 
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end up as an inframarginal tamperer, anything that the manufacturer 
can do in the primary activity to avoid this fate seems more attractive. 
Choosing the good primary activity action rather than the bad is one 
of these things. The good primary activity action is less likely to emit 
damaging evidentiary emissions and more likely to emit favorable 
emissions. Thus, the manufacturer who adopts a safe design upstream 
predicts that it is less likely to find evidence destruction worthwhile 
downstream. 
Drawing an analogy to tax policy may be helpful here. Increasing 
anti-spoliation enforcement is like taxing manufacturers who find 
themselves in the position of the inframarginal spoliator. Because 
manufacturers who adopt unsafe designs are more likely to find 
themselves in this position, taxing inframarginal spoliators is like 
taxing (albeit probabilistically) the design of unsafe products. A tax 
on unsafe design is, of course, an incentive to adopt a safe design. It is 
important to note, however, that this is a tax paid in secret. The court 
may never learn that the product was unsafe or that the manufacturer 
is paying additional costs for its evidence tampering as a result of its 
design choice. 
Another way to see the same point is to recognize that safe 
design is like a substitute (in the economic sense) for document 
destruction in generating the manufacturer’s expected payoffs in 
product liability litigation. Spoliation and safe design are two ways to 
increase expected product liability litigation payoffs. Both have a 
price, however. The price of spoliation includes the legal risk 
therefrom. The price of adopting a safe design includes the reduction 
in profit margins from not cutting corners. When the price of 
spoliation is increased—via increased anti-tampering enforcement—
we can expect the manufacturer to shift toward other methods of 
avoiding product liability litigation outcomes. One of these is to 
choose a safe product design. 
5. Summary. The truth benefits of marginally increasing anti-
tampering enforcement are twofold: (1) the additional information 
that flows into the court as a result of converting the marginal 
tamperer to honest evidence production, and (2) the additional 
information that flows into court because those who still insist on 
tampering are more often caught in the act. 
In contrast, if the object of trial is to set primary activity 
incentives, converting the marginal tamperer is essentially of no 
consequence. Under this objective, the social benefits from enhanced 
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enforcement come primarily from worsening the downstream payoffs 
of those who find the higher cost of tampering still worth incurring, a 
situation more likely to arise following choice of an unsafe design 
upstream. 
B. The Optimal Enforcement Level 
Having established the different nature and source of 
incremental social benefits under the truth-seeking and primary 
activity approaches, we now move on to examine how these different 
incremental benefits change as the level of enforcement is increased. 
From this analysis we draw our main conclusion about differences in 
the optimal level of enforcement. 
The Section begins by establishing that the social benefits of anti-
tampering enforcement are self-dampening under a primary activity 
approach to trial. It then moves on to explain why the social benefits 
of anti-tampering enforcement are self-enhancing under the 
conventional truth-finding approach to trial. It concludes by 
examining the implications of these findings for the optimal level of 
anti-tampering enforcement under each alternative social objective. 
1. Self-Dampening Primary Activity Benefits. Section A.4.b 
established that the primary activity benefits of increased anti-
tampering enforcement accrue mainly through increasing the 
effective tax on inframarginal tamperers. The impact of increasing 
this tax depends on the chance that the bad action (more so than the 
good) puts the actor in a position wherein she chooses to pay this 
tax—that is, puts her in the position of the inframarginal tamperer, 
wherein the potentially unfavorable effect of a given piece of 
evidence on the case’s outcome still outweighs the private costs of 
destroying that evidence. 
The primary activity benefits of additional enforcement are self-
dampening because the greater the level of anti-tampering 
enforcement, the lower the chance of ending up in this position 
following unsafe design. To take an extreme example, when anti-
spoliation enforcement is particularly aggressive, the bad primary 
actor simply does not expect to find herself in a position where 
spoliation would still be worthwhile. The benefits from spoliation 
would have to be improbably high. Therefore, any decrease in 
prospective litigation payoffs in this attenuated contingency is 
unlikely to cause her to change her primary activity behavior. More 
generally, the greater the current level of anti-tampering 
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enforcement, the smaller the chance that the bad actor will end up in 
a position where tampering is still worthwhile, and the smaller the 
effect on primary incentives of additionally raising the cost in this 
contingency.349 
2. Self-Enhancing Truth Benefits. The self-dampening dynamic 
just described follows from the hypothesis that primary activity 
incentive setting is the main purpose of litigation. When the same 
analytical hardware runs the more conventional program of truth-
seeking, the outputted dynamic is likely to be self-enhancing rather 
than self-dampening. The more the legal system is currently doing to 
prevent evidence tampering, the greater the incremental benefits of 
further increasing prevention. 
As noted in Section A.3, the truth benefits of anti-tampering 
enforcement come mainly from two sources: conversion of the 
marginal tamperer and the corrective effect on trial outcomes of 
nabbing the inframarginal tamperer. Let us now review these in turn 
with an eye toward how these positive effects change in magnitude as 
anti-tampering enforcement increases. As we shall see, the former 
conversion effect is markedly self-enhancing over the relevant range, 
whereas the latter corrective effect is likely neutralized by a 
crosscurrent of conflicting forces. 
a. Converting the Marginal Tamperer. Recall that when we 
throw an additional dollar at anti-tampering enforcement, we deter 
the marginal tamperer. Because the marginal tamperer is no longer 
misleading the fact finder, the verdict actually imposed is closer to the 
ideal verdict in these cases. 
But how much closer? That depends on the expected impact that 
the marginal tamperer’s spoliation was having on the outcome of the 
case. Importantly, this impact is likely to be larger the greater the 
current level of enforcement. 
As we begin to increase the private cost of spoliation starting 
from a low level, we tend to discourage those who believe that 
spoliation has only a moderate impact on case outcomes. As we 
continue to increase the private cost of spoliation, our converts to 
honesty are those who believe that their evidence destruction would 
 
 349. When there is a nontrivial chance that safe product designers may also find tampering 
worthwhile, the primary activity benefits of additional anti-tampering enforcement need not be 
monotonically self-dampening. Yet they will still be self-dampening in general trend. See app. 
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have had a greater and greater effect on the court’s findings of fact. 
As we drag the net farther and farther out to sea, in other words, we 
catch bigger and bigger fish. The conversion of each additional 
spoliator, thus, has a greater and greater benefit in terms of aligning 
actual case outcomes with ideal case outcomes. And therefore, the 
more we have already increased anti-tampering enforcement, the 
more attractive it is to increase enforcement even further.350 
b.  Nabbing More Inframarginal Tamperers. Additional 
enforcement effort not only prevents evidence destruction, it also 
leads to more frequent detection when destruction still occurs. If the 
authorities actually catch a greater number of inframarginal 
spoliators, then a greater number of case outcomes can be corrected. 
In determining the trajectory of the truth-finding benefits of anti-
tampering enforcement, this second effect must also be considered. 
But unlike the effects considered thus far, this effect is fundamentally 
ambiguous. 
In one respect, the effect is self-dampening. The greater the 
current level of anti-tampering enforcement, the fewer individuals are 
currently spoliating. Like fishing on an overfished lake, additional 
enforcement effort is less likely to have much corrective benefit when 
remaining situations in need of correction are scarce and difficult to 
find. 
And yet, in another respect, the effect is self-enhancing. As the 
set of inframarginal tamperers diminishes due to increasing 
enforcement, authorities may be able to more effectively target their 
 
 350. Indeed, in a schematic version of this argument, the truth benefits of beefing up anti-
tampering enforcement increase exponentially in the current level of enforcement. If the 
expected private cost of evidence destruction is $1,000, then the marginal spoliator expects that 
her spoliation will change the outcome of litigation by $1,000. Increasing her cost of spoliation 
starting from $1,000 thus results in an expected increase in trial accuracy of $1,000 for this 
marginal spoliator. Similarly, increasing the cost of spoliation starting from $2,000 increases 
expected trial accuracy by $2,000 per marginal spoliator. And increasing the cost of spoliation 
starting from $1,000,000 increases expected trial accuracy by $1,000,000 per marginal spoliator. 
Of course, the truth benefits of additional enforcement do not accelerate ad infinitum. 
Eventually the private cost of spoliation becomes so high that marginal tamperers are few and 
far between. Thus, while the incremental truth benefits per marginal tamperer continue to rise, 
the total incremental truth benefit of increasing the cost of tampering eventually stops climbing 
and begins to fall. But, almost by definition, this tapering off will not become decisive until the 
level of enforcement effort is well beyond the middling range. Thus, it plays no role in the 
explanation for why a middling level of enforcement intensity is inconsistent with a truth-telling 
approach. Over the relevant range for the present analysis, the truth benefits of anti-tampering 
enforcement accelerate as anti-tampering enforcement effort is increased. See app. 
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detection and enforcement effort. Authorities can focus on the now 
smaller set of litigants where the apparent stakes from spoliating 
appear to be high enough to make the destruction of evidence still 
worthwhile. With enforcement resources no longer spread so thin, 
leads can be followed in greater depth. Thus, although a smaller infra-
margin does imply that there are fewer spoliators, it also implies that 
a larger percentage of this smaller number can be caught. 
In the end, the presence of these two countervailing effects 
makes it impossible to say whether the inframarginal truth benefits of 
additional enforcement are self-enhancing or self-dampening. The 
existence of opposing forces, however, does perhaps create a 
presumption—albeit one rebuttable by empirical investigation—that 
inframarginal truth benefits are not so largely self-dampening on net 
as to overwhelm the self-enhancing effect concerning marginal 
tamperers, as explained above. 
3. The Optimal Level of Anti-Tampering Enforcement. We have 
seen that the primary activity incentive benefits of anti-tampering 
enforcement are self-dampening, while the truth-finding benefits are 
self-enhancing. Intuitively, this suggests that the optimal level of anti-
tampering enforcement is lower under the primary activity approach 
than under the truth-finding approach. In fact, the logical implication 
is not so bold, but still quite informative. While a middling level of 
anti-tampering enforcement is consistent with the primary activity 
approach to trial, it is inconsistent with the truth-finding approach. 
Because the truth benefits of additional enforcement are self-
enhancing, if it were worthwhile increasing anti-tampering 
enforcement to a middling level, it would also be worthwhile 
continuing to increase it. Whatever the size of the incremental benefit 
that convinced us to turn the enforcement dial from low to medium, 
an even greater incremental benefit accrues to turning the dial from 
medium to high. 
To be precise, the claim is not that we would necessarily want to 
turn the dial from low to medium, but only that if we did so we would 
not want to stop there. Thus, the analysis tells what optimal 
enforcement cannot be (medium) and not precisely what it is (as 
between low or high). In other words, the conclusion is that, from a 
truth-finding perspective, anti-tampering enforcement is indeed a job 
worth doing well, if it is worth doing at all. 
In contrast, if the object of trial is to set primary activity 
incentives, then a middling level of enforcement is a plausible 
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candidate for the social optimum. Quite possibly, by the time we 
reach this middling level, the self-dampening primary incentive 
benefits of additional enforcement have fallen to such extent that 
additional enforcement effort would not be worthwhile. Quite 
plausibly, therefore, a modicum of effort yields most of the results. 
C. The Optimal Method of Enforcement 
As noted, when commentators bemoan the law’s apparent 
laxness with regard to evidence tampering, some part of this concern 
goes not to general enforcement levels, but to specific enforcement 
methods. In particular, the infrequency with which tamperers are 
called to task, as well as the law’s reluctance to go back and correct 
distorted litigation outcomes are specific sources of dismay—sources 
which are logically distinct from overall enforcement intensity. This 
Section discusses both the frequency of detection and the importance 
of correcting litigation outcomes. As with general enforcement 
intensity, it concludes that the law’s current practice is far better 
aligned with primary activity incentive setting than with truth-
finding.351 After analyzing these issues under each approach in turn, 
the Section compares the results of these analyses to existing law. 
1. Truth-Finding. As noted in the previous Section, the truth 
benefits of anti-tampering enforcement derive not just from deterring 
the tampering, but also from uncovering the tampering activity of the 
inframarginal tamperer and correcting the effect of this tampering on 
the underlying proceeding. This has implications for both the proper 
frequency of detection and the corrective nature of tampering 
remedies. 
With regard to the frequency of detection, it is well known that 
deterrence is the product of both this frequency and the sanction 
imposed conditional on detection. Many considerations go into 
determining the proper mix of these two factors. But when the 
undesirable action is evidence tampering, and one takes a truth-
finding approach to trial, an additional reason is added to the list of 
those favoring detection frequency over sanction magnitude. 
 
 351. That primary activity and truth-finding approaches have different implications for the 
method of enforcement justifies the implicit qualification in this Article’s introduction that the 
social costs are only “roughly” the same across the two approaches. See supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
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To see this, consider raising the sanction on evidence tampering 
while lowering the frequency of detection, in such manner as to hold 
constant the generated level of deterrence. The proponent of truth-
finding would not be indifferent to this rearrangement. Although the 
same number of marginal tamperers are converted to honest 
litigants—and, as noted, this is a boon for truth-seeking—those who 
still choose to tamper are less frequently caught, and the outcome of 
litigation is more frequently in error. Thus, all else the same, the 
proponent of truth-finding prefers to deter with a high rate of 
detection rather than a high level of sanction. For truth-finding, the 
former method kills two birds with one stone by both preventing 
tampering and more frequently allowing it to be corrected. 
Part and parcel with the fact that it leans toward detection 
frequency, the truth-finding approach also has an additional reason to 
prefer that the sanctions themselves are corrective of underlying 
litigation outcomes. Merely fining spoliators, for instance, does 
nothing to correct litigation outcomes that have already been skewed 
by the spoliation. 
2. The Primary Activity Incentives Approach. The primary 
activity approach lacks the same impetus both to emphasize detection 
frequency over sanction level, and specifically to correct skewed 
litigation outcomes. From a primary activity perspective, the best way 
to raise the private cost of tampering is simply that which incurs the 
lowest social cost. All that is important is that from an ex ante 
viewpoint, the primary activity actor anticipates worsened litigation 
outcomes for inframarginal tamperers. For the purpose of influencing 
the actor’s primary activity choices, precisely how this tax is 
imposed—aside from the issue of how much its imposition costs the 
public—is of secondary importance.352 
Consider how this imbues the primary incentive proponent with 
a different attitude toward the two enforcement-method issues 
considered in this Section. First, in terms of the balance between 
detection probabilities and sanction levels, the primary activity 
proponent faces a trade-off in generating the tax on inframarginal 
tamperers that is similar to that faced by the proponent of truth-
finding. But the primary activity proponent lacks the truth-seeker’s 
 
 352. This point is related to one made in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the 
Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191, 192–93 (1996) (finding that courts should impose 
ex ante expected damages on injurers, rather than actual ex post damages). 
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additional reason to favor detection over sanction level: namely, the 
desire to correct as many litigation outcomes as possible. Thus, in 
choosing how best to produce a given expected sanction for 
tampering, the primary activity approach suggests a lower optimal 
frequency of detection and a higher optimal sanction relative to the 
truth-seeking approach.353 
Secondly, it is clear that when sanctions are imposed for evidence 
tampering, the primary activity approach also has less concern for 
whether those sanctions actually correct past litigation outcomes. This 
is not to say that the primary activity approach has no concern for 
correction.354 The point is rather that the primary activity approach 
lacks the additional impetus to correct litigation outcomes implied by 
the truth-finding approach. And thus to the extent that primary 
activity considerations are predominant, one would expect to see less 
of an effort to correct outcomes. 
3. Existing Law and Practice. Existing law and practice seem 
more in line with the primary activity approach on both scores. In 
terms of the balance between frequency of detection and size of 
sanction, there is some indication that perjury and obstruction are 
rarely punished, especially in civil actions between private parties.355 
And yet, as noted in Part I.B, when these activities are punished, the 
sanctions are relatively high. The sentence in the federal system for 
 
 353. It would not be correct to conclude that the primary activity approach would favor 
driving detection probabilities to zero and sanctions to infinity, despite how the theory of 
enforcement is sometimes caricatured. For example, because it raises the procedural and 
evidentiary effort expended by the parties, see Kakalik et al., supra note 91, at 634–50, raising 
sanctions is not in fact a costless alternative to raising detection probabilities. This point has 
recently been explored in relation to the question of whether what plaintiffs recover should 
equal what defendants pay in damages. See Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Special Levies on 
Punitive Damages: Decoupling, Agency Problems, and Litigation Expenditures, 15 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 175, 175–76 (1995) (questioning the effectiveness of “special levy” statutes, which 
“require plaintiffs to hand over portions of their punitive damage awards to the state”); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and 
Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562, 562–63 (1991) (advocating “decoupled liability,” whereby 
“the plaintiff is awarded an amount different from what the defendant is made to pay,” as a 
method for reducing social costs); Albert Choi & Chris W. Sanchirico, Should Plaintiffs Win 
What Defendants Lose?: Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling, 33 J. 
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming June 2004) (considering “the infra-marginal effects of both 
decreasing recovery and increasing damages”). 
 354. The incentives of plaintiffs and victims must also be considered, and such incentives 
may be enhanced if these parties are confident that the impact of the defendant’s false evidence 
will be nullified. 
 355. See supra Part I.B. 
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either obstruction or perjury is at least ten to sixteen months in 
prison.356 The reputational and economic sanction—both short- and 
long-term—that this entails looms large for the average litigant who 
happens, for example, to be in court defending her firm’s failure to 
perform on a contract, or her firm’s apparent lack of care in designing 
a potentially hazardous product. The loss of future income from 
serving a prison term would pale in comparison to whatever this 
agent of the firm stood to gain—in terms of short-run profits or career 
advancement—by shorting the customer or cutting corners on 
product design. 
Furthermore, as noted in Part II, when sanctions are imposed 
under current law, they rarely correct the underlying litigation result. 
Conceivably, on convicting litigant X for obstruction of justice for 
destroying documents during pending litigation, the law might 
sanction her by going back to correct the outcome in the case that she 
won by virtue of this destruction. Making her pay back what she won 
in that case would be one way to fine her. But this rarely happens. 
Unless there has been a “fraud upon the court”—which, as noted, 
means more than mere obstruction by a private litigant—or the 
obstruction is caught within a year after entry of judgment, that 
judgment will generally stand, even as the convicted obstructer is 
sentenced to time in prison.357 
The spoliation inference instruction—a jury instruction 
“permitting” the jury to infer that nonproduced evidence would have 
been unfavorable to the party that had control over the missing 
evidence—at first appears to be a form of corrective remedy. But the 
effectiveness of this form of instruction is seriously open to question. 
First, the instruction does not prescribe a mandatory inference; it is 
not even a presumption, which would shift the burden of production. 
It is merely a suggestion to jury members, without any follow-up from 
the court, that they may, if they like, draw a particular inference. And 
this is an inference they may already be drawing, especially given that 
the spoliation victim is usually free to admit evidence of the spoliation 
and argue on its own accord for the inference.358 Secondly, even if the 
jury takes important cues from the judge’s instruction, the judge will 
issue the instruction only if there is sufficient indication that the 
missing evidence was indeed unfavorable to the spoliator. Evidence 
 
 356. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 358. See supra note 297. 
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used to establish the content of the missing evidence will often itself 
be admissible directly to prove the underlying propositions for which 
the spoliated evidence would have been offered. Therefore, in many 
cases the judge will be issuing the spoliation instruction precisely 
when the inference encouraged by that instruction is unnecessary 
given available evidence on the same point. In this case, the only new 
information conveyed to the jury will be the judge’s displeasure with 
the spoliator. To the extent that the instruction has any effect, 
therefore, the effect seems more punitive than accuracy-inducing, as 
other commentators have remarked.359 
D. Summary 
The truth-seeking approach to trial puts great weight on both 
deterring tampering and correcting its effects. The primary activity 
approach is more concerned with lowering the litigation payoffs of 
those who still find tampering worthwhile, and thereby raising the 
private cost of socially disfavored primary activity choices. This 
different locus of concern manifests in different prescriptions for anti-
tampering policy. 
Importantly for our evolving sense of trial’s purpose, the 
prescriptions of the primary activity approach seem more in line with 
current law. The primary activity approach is more consistent with 
the middling attitude toward anti-tampering enforcement that seems 
to characterize the existing regime. Moreover, the primary activity 
approach is also better aligned with current law’s reliance on high 
sanctions rather than frequent detection, as well as its reluctance to 
go back and correct litigation outcomes skewed by tampering. 
IV.  IS THE LAW MYOPIC? 
According to the conventional assessment of the rules regulating 
evidence tampering—an assessment informed by the view that trial is 
primarily a truth-seeking enterprise—the law in this area is myopic. 
Its almost exclusive focus on tampering that occurs while litigation is 
pending or imminent merely encourages tamperers to shift their 
 
 359. See, e.g., Maguire & Vincent, supra note 120, at 258 (finding that in granting a 
spoliation inference instruction, “courts sometimes adulterate their logic with punitive 
enthusiasm”). 
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operations upstream, away from the time of filing, and beyond the 
law’s limited reach.360 
This Part of the Article suggests that what is myopic is not the 
law’s approach to evidence tampering, but rather the analytical 
approach to such law that focuses solely on the direct control of 
tampering activities. More broadly defined, “the law” does not, in 
fact, focus solely on downstream tampering. Instead, the law simply 
employs a set of devices for the control of upstream tampering that 
does not include the array of criminal, procedural, and evidentiary 
sanctions examined in Part II. 
Section A explicates those upstream devices. In the process, it 
provides two explanations for why anti-tampering law has always 
seemed shortsighted under the conventional view. In the first place, 
the devices used to control upstream tampering are so much a part of 
the accepted fabric of evidence law as to be virtually invisible. As 
with an optical puzzle, one must purposefully adjust one’s point of 
focus to bring these features to the fore. Secondly, such features do 
not regulate upstream tampering in a way that makes sense under the 
dominant truth-seeking approach to trial. Their role becomes clear 
only when one regards evidence production as a component of the 
law’s overall project of regulating primary activity behavior. 
Sections B and C argue that these upstream devices are crucial to 
understanding the truncated reach of direct regulations. Section B 
critiques the leading alternative justification for the downstream focus 
of direct regulation. Section C argues that direct regulations are 
merely picking up where the subtler devices examined earlier in this 
Part leave off. 
 
 360. See supra note 119. Note that the substitution into upstream activity produced by the 
law’s downstream focus can also come in the form of preventing the creation of documents in 
the first place. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.15, at 19 (“[A] strict [document 
destruction] regime could generate a . . . chilling of the production of useful documentary 
evidence.”). But see KATZ, supra note 13, at 52–59 (suggesting that the law may not be to blame 
for a “forbidden result” no longer being forbidden); Leo Katz, Subornation of Perjury: A 
Definition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1988, at A23 (arguing that the requirement that there be a 
pending investigation does not create a loophole in the law). 
Yet, another form of substitution is upstream document creation. See Beckstrom, supra 
note 12, at 716 n.100 (“[A]ntitrust counselors, while urging early destruction of records in 
general, are agreed that one of the tenets of a good ‘antitrust compliance program’ is the 
thorough documentation of exculpatory information whenever companies take action in an area 
that is ‘antitrust sensitive.’” (emphasis added)). 
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A. The Ex Ante Inscrutability of Fact-Finding 
Why is evidence law so permissive regarding how parties choose 
to prove their claims or defenses?361 Such a rule seems to ignore an 
important externality: the proponent of evidence does not pay the full 
cost of its consideration by the fact finder.362 Perhaps the law should 
be more discriminating in this regard, admitting only evidence whose 
consideration is socially, as opposed to just privately, worthwhile.363 
Perhaps it should do more to insure that only the “best evidence” is 
considered.364 
Some insight into this fundamental puzzle of evidence law is 
provided by viewing the ad hoc nature of fact-finding as one part of a 
kind of “decoy” strategy. Roughly stated, the clearer the parties’ 
sense of precisely which of the evidentiary emissions of their primary 
activity choice will be decisive in future litigation, the more effectively 
they can target their destruction and fabrication efforts. And the 
 
 361. Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 279, 
279 (1996) (identifying the “core principle (albeit with exceptions) of legally unregulated fact-
finding,” also termed “the doctrine of ‘free proof.’”). See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining 
“relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence”); FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution . . . Act of Congress, [or] by these rules . . . .”); see also 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186–87 (1997) (“[T]he Government invokes the 
familiar, standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own 
choice . . . . This is unquestionably true as a general matter.”). 
 362. Federal Rule of Evidence 403, whose central purpose is to guard against “unfair 
prejudice,” also permits the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by . . . considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.” Yet, Rule 403 is hardly used as a device for internalizing evidence costs. 
Nor are many of the other rules by which certain forms of evidence are inadmissible. On this 
particular externality, see the discussion in Sanchirico, Character, supra note 14, at 1250–52 and 
sources cited therein. 
Regarding the full set of externalities at issue here, see e.g., Steven Shavell, The Social 
Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333–
34 (1982) (arguing that in deciding whether to file, plaintiff ignores both (1) the defendant’s 
litigation expenses, and (2) the primary activity incentives created by litigation, and proposing 
that the combination of these effects can result in a surplus or deficit of lawsuits). 
 363. Stein, supra note 361, at 279 (criticizing from a truth-finding perspective the “core 
principle (albeit with exceptions) of legally unregulated fact-finding” and “oppos[ing] the 
doctrine of ‘free proof’”). 
 364. Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988): 
[M]y thesis is that there exists, even today, a principle of evidence law that a party 
should present to the tribunal the best evidence reasonably available on a litigated 
factual issue. This principle is not absolute . . . . Nevertheless, it is a general principle 
that manifests itself in a wide variety of concrete rules governing the trial process. 
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more effectively parties can tamper with evidence, the lower the 
litigation risk from taking the bad primary activity action. These 
benefits of inscrutability weigh against the obvious drawbacks of a 
system that is not as choosy as it might be about the evidence it 
entertains.365 
1. Thought Experiment: Broadening the Range of Potentially 
Unfavorable Evidence. To explore more fully the impact of fact-
finding inscrutability on evidence tampering and litigation objectives, 
imagine the following thought experiment. First, suppose that we 
have identified the full set of “evidentiary emissions” that are more 
likely to be generated following the defendant’s “bad” primary 
activity behavior than following her “good.” Second, imagine a 
system—more restrictive than our own, with its lenient relevancy 
requirement—that admits as proof of defendant’s bad behavior only 
those evidentiary emissions for which the probability of generation 
following bad behavior exceeds by some threshold the probability of 
generation following good.366 If the difference in probabilities does 
not meet this threshold, a more stringent manifestation of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403367 prohibits admission: the evidence is judged to 
be insufficiently probative of bad behavior to justify the public 
expense of hearing it.368 
Third, starting from this system, imagine broadening the range of 
evidence that counts toward liability—thus moving toward our actual 
system. As shown within, this broadening will magnify the 
defendant’s incentive to choose the good primary activity action. At 
the same time, it will have an ambiguous effect on the court’s ability 
to find truth. 
 
 365. Stein, supra note 361, at 279. The ad hoc nature of fact-finding exacerbates other 
sources of organic uncertainty that are already present. For instance, a manufacturer will face 
uncertainty regarding not just what evidence plaintiffs will use against it in court, but also which 
of its customers end up as plaintiffs, and which of its products lead to accidents. 
 366. Alternatively, and to the same effect in the following discussion, we could imagine 
establishing a threshold for the ratio, rather than the difference, of these conditional 
probabilities. This ratio corresponds to the likelihood ratio in the odds formulation of Bayes’ 
Rule. 
 367. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (granting trial judge discretion to rule relevant evidence 
inadmissible when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice [and] waste of time”). 
 368. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is rarely invoked for this kind of “efficiency” purpose. 
More commonly, it is employed to avoid undue prejudice. 
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2. Effect on Primary Activity Incentives. When relatively few 
pieces of evidence are admissible, the defendant can focus her 
evidence destruction efforts. Conversely, the more forms of evidence 
that are admissible, the more the defendant has to spend destroying 
evidence in order to avoid liability—or, put another way, the less 
effective at avoiding liability is any given level of effort devoted to 
evidence destruction. Thus, broadening the set of evidence that may 
count toward the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion raises the 
defendant’s cost of avoiding liability via tampering. This thereby 
decreases the defendant’s litigation payoffs in states of the world 
where the set of natural evidentiary emissions would be sufficient for 
liability. These states being more likely following “bad” primary 
activity behavior, the end result is an increase in the defendant’s 
incentive to eschew such bad behavior. 
To take a schematic, but illustrative, example, suppose that 
following the defendant’s choice in the primary activity, any number 
of twenty different “pieces” (i.e., forms) of damaging evidence are 
emitted into his possession. The emission of each of these pieces of 
evidence is more likely following the defendant’s choice of the bad 
primary activity action than following his choice of the “good.” But 
some of these pieces of evidence are more socially preferable than 
others. Their probability difference may be greater, or their 
probability levels lower, or they may just be less expensive to present 
and hear. The precise reason for the social preference is not 
important here. 
Evidence system 1 chooses the very “best” piece of evidence 
from the twenty and insists that imposition of liability rests solely on 
the plaintiff’s presentation thereof. A defendant who wants to avoid 
liability can, of course, always choose the good primary activity 
action. But in this first system, he also has the relatively viable 
alternative of taking the bad action—which he finds less costly in the 
primary activity—and focusing his efforts instead on preventing or 
destroying this best piece of evidence, whenever it is emitted. 
Compare this with evidence system 2. This system chooses the 
“top ten” pieces of evidence from the full set of twenty and stipulates 
that only these are admissible. It then requires that the plaintiff 
present at least five of these to meet her burden of persuasion.369 
 
 369. The text stipulates that five, rather than one, out of the top ten must be presented to 
suggest the fact that by adjusting the number of pieces of evidence required from the admissible 
set, evidence system 2 may be made roughly comparable in terms of its true and false positives 
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Destroying or preventing evidence is now a less attractive means of 
avoiding liability. Formerly, the defendant could focus his destruction 
efforts on the single best piece of evidence. Now to avoid liability 
entirely the defendant must destroy the excess, if any, of the number 
of emitted pieces of evidence over four. For example, if five pieces 
are actually emitted, the defendant avoids liability by destroying one. 
If seven are emitted, the defendant avoids liability by destroying 
three. And if all ten pieces are emitted, the defendant avoids liability 
by destroying six. 
Choosing the good primary activity is a more attractive means 
for the defendant of avoiding liability in system 2 than in system 1. In 
system 1, taking the good primary activity action competed with the 
relatively easy alternative of taking the bad action and (more often) 
precluding or destroying a single pre-specified piece of evidence. In 
system 2, the alternative to the good primary activity action is not as 
attractive. To guarantee exoneration, for example, the defendant 
would have to prevent or destroy the emission of up to six pieces of 
evidence. Alternatively, monitoring only one piece of evidence—as 
was completely effective in system 1—only somewhat reduces, and 
does not eliminate, the possibility of being held liable in system 2. 
In evidence system 3, each of the twenty pieces of evidence is 
ruled admissible and the burden of proof may be met by the 
presentation of any ten. Relative to system 2, avoiding liability by 
evidence tampering is now even more expensive. Avoiding liability 
requires destroying the excess, if any, of the number of emitted pieces 
of evidence over nine. Thus the required amount of destruction now 
ranges from one to eleven, rather than from one to six. Turning these 
evidentiary emissions off at the source—by taking the good primary 
activity action—now seems all the more attractive. 
The mechanism at work here is reminiscent of strategies 
employed in other areas. We may imagine that when the queen of a 
particularly troubled country traveled about, the coach that 
transported her was randomly and secretly selected from her fleet and 
then sent out as one in a sequence of departures along with other 
empty coaches acting as decoys. On the one hand, this procedure 
meant that the queen did not always travel in the fastest and most 
comfortable carriage. On the other hand, it helped to confound her 
would-be assassins. In particular, it raised the cost of producing any 
 
to evidence system 1. Note in this regard that the existence of any one of the top ten would be 
far more likely than the existence of a particular one of the top ten. 
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given likelihood that she came to harm. An assassin had to attack all 
coaches to guarantee his objective. Correspondingly, attacking only 
one coach had less of an impact on the probability that the queen 
would actually come to harm. One hopeful possibility, and likely the 
intention of the queen’s guard, was that assassins would find attacking 
any number of coaches not worth their while. 
Similarly, as we broaden the range of admissible evidence we 
begin to give weight to evidence that, considered in isolation, seems 
of questionable merit—evidence with a scintilla of probative value, 
for instance. Yet admitting this evidence makes evidence destruction 
a less effective method of avoiding liability, and thus makes the 
alternative method—taking the good primary activity action—
relatively more attractive. 
3. Effect on Truth-Finding. Any policy choice that lowers 
litigation payoffs in evidentiary contingencies that are more likely 
following the bad primary activity action increases the incentive to 
choose the good primary activity action. The decoy effect discussed 
above does precisely this, and so its connection to the primary activity 
approach is clear. 
In contrast, the connection to truth-finding is decidedly murky. 
Consider again the thought experiment wherein the range of 
potentially unfavorable evidence was extended. For the truth-finding 
approach, this adjustment sets in motion several contradictory forces. 
First, the chance that any given bad primary activity actor will 
avoid liability goes down. This is because fewer bad primary activity 
actors find it worthwhile to destroy the now larger amount of 
evidence that must be eliminated to avoid liability. Naturally, this 
reduction in the rate of false exonerations improves truth-finding. 
Second, the chance that any given good primary activity actor 
will be held liable goes up. This is for two reasons. First, even good 
actors sometimes face bad evidence. In a system with narrower 
admissibility, these good actors might have found it worthwhile to 
destroy their way out of liability. Now they may prefer to just pay the 
damages. Secondly, the evidence added to expand the set of 
admissible evidence may not be as precise a signal of the bad act. 
Some good actors will be held liable based solely on the additional 
noise. Overall, the greater rate of false liability is bad for truth-
finding. 
These first two effects pull in opposite directions. Nonetheless, 
were they the only considerations, one could perhaps argue that the 
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news was good for truth-finding on net. Given that a larger 
proportion of bad actors than good are tampering in the first place, it 
is plausible that a larger proportion of bad actors are converted away 
from tampering. This suggests that the decrease in the rate of false 
exoneration is greater than the increase in the rate of false liability. 
However, these are not the only considerations.370 Two others are 
worth highlighting. First, even if the rate of false exoneration falls by 
more than the rate of false liability rises, the absolute number of 
wrongly decided cases may still increase if there are fewer bad actors 
than good.371 The fewer bad actors there are to falsely exonerate, the 
lower the impact of a given decrease in the rate of false exonerations. 
Similarly, the more good actors there are to falsely hold liable, the 
greater the impact of a given increase in the rate of false liability. 
Secondly, the policy change under consideration influences not 
just what happens at trial, but also what happens in the primary 
activity. In particular, as explained in Section 2, expanding the set of 
admissible evidence increases the incentive to eschew the bad 
primary activity act. As such, the number of bad primary activity 
actors will decrease and the number of good will increase. This has 
two central implications. In the first place, it adds to the ambiguity of 
the population composition effects described in the previous 
paragraph. These are not just uncertain, but also in flux. Second, it 
adds its own independent source of ambiguity. The change in primary 
activity behavior has a direct impact on the number of wrongly 
decided cases. The direction of the effect depends on whether the 
initial rate of false exoneration is greater or less than the initial rate of 
false liability. If the rate of false exoneration is greater, the 
population shift toward good actors will decrease the number of 
 
 370. The discussion in the following two paragraphs is guided by the following mathematics. 
Let b be the proportion of bad actors in the population. Let fe be the rate of false exoneration 
and fl, the rate of false liability. Then the number of wrongly decided “cases” (see infra note 
371) is bfe + (1-b)fl. The total derivative of this expression is bdfe + (1-b)dfl + db(fe-fl). The 
current paragraph considers the first two addends. The next paragraph considers the second 
derivative of these addends with respect to b, and the third addend. 
 371. Adding to the murkiness here is the fact that truth-finding is not a self-defining policy 
objective. In the first place, how false exoneration and false liability are combined into a single 
evaluative dimension must be additionally specified. The implicit assumption in this analysis is 
that the actual incidence of each kind of error is important in this combination. Second, one 
must also additionally specify how to treat cases that do not reach trial, perhaps because they 
are not even filed. “Cases” is used in the text in an expansive sense to mean “underlying events 
or conditions,” including those that do not result in filed suits. A unfiled “case,” therefore, is 
counted the same as a finding of no liability. Quite reasonably, then, when a bad actor is not 
even sued, this is counted as an inaccuracy. 
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wrongly decided cases. If the rate of false liability is greater, the 
number of wrongly decided cases will increase. To see this, imagine 
converting a single actor from bad to good. Will the chance that her 
case is wrongly decided increase or decrease? Clearly, it will increase 
if mistakes are more often made for good actors than for bad. 
B. The Questionable Private-Costs Reason to Push the Tamperer 
Upstream 
Before connecting the foregoing analysis to the downstream 
focus of anti-tampering enforcement, let us assess the most common 
alternative explanation for this apparently myopic outlook.372 
This explanation posits that effectively blocking (i.e., preventing 
or destroying) a given evidentiary emission of the bad primary 
activity action is in effect less expensive for the potential litigant the 
closer the blocking is to the time of litigation. According to this view, 
evidentiary emissions are not just the byproducts of primary activity 
behavior, they also often facilitate that behavior. A document on 
pricing policy is not just the byproduct of anti-competitive behavior, 
but also facilitates the planning and implementation of business 
strategies, some of which may be regarded as anti-competitive under 
the law, and some as pro-competitive. The imperfections of the 
human mind and its imperfect ability to communicate make 
recordation a valuable business tool.373 A business that prevents the 
creation of such a pricing document, or that re-collects and destroys 
all copies of such documents immediately after the pricing meeting, 
does not enjoy these benefits to as great an extent. On the other 
hand, a business that keeps the pricing document on file up until 
litigation, at which time it shreds the document or simply fails to 
produce the document on request, has the benefit of that recordation 
in devising, communicating, and implementing its business plan.374 
 
 372. This Article focuses on the contest between two consequentialist conceptions of trial. 
But there may also be deontological arguments for the law’s apparently myopic focus on 
upstream tampering. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 13, at 52–59 (arguing for the moral significance 
of certain formal distinctions, an approach that might be applied to justifying document 
“retention” policies that are sufficiently nonselective); see also Katz, supra note 119 (suggesting 
that there is an important moral distinction between upstream and downstream obstruction). 
 373. This idea is explored in depth in Chris W. Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the 
Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 STAN L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2004) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 497882). 
 374. See Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 717: 
[T]he proposed statute would not completely frustrate those who would purposefully 
violate the substantive laws. Refuge could often be found in the simple expedient of 
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Because downstream blocking of a given evidentiary emission is 
effectively less expensive than upstream blocking, the argument 
continues, downstream blocking is a greater problem for legal 
process. Directing enforcement resources at preventing downstream 
tampering thus makes sense. To the extent that the literature on 
evidence tampering has at all considered primary activity incentive 
effects, this is the extent of the discussion.375 
Although the opportunity cost of making use of one’s evidentiary 
emissions in the time before litigation is certainly a cost of early 
destruction, it is not the only cost. And while opportunity costs may 
be lower for downstream destruction, other kinds of tampering costs 
are likely to be greater. 
What is important to the tampering litigant, of course, is not 
destroying a particular piece of paper, but rather preventing the 
evidentiary emission represented by that piece of paper from getting 
into court. It profits the spoliator little to have shredded every copy of 
the damaging document except the one that gets admitted into 
evidence. Practice journals warn that damaging documents have a 
way of multiplying with cancerous rapidity.376 The fact that copies can 
themselves be copied leads to the possibility of exponential growth. 
And the farther down the family tree ones goes, the less information 
and control there is over where the documents are. Practice guides 
specifically warn that copies of documents may end up in employees’ 
personal files.377 It may be difficult for the center to find out about 
 
not making records. At least this route would be inconvenient for them because it is 
usually better business practice (aside from antitrust considerations) to make a record 
of anything so important to a business that it is willing knowingly to violate the 
antitrust laws to accomplish it. 
 375. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.15, at 19 (citing Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 
717). In fact, this precise point is only weakly made by Beckstrom. It appears in much stronger 
form in Hart, supra note 348, at 1676: “[A]n attorney [may feel] that the only way to keep 
certain evidence out of court is to destroy it altogether, or, in the case of documents, to 
recommend that they never be created.” 
 376. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 9.4, at 365–66: 
[D]uring the investigations of Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, two of the keys to the prosecution where (1) the fact that, unbeknownst to 
Mr. Boesky, his secretary had made copies of ledgers (the originals of which Mr. 
Boesky ordered destroyed) that reflected a secret agreement between Mr. Boesky 
and Mr. Milken, and (2) the ability of Mr. Boesky’s former . . . bookkeeper . . . to 
reconstruct the transactions from slips of paper that even those who produced them 
to the government could not understand. 
 377. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 9.9, at 304 (“The ‘pack-rate’ [sic] 
phenomenon, which refers to employees who create and maintain their own personal files of 
documents which were to have been destroyed, drastically undermines the benefits of 
[document retention/destruction programs].”). 
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these copies and even more difficult to prevent their comprehensive 
destruction when employees are capable of imagining that their 
personal interests are not always aligned with those of their current 
employer.378 
The use of computers and electronic documents exacerbates the 
problem. No need to travel to Kinko’s, no need to stuff envelopes. A 
few clicks and what was one pattern of electrons on one magnetized 
disk is nearly instantly one hundred replicas in one hundred far-flung 
locations, a process that is easily repeated from each of these one 
hundred locations. 
Therefore, while the opportunity cost of early destruction may be 
greater than for later destruction, the actual costs of effective 
destruction are likely lower.379 One surefire method of preventing a 
document from showing up on a potential plaintiff’s computer screen 
is not to create the document in the first place. One way to be sure 
that the meeting agenda does not end up in the wrong hands is to 
completely delete it right after it is printed, and then collect and 
destroy all of the printed copies right after the meeting. 
Another reason why downstream destruction is not necessarily 
less costly has to do with how the destruction itself would be proved. 
Throughout we have been discussing the evidentiary emissions of the 
primary activity action. Similarly, sanctions are imposed on document 
destruction on the basis of the evidentiary emissions of destructive 
activity. Evidentiary emissions, like environmental emissions, often 
dissipate and degrade over time. Witnesses’ recollections become 
clouded. Documents do disappear. Trash is eventually burned. 
Important aspects of legal process—such as statutes of limitations—
are designed with evidentiary half-lives in mind. Consequently, 
downstream destruction is a riskier activity because the destruction is 
still fresh at the time of litigation. 
 
 378. See, e.g., id. § 17.4, at 373 (“Clients . . . must be made aware that their employees . . . 
will not be willing to go to prison for them.”). 
 379. See, e.g., id. § 9.4, at 300 (“As was illustrated perfectly in Oliver North’s destruction and 
alteration of Iran-Contra memos, rarely will a document-destruction effort find all copies, 
computer records, or memories of the documents. In those circumstances, the document 
remains as evidence, accompanied by the strong negative inference arising from the attempted 
destruction.”). 
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C. The Private Benefits Reason to Focus Direct Regulation 
Downstream 
For the foregoing reasons it is difficult to argue that the 
downstream destruction or fabrication of a particular evidentiary 
emission is somehow more cost-effective for the litigant than the 
same activity upstream. It is difficult, therefore, to explain the law’s 
preference for upstream tampering in terms of private costs. 
A better explanation may reside in the differential private 
benefits of upstream versus downstream fabrication and destruction. 
This Part of the Article began with the argument that the inscrutable 
nature of the fact-finding process was a device for raising the cost of 
using evidence tampering to affect litigation outcomes. It seems clear 
that the effect of this characteristic of fact-finding on evidence 
tampering would differ systematically across upstream and 
downstream tampering activity. The upstream tamperer has much less 
of an idea of what evidentiary emissions will be decisive in future 
litigation. The nature of future litigation itself—let alone the evidence 
that will be decisive for that judge or jury—is all guesswork for the 
upstream tamperer.380 For the downstream tamperer, on the other 
hand, many, though not all, of the uncertainties have already been 
resolved. More generally, the further downstream the tamperer’s 
vantage point, the more she knows about what evidence is likely to 
make a difference to litigation outcomes. 
Because the decoy logic described in Section A is systematically 
less effective the farther one travels downstream along the litigation 
flow, it stands to reason that some other line of defense is necessary 
for downstream tampering. The direct regulation of evidentiary foul 
play—including the criminal, procedural, and evidentiary sanctions 
examined in Part II—fills that role. 
This argument helps to explain several specific and puzzling 
aspects of existing doctrine. First, it sheds some light on the law’s 
tendency to ignore evidence tampering that predates the complaint.381 
Given all the possible lawsuits that might be filed, service of the 
complaint with its short plain statement of the plaintiff’s claims often 
represents a discrete jump in the information available to parties 
about precisely what evidentiary emissions are likely to be decisive. 
 
 380. See Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 713 (“[I]t is easier to keep everything than spend time 
and effort deciding what to keep and what to throw away.”); id. at 716 (“[O]ld documents may 
serve to explain, as innocent, conduct that at first glance may be suspicious.”). 
 381. See generally supra Part II. 
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Second, the argument helps to explain the law’s focus on whether 
the tamperer was “on notice” of the litigation in those few 
circumstances where the law has been willing to sanction pre-filing 
tampering. After the nth small airplane crashes, the nth rifle fires on 
safety release, or the nth train hits the car at the crossing, the plaintiff’s 
formal statement of her complaint is nearly superfluous: the 
defendant already knows quite a bit about what evidence will likely 
be important in the evidentiary battle to ensue. 
Third, the argument provides additional insight into why the 
system is most consistent and energetic about sanctioning the 
tamperer when it violates an order to produce or preserve.382 No 
doubt some of the reason for this resides in the party’s bold 
disobedience of a specific judicial dictate. But a more complete 
explanation might also note that a litigant’s efforts to secure a court 
order for the preservation or production of particular evidence are a 
very strong indication that this evidence is important to the litigant’s 
case. To obtain a preservation order is to tip one’s hand. The order 
and the effort expended to obtain it provide reliable information to 
the other side—in the form of a costly signal with differential 
benefits—about the importance of such evidence to the movant’s 
case. Thus, the order should lead the opposing side rationally to 
increase its assessment of the probability that this evidence will be 
decisive in the court’s imposition of liability or awards. Accordingly, it 
increases the opponent’s perception of the private benefits of 
destroying or altering this evidence. Effective sanctions summarily 
imposed become a necessary counterweight to this more powerful 
destructive impulse. 
CONCLUSION 
Current writing on evidence tampering creates the impression 
that the current system of litigation is in a state of fundamental 
disrepair. But determining whether the system is doing what it is 
supposed to be doing requires a clear conception of what the system 
is supposed to be doing in the first place. And, as this Article has 
argued, the general perception that the system is broken may have 
more to do with defects in the conventional view of trial’s purpose. 
The conventional approach to legal process focuses almost 
exclusively on the task of resolving the particular factual dispute that 
 
 382. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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happens to have been placed before the court. The rules of evidence, 
for instance, are conventionally viewed as a means of ensuring that 
such disputes are correctly decided. This Article suggests, in contrast, 
that the litigation pyramid’s massive primary activity base does and 
should play a vital role in determining what happens at its tiny trial 
vertex. Most important is not the system’s ability to sort out what has 
already come to pass in each of the ninety million transactions and 
occurrences that make their way into filed cases every year,383 but 
rather the system’s ability to influence what will happen in every 
transaction or occurrence engaged in by each of 275 million 
individuals every day. 
To be sure, the implications of truth-finding and primary activity 
incentive setting often correspond. But, if an area of procedural law 
remains troubling in conventional discourse, there is a fair chance 
that this is a place where the generally accepted truth-finding 
approach is a poor proxy for the law’s primary activity purpose. The 
law of evidence tampering confirms this tendency. It is an area that 
remains especially troubling to those who have studied it. And, as 
established in this Article, it is also an area where the goal of finding 
truth ex post is a poor proxy for the goal of shaping truth ex ante. 
Under the truth-finding approach, anti-tampering enforcement 
has the dual purpose of deterring tampering and correcting litigation 
outcomes that are skewed by tampering that was undeterred. From a 
primary activity incentive perspective, anti-tampering enforcement is 
in the first instance a tax on those who find tampering worthwhile 
despite its legal risks. Because taking the socially disfavored primary 
activity action is more likely to place one in this position, anti-
tampering enforcement is also a tax on the socially disfavored action. 
From these differences it follows that the primary activity 
approach is more in line with the law’s apparently lax attitude toward 
evidence tampering. Where the benefits of enhanced anti-tampering 
enforcement are self-enhancing under the truth-finding approach, 
they are self-dampening under the primary activity approach. 
Consequently, where reconciling the law’s leniency toward evidence 
 
 383. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2001: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 10 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2002) (describing the 
number of state transactions); LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, ACTIVITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS: ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (2001), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/dirrpt01/2001.pdf (describing the number of federal 
transactions). 
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tampering with truth-finding requires substantial conceptual 
contortion, reconciling it with primary activity incentive setting 
merely requires hypothesizing that the self-dampening effect 
characterizing that approach is sufficiently prominent. Similarly, the 
law’s preference for high sanctions rather than likely detection as a 
means of discouraging tampering makes less sense if a major purpose 
of enforcement is to rectify litigation outcomes that are skewed by 
tampering, as implied by a truth-finding approach. Nor is it easy to 
justify the law’s reluctance to correct litigation outcomes when 
tampering is discovered after judgment is entered. Such difficulties 
are largely avoided, however, when anti-tampering enforcement is 
viewed as but one integrated component in the overall mechanism by 
which law affects everyday behavior. 
The view that trial is primarily a truth-finding exercise also leads 
one away from the most natural justification for the law’s apparently 
myopic insistence on punishing only downstream tampering. The 
inscrutable, ad hoc nature of fact-finding, which seems like a bad idea 
from a truth-finding perspective, makes sense from a primary activity 
perspective. The difficulty of targeting one’s tampering activity raises 
the cost of avoiding litigation exposure for “bad” primary activity 
behavior. That unpredictability is greatest in the upper reaches of the 
litigation flow. And this helps to explain why the devices that directly 
sanction evidence tampering are so focused on downstream activity. 
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APPENDIX 
This Appendix supplements the analysis in Part III. Section A 
contains an intuitive discussion of several issues not covered in the 
main text. Section B subjects the analysis in Part III to mathematical 
modeling in order to test its internal consistency and make explicit its 
underlying assumptions. 
A. Supplemental Discussion 
1. The Trajectory of Social Costs. As noted in the Introduction, 
the social costs of anti-tampering enforcement are roughly the same 
across truth-finding and primary activity approaches.384 Nonetheless, 
the trajectory of social costs is a potentially important ingredient in 
distinguishing the implications of these rival approaches. 
Part III.B discussed how the differing trajectories of social 
benefits across truth-finding and primary activity approaches had 
different implications for the optimal enforcement level. That 
discussion implicitly assumed that incremental social costs were 
relatively constant. How would the analysis in Part III.B change, if we 
included explicit consideration of the trajectory of social costs? 
a. Condition on Cost and Benefit Trajectories. We start with the 
principle that social costs must be accelerating relative to social 
benefits as we increase the level of enforcement toward the socially 
optimum level. (This principle is sometimes referred to as the 
“second-order necessary condition” for an optimum.) The reasoning 
here has three steps. First, when we are precisely at a socially optimal 
level of anti-tampering enforcement—the level that balances costs 
and benefits to produce the largest net social benefit—the social 
benefits from further increasing anti-tampering enforcement must be 
no more than the social costs. Otherwise, capturing these additional 
social benefits would, impossibly, improve upon what was supposed 
to be the best that we could do. 
Second, and by similar reasoning, starting from a level of 
enforcement just below the socially optimal level, the social benefits 
from increasing anti-tampering enforcement up to the socially 
 
 384. They are only “roughly” the same because the differing implications for enforcement 
methods, as discussed in Part III.C, supra, may produce different social cost trajectories. 
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optimal level must be greater than the additional costs. Otherwise, 
the lower level would, again, be better than the best. 
Combining these first two steps, we see that marginal social 
benefits must be less than marginal social costs at enforcement levels 
just below the optimum, but greater at the optimum. In other words, 
the social benefits from anti-tampering enforcement must be 
increasing at a faster rate than the social costs at enforcement levels 
just below the optimum, but at a slower rate than social costs at the 
optimum. 
This in turn has implications, in the third and final step, for the 
relative acceleration of social costs. If someone says that the red car 
was moving at a slower speed than the blue car at 11:50 A.M. and a 
faster speed at noon, it must be that the red car was accelerating 
relative to the blue car at some point between these two times. 
Similarly if the social benefits of anti-tampering enforcement are 
increasing at a faster rate than the social costs below the social 
optimum (i.e., at 11:50 A.M.) and a slower rate than social costs at the 
optimum (i.e., at noon), then social costs must be accelerating relative 
to social benefits as we approach the social optimum from below. 
b. Implications for Truth-Finding. If we take truth-finding to be 
the object of trial, it is difficult to justify the middling level of anti-
tampering enforcement that we seem to see in the current system. We 
have seen that the social costs of anti-tampering enforcement must be 
accelerating relative to the social benefits as we approach the social 
optimum from below. It is unlikely that this will happen at any 
middling range of anti-tampering enforcement. At a middling level of 
enforcement we can expect a steady (or even increasing) density of 
marginal tamperers. When this is the case, the social benefits of anti-
tampering enforcement grow roughly exponentially,385 which is to say 
that marginal social benefits increase in proportion to the level of 
anti-tampering enforcement—which is, in turn, to say that the social 
benefits accelerate. 
In contrast, it is implausible that social costs of anti-tampering 
enforcement accelerate in their middling range, let alone that their 
acceleration exceeds that of the truth benefits of enforcement. In the 
first place, at middling levels of enforcement, economies of scale in 
anti-tampering enforcement are unlikely to have so exhausted 
themselves as to reverse into diseconomies of scale that are, in turn, 
 
 385. See supra note 350. 
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so constricting as to cause the social costs of anti-tampering 
enforcement to increase at an increasing rate. 
Secondly, the decrease in the number of inframarginal tamperers 
as we increase enforcement386 acts as a decelerating force for social 
costs. The cost of anti-tampering enforcement is tied in part to the 
number of inframarginal tamperers. The greater the number of 
inframarginal tamperers, the more often courts must hold evidence 
tampering hearings, the more frequently litigants must defend 
themselves at such hearings, the greater the number of litigants who 
spend time and effort practicing and preparing their tampering 
activities to avoid getting caught. Therefore, if we raise the private 
cost of tampering by beefing up anti-tampering enforcement, this 
increases social costs in part because the tampering that is still being 
perpetrated is more socially expensive. But, the greater the level of 
anti-tampering enforcement, the fewer the number of inframarginal 
tamperers, and so, for this effect, the lower the incremental cost of 
increasing anti-tampering enforcement. 
Therefore, the improbability of significantly decreasing returns 
to scale at low and middling levels of enforcement combined with the 
marginal cost-reducing effects of a shrinking infra-margin make it 
unlikely that social costs accelerate faster than truth-oriented social 
benefits. This in turn makes it unlikely that a truth-oriented system 
would ever purposefully settle on even a middling level of anti-
tampering enforcement. Thus, even allowing for a more general 
configuration of social costs, there is still great difficulty in reconciling 
the current shape of our anti-tampering enforcement efforts with the 
rhetoric that trial is predominantly a truth-finding exercise. 
c. Implications for Primary Activity Incentive Setting. On the 
other hand, there is no inconsistency in explaining a middling level of 
anti-tampering enforcement taking primary activity incentive setting 
as the object of trial. We have seen that the social costs of anti-
tampering enforcement must be accelerating relative to the social 
benefits as we approach the social optimum from below. It was 
further demonstrated that the social benefits of anti-tampering 
enforcement measured in terms of the effect on the primary activity 
incentives of the tamperer, rather than in terms of truth-finding, have 
a self-dampening character. In other words, these important social 
benefits of anti-tampering enforcement increase at a decreasing 
 
 386. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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rate—which is to say that they decelerate as we approach the social 
optimum. Therefore, the social optimum may lie anywhere that the 
economies of scale in anti-tampering enforcement are not so great. In 
particular, at any middling level of enforcement, the social costs of 
anti-tampering enforcement are not likely to be decelerating faster 
than the social benefits. Importantly, the social optimum may well be 
at a point where economies of scale in anti-tampering enforcement 
are not exhausted, as long as the increase in social costs slows less 
rapidly than the increase in social benefits. 
2. The Role of Inframarginal NonTamperers. This Section 
considers the effect of increased anti-tampering enforcement on the 
inframarginal nontamperer, the third type in the taxonomy from Part 
III.A.2, and a type that was explicitly left out of the analysis of 
incremental increases in enforcement in Parts III.A.3 and III.A.4. The 
conclusion is this: Those who were already choosing not to destroy 
evidence prior to the increase in enforcement are only secondarily 
affected by increasing the level of anti-tampering enforcement from 
its current level. Further, what effect there is on these actors remains 
ambiguous and is unlikely to be decisive in shaping the overall effect. 
In a world with no “false positives” in anti-tampering 
enforcement—i.e., a world in which those who do not destroy 
evidence are not falsely positively identified as spoliators—increasing 
enforcement levels has exactly no effect on the inframarginal 
nontamperer. First, the inframarginal nontamperer has already 
decided that tampering does not pay and so does not change its 
behavior in response to increased enforcement. Second, the 
inframarginal nontamperer is never mistakenly punished. Thus, 
whatever is done to beef up anti-tampering enforcement is, from its 
perspective, superfluous. 
In a world with false positives in anti-tampering enforcement, the 
effect on the inframarginal nontamperer of increased enforcement 
effort is precisely as ambiguous as the effect of increased enforcement 
on the incidence of false positives. Some methods of enhancing anti-
tampering enforcement may have as a byproduct an increase in the 
number or severity of erroneously imposed spoliation sanctions. This 
in turn will lower litigation payoffs for the nonspoliator, who now 
faces a heightened risk of becoming one of the system’s false 
positives. On the other hand, additional resources devoted to anti-
tampering enforcement may actually decrease the number of false 
indictments and convictions as investigations and satellite trials are 
080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC 9/17/2004  2:04 PM 
1322 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1215 
more thoroughly conducted. This would raise the litigation payoffs 
for the inframarginal nontamperer. 
It is thus impossible to deduce how inframarginal evidence 
destroyers will be affected by increased enforcement. However, it is 
perhaps possible to infer that the crosscurrent of countervailing 
effects on these still honest actors makes it likely that, whatever 
direction the effect points in, the net effect is unlikely to defeat the 
summary proposition of the foregoing analysis: the main force driving 
the primary activity benefits of anti-tampering enforcement is the 
effective taxation of those on the opposite side of the evidence 
tampering margin, the inframarginal tamperers. 
3. Self-Dampening Primary Activity Benefits and the Possibility 
that “Good” Primary Activity Actors will be Inframarginal Tamperers. 
The following discussion pertains to Part III.B.1. The claim there was 
that decreasing the payoffs for inframarginal tamperers has less and 
less impact on primary activity incentives because the chance of 
ending up as an inframarginal tamperer declines. 
However, when there is a nontrivial chance that safe product 
designers may also find tampering worthwhile, the primary activity 
benefits of additional anti-tampering enforcement need not be 
monotonically self-dampening. If anti-tampering enforcement is 
increased by a small amount, the probability of ending up as an 
inframarginal tamperer given safe product design may decrease faster 
than the same probability given unsafe design. For example, the 
probability of ending up as an inframarginal tamperer given safe 
design may decline by two percentage points from 5% to 3%, 
whereas the probability of ending up as an inframarginal tamperer 
given unsafe design may decline by only one percentage point from 
20% to 19%. Thus, the probability difference actually increases from 
fifteen percentage points to sixteen. That, in turn, means that 
decreasing the payoffs for inframarginal tamperers has a greater 
impact than before. 
Nevertheless, the probability difference cannot be larger than the 
larger of the two probabilities (i.e., the probability for unsafe design). 
Therefore, the primary activity benefits of additional enforcement 
will always exhibit self-dampening in the large, if not also in the small. 
If, in the above example, we continued to increase anti-tampering 
enforcement until the probability of ending up as an inframarginal 
tamperer given unsafe design was 14%, the probability difference 
could be no greater than 14%, implying a decrease from 15%. 
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In addition, for many common distributional forms, primary 
activity benefits will indeed be uniformly self-dampening over the 
relevant range. Imagine, for example, that the benefits of tampering 
given safe product design are normally distributed with mean ms and 
variance one, while the benefits of tampering given unsafe product 
design are normally distributed with mean mu > ms and variance one. 
In this case, the probability density of tampering benefits given safe 
design exceeds that for unsafe design at all benefits levels greater 
than the average of the two means. Therefore, the relevant 
probability difference, as identified above, is decreasing for all levels 
of private tampering costs greater than this average mean. That 
implies that as we increase the level of enforcement, primary activity 
benefits become once and for all self-dampening even while more 
than half of those who design unsafe products still find tampering 
worthwhile. 
4. Focus on Marginal Changes. The thought experiment in Part III 
considers a marginal increase in the expected sanction for document 
destruction, one small enough to deter only the “marginal tamperer,” 
as defined below. The effect of a larger increase will simply be the 
aggregation of the effects of many small increases. 
5. Tamperer’s Opponent’s Primary Activity Incentives. In judging 
the primary activity incentive benefits of increased enforcement Part 
III focused on the impact on the tamperer’s own primary activity 
incentives. Another thought experiment might be conducted to 
examine the effect on the tamperer’s opponent’s incentives.387 
Differences between the truth-finding approach and the primary 
activity incentive approach exist in either case. But they are more 
pronounced in the case of the tamperer’s own incentives, and that is 
why it is highlighted in the text. 
6. Alternatively Manipulating the Stakes Attached to Evidence 
Production. For the task of affecting the incidence and impact of 
evidence tampering, the law actually has two points of impact, 
corresponding to the costs and benefits that individuals weigh in 
deciding whether to engage in evidentiary foul play. Part III of the 
Article considers the law’s attempts to alter the individual’s perceived 
 
 387. Some of issues in this case are considered in Sanchirico, Games, Information, and 
Evidence Production, supra note 14 and Sanchirico & Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage, supra 
note 14. 
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private cost of engaging in evidentiary foul play. Such policy reforms 
include beefing up the prosecution of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, or more liberally meting out adverse inference instructions 
and discovery sanctions against the spoliator. In some contexts the 
law can also affect the litigants’ perceived private benefits from 
evidence tampering, by fine-tuning how verdict and remedy hang on 
particular forms of evidence. This is perhaps most relevant in a 
contractual context.388 
B. Mathematical Analysis 
Consider the problem of choosing the level of anti-tampering 
enforcement to maximize social welfare.389 The argument in Part III 
may be cast in terms of the second-order necessary conditions for an 
interior maximum.390 The first-order necessary condition for an 
interior maximum is that marginal net social benefits are zero. As is 
well-known, this condition is not sufficient. For example, it would also 
be satisfied at an interior level of enforcement that minimizes social 
welfare. The second-order necessary condition for an interior 
maximum is that marginal net social benefits are decreasing in the 
level of anti-tampering enforcement. To say that the benefits of anti-
tampering enforcement are “self-enhancing” under a truth-seeking 
approach is to say that marginal social benefits are everywhere 
increasing, not decreasing. Thus the second-order necessary condition 
for an interior maximum will be satisfied at no interior level of 
enforcement under the truth-seeking approach. In contrast, under a 
primary activity incentives approach, the second-order necessary 
condition for a maximum will be satisfied at all interior points. The 
precise optimal level of enforcement under the primary activity 
approach will depend on where marginal net social benefits vanish. 
Unlike for truth-seeking, nothing prevents that optimal level from 
residing in the low to middling range. 
Second-order conditions fail under the truth-seeking approach 
because the map from anti-tampering enforcement to trial accuracy 
 
 388. See generally Sanchirico & Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage, supra note 14 (analyzing 
how fabrication of evidence is affected by altering the map from evidence to liability). 
 389. For purposes of the ensuing discussion, assume that social welfare is twice continuously 
differentiable in enforcement levels. 
 390. For a discussion of these conditions see, for example, ALPHA C. CHIANG, 
FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 246–47 (Patricia A. Mitchell & 
Gail Gavert eds., 3d ed., McGraw-Hill Inc. 1984) (1967). 
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exhibits a core nonconvexity.391 Nonconvexity in this context is the 
technical counterpart to the self-enhancing effect described in the 
main text.392 Identifying this core nonconvexity is, in turn, the core of 
this Article’s analysis of enforcement levels (Part III). This 
nonconvexity may be masked by ancillary convexities in other 
functional components of social welfare. Yet though such masking is 
theoretically possible, it is empirically unlikely for reasons discussed 
at length below. 
1. Basic Model. The core nonconvexity in the optimal choice of 
anti-tampering enforcement under a truth-seeking approach is 
apparent in the following simple model (which is enriched in 
subsequent sections). The model tracks the thought experiment laid 
out in Part III.A.1. In order to incorporate the complications of anti-
tampering enforcement—complications that are absent in 
conventional models of legal process—the model simplifies other 
aspects of the conventional model—such as filing and settlement 
decisions. 
a. Timeline. In period 1, a risk-neutral manufacturer chooses 
whether to design its product safely or unsafely. If, and only if, the 
product is unsafely designed, the plaintiff files suit in period 2.393 In 
period 3 “nature” determines for the manufacturer its benefit from 
 
 391. Cf. David A. Starrett, Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theory of Externalities, 4 J. 
ECON. THEORY 180, 189–93 (1972) (identifying a core nonconvexity in the production 
possibilities set in the presence of externalities and noting the troubling implications of this 
nonconvexity for general equilibrium theory). 
 392. The adjective “nonconvexity” as used in this context refers to the set of points that lie 
below the function. This set is said to be “convex” if the line segment between any two points in 
the set is entirely contained in the set. Unfortunately, this property is equivalent to another 
property of the function that is frequently termed “concavity.” The function is called “concave” 
if the line segment between any two points on its graph lies entirely below the graph. See 
generally RALPH TYRRELL ROCKAFELLAR, CONVEX ANALYSIS (Marston Morse & A.W. 
Tucker eds., 1970) (reviewing the properties of convex sets and concave functions). 
Whichever term is used, the important implication for our purposes is that, over a range 
in which an increasing function is nonconvex, the greater the function’s level, the greater its 
current rate of increase. To relate this property to the formal definition, note that if one draws a 
line segment between two points on the graph of the function over this range, the line will be 
above the graph and so also outside the set of points that lie below that graph. Relative to a 
linear increase between the two points, therefore, the function starts slower, but accelerates to 
such extent that it reaches the same endpoint. 
 393. One implication of the assumption that the injurer is only sued when actually liable (a 
typical assumption in models of litigation) is that the primary activity benefits of additional 
enforcement are self-dampening everywhere, rather than just self-dampening in general trend. 
See the discussion supra note 349. 
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pursuing a policy of destroying evidence of product design. This 
benefit comes via a reduction in the probability of being held liable at 
trial. We denote this benefit b and assume that it has continuously 
differentiable density f. The probability of being held liable is then p-
b, where 0 < p < 1 is a fixed baseline probability of liability. In this 
subsection, we assume that b is uniformly distributed between 0 and 
p, and we denote the constant density: 
1
pf = .  
If the manufacturer chooses to destroy evidence, it is sanctioned for 
that destruction with probability q. If sanctioned, it must pay a fine of 
s. In period 4, the manufacturer is held liable with probability p-b, 
and, if held liable, pays a fine of l. 
b. Evidence Destruction Decision. The manufacturer chooses to 
destroy evidence if its expected litigation loss after destroying 
evidence (inclusive of the expected sanction from destruction) is less 
than its expected litigation loss if it refrains from destroying evidence: 
 
( )( ) ( ) {
...ifif not caught destroying if caught...
 doesn't
destroyexpected litigation loss if destroys
1 .q p b l q pl s pl− − + + ≤
1442443 14243
144442444443
 
Equivalently, the manufacturer destroys evidence if the benefit 
exceeds the threshold ˆb : 
( )1
ˆ
qs
q lb b−≥ ≡ . (1) 
Personifying different states of the world, we refer to ˆb  as “the 
marginal tamperer.” The smallest possible marginal tamperer is ˆb  = 0, 
in which case, the manufacturer always chooses (i.e., “all 
manufacturers choose”) to destroy evidence. The largest relevant 
marginal tamperer is ˆb  = p, in which case—given that b is supported 
below p—the manufacturer never finds destruction worthwhile. 
2. The Truth-Seeking Approach. An accurate outcome at trial 
means that the manufacturer is held liable for unsafe design. If the 
manufacturer does not destroy evidence, the chance of liability is p. If 
the manufacturer does destroy evidence and is not caught for doing 
so, the chance of liability is only p-b. And if the manufacturer 
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destroys evidence and is caught, the probability of liability returns to 
p. Therefore, the probability of liability conditional on trial, is:394 
( ) ( )( ) {
ˆ
ˆ0 caught
not caught
manufacturers destroying
that don't destroy evidence
evidence
manufacturers
that do destroy
evidence
, 1
pb
b
A q s pf db q p b qp f db
 
 
 
= + − − + 
 
 
 
∫ ∫ %1442443
123
1444442444443
 .  (2) 
The policy instruments of interest here are q and s, the 
probability of detection for document destruction and the ex post 
sanction for the same. This is reflected in the notation on the left-
hand side of (2). 
There are social costs to creating both q and s.395 For the moment, 
assume that the marginal cost of s for any given level of q is 
constant—i.e., social costs take the form: 
 
C(s,q) = sα(q) + c(q) + k ,   (3) 
 
where k is a constant and α and c are arbitrary functions. 
In order to provide an expression for social welfare, we need an 
expression for the value of accuracy in this kind of case. Assume that 
this value is some arbitrary constant multiple of accuracy itself, and 
recalibrate the cost function C so that this constant multiple may be 
taken as 1. Social welfare is then: 
 
W(q,s) = A(q,s) – C(q,s) . (4) 
 
In maximizing social welfare (4), q must be a probability, 
 
0 ≤ q ≤ 1 , (5) 
 
 394. Throughout this Appendix, a tilde over a variable indicates that it is the variable over 
which integration is performed. 
 395. In particular, the social costs of s involve the cost of effort exerted by the parties in 
defending against imposition of s in ancillary process. Thus, it is not true, as is sometimes 
assumed, that the marginal cost of s is zero. See generally, e.g., Choi & Sanchirico, supra note 
353 (noting impact of, in effect, s on litigation effort and importance of this impact in assessing 
the wisdom of decoupling what plaintiffs recover from defendants pay in damages). 
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0; 0W W
q s
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
2 2
2 20; 0
W W
q s
∂ ∂≤ ≤
∂ ∂
and s and q must place ˆb  between 0 and its upper bound, p, implying: 
    ( )10 .pl qqs
−≤ ≤    (6) 
Thus, the goal is to maximize (4) subject to (5) and (6). An interior 
maximum for this problem satisfies both (5) and (6) with strict 
inequality. Furthermore, an interior maximum satisfies the following 
first-order necessary conditions: 
 
(7) 
 
 
and the following second-order necessary conditions: 
 
 
(8) 
 
 We will now show that at any pair (q*,s*) (not necessarily 
interior) that maximizes (4) subject to (5) and (6), the marginal 
tamperer is either ˆb  = 0 or ˆb  = p. In other words, either the 
manufacturer always chooses to tamper, there being no deterrence at 
all of evidence destruction, or the manufacturer never chooses to 
tamper, there being effectively complete deterrence of evidence 
destruction. 
The method of proof is to focus on s and to show that the second-
order necessary condition with respect to s can never be satisfied at 
any level of s that is strictly between 0 and what it would take to make 
ˆb  = p. That is, 
( )1
.
pl q
qs
−
=  
These two extremes in s correspond to the two extremes in ˆb , as just 
discussed. 
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The first derivative of W(q,s) with respect to s is: 
 
{ ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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1
q
q l
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q l
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q l
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−
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∂
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−
 
= − − 
 
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123144424443
   (9) 
The interpretation of the first two addends of the first statement in 
(9) tracks the discussion in the main text. The expression 
( )1
q
q l f−  
can be thought of as the number of marginal tamperers that convert 
from tampering to not tampering when we raise the tampering 
sanction s by one unit. In particular, 
( )1
q
q l−  
is the increase in the marginal tamperer ˆb  and f  is the number of 
manufacturers at that level. Therefore, (9) shows that the incremental 
benefit of raising s is the conversion of 
( )1
q
q l f−  
manufacturers from a lower probability of product liability, namely 
(1–q)(p– ˆb )+qp, to a higher probability of product liability, namely p. 
Given this interpretation, the self-enhancing quality of anti-tampering 
enforcement under a truth-seeking approach can also be seen in (9). 
Converting marginal tamperers has a greater impact on accuracy, the 
greater the impact of the marginal tampering. Per marginal tamperer, 
the chance of rightful liability increases from (1–q)(p– ˆb ) + qp to p, an 
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increase of (1–q) ˆb . The impact of the marginal tamperer’s tampering 
should he not get caught, ˆb , is larger, the larger is the expected 
sanction s from tampering. Therefore, the larger is s, the greater is the 
accuracy benefit of further increasing s. 
This self-enhancing effect is precisely reflected in the sign of the 
second-order derivative of W with respect to s, which is most easily 
taken from the last expression in (9): 
( ) ( )( )2 212 1 0.qq lW q fs −∂ = − >∂   (10) 
Expression (10) is strictly positive for all levels of q strictly between 0 
and 1 and all levels of s. This means that at any interior level of ˆb  
(wherein q must be strictly between 0 and 1), the marginal net social 
benefit of s is strictly increasing. This, in turn, means that the second-
order condition with respect to s (as laid out in (8)) cannot be 
satisfied at an interior level of ˆb . 
Expression (10) represents the core nonconvexity of truth-
oriented W in the anti-tampering enforcement level. In a more 
complicated model, this core nonconvexity can be masked by other 
ancillary effects. We consider the most important of these in turn. 
a. Density Effects. It is true that curvature in the density of 
marginal tamperers can mask the core nonconvexity exhibited in (10). 
But this statement is not terribly profound. To the extent that the 
slope of the density is up for grabs, so are the first and second 
derivatives of social welfare. In fact, for any desired magnitudes for 
these derivatives at any point, one can always find a distribution f to 
create these magnitudes. This fundamental ambiguity is endemic to 
theoretical models that posit abstract distributions—and thus all 
models that admit parametric uncertainty. To say anything at all one 
must make some commitments regarding distributional shape. 
In the analysis above, we committed to a uniform distribution for 
b. This was, of course, much more than was necessary to enable the 
core nonconvexity there identified to have its effect. Indeed, the 
distributional assumptions required to mask that core nonconvexity 
are empirically implausible at a low to middling level of enforcement, 
such as is apparently seen in practice. 
Intuitively, in order for distributional effects to overwhelm the 
effect of the core nonconvexity and enable a low to middling level of 
optimal anti-tampering enforcement, it would have to be the case that 
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the density of b was falling rapidly at such a level. In other words, the 
fact that we catch bigger and bigger fish as we drag the net farther 
and farther out to sea (the core nonconvexity) would have to be offset 
by a declining density of fish even when we are just starting out and 
are still relatively close to shore. A declining density may be plausible 
at high levels of b. But a declining density is more difficult to 
reconcile with the claim that enforcement levels are low to middling 
and that tampering is rampant. 
In formal terms, with a more general density f of b we have: 
 
 
, (11) 
 
 
 
 
    
and 
 
 
(12) 
 
 
(compare the last addend in (12) with (10)). We are interested in 
conditions under which (12) is still positive. Dividing through by 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )21 ˆ1qq l q f b− −  
yields 
 
 (13) 
 
 
The left-hand addend in (13) is the percentage change in the density 
per percentage change in the marginal tamperer ˆb ; thus, it is the 
elasticity of the density with respect to ˆb . If the density is falling, this 
elasticity is negative. Therefore, social welfare will be concave—that 
is, (12) and (13) will be nonpositive—only where the elasticity of the 
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density is not only negative, but less than negative one. Consider how 
this plays out for two common families of distributions 
1.  Special Case: Truncated Normal Distribution. Suppose, for 
example, that b’s density is a symmetric, truncated normal 
distribution with truncation bounds 0 and p, mean (and mean 
parameter) ½ p, and variance parameter σ2.396 Some algebra shows 
that the elasticity of this density is: 
 
 
.   (14) 
 
Applying the quadratic formula and ignoring the irrelevant root, this 
elasticity is less than negative one if, and only if, 
 
.   (15) 
 
The right hand side of (15) is always bigger than ½ p, the mean of the 
distribution of b. Therefore, at any interior solution—wherein the 
elasticity of the density must be less than negative one, and so (15) 
must hold—the manufacturer will be deterred from evidence 
destruction at least half of the time. This in itself might be regarded as 
inconsistent with low to middling enforcement. But, in fact, quite a bit 
more can be said. The larger the variance parameter σ2, the greater 
the point at which social welfare becomes concave, thus satisfying the 
second-order condition. Indeed, so long as 
1
2
pσ ≥ ,  
social welfare is concave over its entire range, even though the density 
is falling on the upper tail. 397 And this means that there is no interior 
solution, as in the uniform distribution case considered above. 
 
 396. The density function for this truncated normal would be 
( )122 21 122 exp b pπ σ ω− −   , 
where ω is the integral from 0 to p of the corresponding normal density without truncation. 
 397.  1
2
pσ ≥ implies 2 21 1 14 2 4 4p p pσ+ + > and p is the upper bound on b. 
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2. Special Case: Truncated Exponential Distribution. Consider a 
truncated exponential density with truncation bounds 0 and p and 
with parameter λ: This density will be proportional to the exponential 
density without truncation: λe-λb. (Note that 1/λ will not be the mean of 
the truncated distribution.) This density is decreasing along its entire 
range. Yet, its elasticity is: 
 
.  
 
Thus, social welfare will not be concave until b > 1/λ. So long as  
1/λ > p, social welfare will be nowhere concave and an interior solution 
will be impossible. 
b. Social Cost Effects. The effect of the core nonconvexity 
identified above can be overwhelmed if the marginal cost of s is 
sufficiently increasing. Yet, this is even more implausible at low to 
middling levels of enforcement than a rapidly decaying density. The 
phenomenon of increasing marginal costs corresponds to the 
exhaustion of economies of scale in enforcement. In contrast, low 
enforcement levels most plausibly correspond to a situation in which 
not all economies of scale had been tapped, and in which marginal 
social cost is roughly constant, if not actually decreasing. 
In formal terms, with a general cost function (and a general 
density) we have 
 
,  
 
 
 
 
 
, (16) 
 
and 
 
 
.  (17) 
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Dividing (17) through by 
( )( ) ( ) ( )21 ˆ1qq l q f b− −  
and using the first-order condition (i.e., setting (16) to zero), we 
obtain the following restatement of the second-order condition: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
ˆ ˆ
,
ˆ ,2 1 .
ss
s
f b b C q s s
C q sf b
W
s
′∂
∝ + −
∂
  (18) 
Relative to (13), the new term here, on the far right, is the elasticity of 
marginal social costs in s. (Cf. the elasticity of total social costs.) We 
would expect this to be nonpositive at low levels of q and s. 
Therefore, this effect would most likely work in tandem with the core 
nonconvexity (represented by the “1” in (18)) to ensure that social 
welfare is not concave at low levels of s and therefore that the social 
optimum cannot there obtain. (Were it working in tandem with the 
core nonconvexity, the possibility that the density effects described 
above would be negative enough to produce convexity would be even 
less likely.) 
Notice that in the uniform distribution, constant-marginal-cost 
model considered initially, the right side of (18) reduces to 1. 
3. The Primary Activity Approach. In contrast, the social 
benefits of additional anti-tampering enforcement have a natural 
convexity under the primary activity approach.398 Working with the 
general density model considered above in Section B.2.a, deterrence 
is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )ˆ
ˆ0
1
pb
b
plf b db q p b l q pl s f b db
↑↑
 ∆ = + − − + + 
 ∫ ∫
% % .    (19) 
Mathematically, the important difference between (19) and the 
expression for accuracy (11) is not the addition of the scalar 
multiplier l, but rather the addition of qs to the right-hand integrand. 
The presence of this term signifies that, from an ex ante perspective, 
the manufacturer feels the expected sanction from document 
destruction, in those cases where destruction is worthwhile, as part of  
 
 
 398. As noted, this corresponds to the statement that the social welfare function under this 
approach is naturally concave. See supra note 392. 
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the ex ante legal cost of designing an unsafe product. The first 
derivative of (19) with respect to s is: 
( ) ( )1 ˆqq l plf bs −∂∆ =∂
( ) ( )1 1qq l q p−− − ˆb−( ) l q pl+ s+( )( ) ( )
( )
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ˆ
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∫
%
%
   (20) 
Tracking the main text in Part III.A.4.b, what remains in (20) is the 
inframarginal effect of increasing litigation losses for manufacturers 
who still find it worthwhile to destroy evidence. In contrast to the 
effect on truth-finding, the conversion of marginal tamperers to 
marginal nontamperers has no effect on deterrence. This is because 
the marginal tamperer is exactly indifferent between tampering and 
not tampering. And so its change in behavior—from tampering to not 
tampering—does not change its all-in litigation losses from unsafe 
design, which are what matter for inducing safe design. 
It is instructive to examine precisely how the first statement in 
(20) reduces to the second. The backslashes in the first statement in 
(20) represent the fact that the marginal tamperer is indifferent 
between tampering and not tampering taking into account the 
expected sanction from doing so. The cross slashes represent the fact 
that, given the marginal tamperer’s zero net payoff from destruction, 
its all-in litigation losses are unaffected by changing its behavior in 
response to the increase in evidence destruction sanctions. 
The second derivative of deterrence is: 
 
.  (21) 
 
This second derivative is always negative, signifying that the positive 
incremental effect of increasing s on deterrence is decreasing in the 
level of s. As noted in the text, this is because increasing s increases 
deterrence by virtue of its effect on the infra-margin, and this infra-
margin decreases in ex ante importance as s increases. 
( ) ( )2 1 ˆ 0qq l qf bs −∂ ∆ = − <∂
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The convexity of social welfare when the social objective is 
primary activity incentives also may be masked by other effects. Such 
effects include the two considered above for truth-finding—density 
effects and cost effects—as well as complications that may follow 
from the possibility that safe product designers will still find 
tampering worthwhile, as discussed in Section A.3. In addition, this 
effect can be confounded by countervailing curvature in the way the 
level of deterrence ∆ enters overall social welfare. But there is no 
more reason to think that any of these effects works against the 
convexity we have identified than to think that it works with it. And 
the foregoing analysis therefore justifies at least a theoretical 
presumption—albeit empirically rebuttable—that the primary activity 
approach is consistent with satisfaction of the second-order conditions 
at middling levels of enforcement. 
 
